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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Joon Park 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
School of Music and Dance 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Music, Motion, and Space: A Genealogy 
 
 
How have we come to hear melody as going “up” or “down”? Why does the 
Western world predominantly adopt spatial terms such as “high” and “low” to distinguish 
musical notes while other non-Western cultures use non-spatial terms such as “large” and 
“small” (Bali), or “clear” and “dull” (South Korea)? Have the changing concepts of motion 
and space in people’s everyday lives over history also changed our understanding of musical 
space? My dissertation investigates the Western concept of music space as it has been shaped 
by social change into the way we think about music today. In our understanding of music, 
the concept of the underlying space is so elemental that it is impossible for us to have any 
fruitful discourse about music without using inherently spatial terms. For example a term 
interval in music denotes the distance between two combined notes; but, in fact, two sonic 
objects are neither near nor far from each other. This shows that our experience of hearing 
interval as a combination of different notes is not inherent in the sound itself but 
constructed through cultural and social means. In Western culture, musical sound is often 
conceptualized through various metaphors whose source domains reflect the society that 
incubated these metaphorical understandings. My research investigates the historical 
formation of the conceptual metaphor of music. In particular, I focus on historical 
formation of the three underlying assumptions we bring to our hearing of music: (1) “high” 
v 
and “low” notes and motion between them, (2) functionality of musical chords, and (3) 
reliance on music notation. In each chapter, I contextualize various music theoretical 
writings within the larger framework of philosophy and social theory to show that our 
current understanding of musical sound is embedded with the history of Western culture. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Our current conceptualization of music depends upon a framework in which musical 
objects are related with reference to space.  This is assumption so elemental that it is 
impossible to have any discourse on music without using inherently spatial concepts such as 
“high” and “low” pitch, intervals between pitches, and inversion of their relations. Also, the 
modern concept of harmony, as a “sounding together” of different musical objects, contains 
a question regarding the location of the different harmonious objects. The same goes for the 
concept of melody; it is a succession of single notes located above or below one another. At 
a more basic level, a musical note—the most fundamental building block of Western 
music—is not only a unit of musical sound, but also carries the potential for motion. Notes 
are distinguished from one another based on their locations in conceptual musical space. 
Yet, we all know that sounds are not actually high in the air or low on the ground, nor are 
there spatial intervals between them or inversions among them. Nevertheless, the metaphors 
have been naturalized; when a melody is described as moving up or down, we do not need 
to unpack the metaphor of high and low as they map on to the different pitches of 
corresponding frequencies; we just intuit its meaning. Many music theorists, musicologists, 
ethnomusicologists, philosophers, and neuroscientists point out that the spatial 
conceptualization is merely one of many ways to talk about, and understand music.1 In 
Western culture, however, the absence of competing models of conceptualization made the 
                                                 
1 Among many contemporary sources, see in particular Larson (2012); Zbikowski (2002); and 
Gjerdingen (1994). For a more historical account, see Lee Rothfarb’s chapter in Cambridge History of 
Western Music Theory (2002) and Zukerkandl’s Sound and Symbol (1956). 
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spatial understanding of musical objects subsume all other possible ways to organize musical 
sound in our minds. 
 
My dissertation is a genealogy of the contemporary understanding of musical space 
from its birth in ancient Greek philosophy through to twenty-first century theories of music. 
Since Late Greek antiquity and early medieval periods, the spatial understanding of musical 
sound, disguised as the only way to hear music, impacted the entire demographic of Western 
culture. Most importantly though, it formed how music theorists think about music; the 
people who constructed the system of conceptualizations in a transmittable form. Within the 
system, a musical note came to be understood as an entity in a void-like space. Following the 
Greek concept of monad, as the indivisible and the most fundamental unit of being, a 
musical note became a sonic monad of which more complex events are built. Along with the 
concept of monad, a concept of space was formed as it was needed to allow for the potential 
complexity of the monad. The concept of a note as an entity in space offered a possibility of 
imagining another note simultaneously occupying the same space. In other words, Western 
polyphony (in the widest application of the meaning, as non-monophony) is built on the 
assumption that there exists a space in which more than one note can simultaneously occur. 
Without the spatial conceptualization and the treatment of a note as a single entity, the sonic 
element we call polyphony, or more broadly, harmony, would just be considered as a single 
sonic element of its own. We sometimes experience this outside of musical contexts, such as 
in the case of a dial-tone or train whistle. Although we can parse out the different pitches 
that constitute a dial-tone or a train whistle, our immediate intuition is rarely to hear it as a 
combination of two distinct sounds. Rather, the process of parsing out is only applicable 
after projecting a musico-spatial filter to the sonic materiality of the dial-tone or train whistle. 
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The musico-spatial reinterpretation enables commensurability between different types of 
sound. The reason that we can relate the sound of a piano and a violin, (or any other 
combination for that matter) as operating in a single conceptual canvas, thereby creating a 
harmony, is because we normalize the raw sonic materials (piano- and violin-ness) into a 
feature that is commensurable, a difference in frequency ascribed onto vertically-oriented 
space.2 The vertically-oriented space is quantified so that it is possible to measure the vertical 
distance (the height) of a pitch. Other musical aspects are either quantifiable in different 
measure—as in the case of duration, or not quantifiable at all in musical terms as in the case 
of dynamics. However, these aspects do not acquire a meaningful interpretation without a 
note which they are ascribed to. It is always discussed as duration and dynamics of a note. In 
other words, other aspects of music are modifiers of a spatially defined note.  
In general, establishing commensurability between two distinct objects requires this 
kind of normalization which enables the act of comparing with the same tools of 
measurement. This is how Aristotle was able to relate a house and a bed in Nicomachean Ethics 
(5.5.1133a6-14) and also why Karl Marx needed to establish socially necessary labor-time as a 
common measure of all commodities in Capital (1990, 129). In the musical context, the most 
relevant establishment of commensurability was done in the context of Pythagorean-Platonic 
                                                 
2 Although it is not the main scope of my work, it is worth noting that temporal unfolding is ascribed 
onto horizontally-oriented space. Preconditioned by ancient Greco-Roman writing practice, the left-
to-right orientation of temporal unfolding was the default mode of any script writing in Western 
tradition. This, in turn, preconditioned the non-temporal aspect of the music (which ended up being 
a difference of pitch) to be ascribed in the vertical space. This observation becomes more meaningful 
when compared with the ancient East Asian practice of writing practice which ascribes the temporal 
unfolding on to vertically-oriented space—the opposite from Western practice. I think the vertical 
writing practice of East Asia is imposed by the writing surface, narrow strips of wood or bamboo. 
The vertical growth of these writing surfaces embodies the temporal changes as vertical, not 
horizontal.  
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ontology. In the Pythagorean-Platonic view of the world, the essence of every being and the 
relationship of beings in the world can be expressed in numbers and ratios. Therefore, the 
study of number was the study of the essence of the universe. There are four different 
studies of number: arithmetic—study of discrete number, music—study of numbers in 
proportion, geometry—study of continuous magnitude, and astronomy—study of 
magnitude in motion. In this Greek epistemological context, the discipline of music is first 
defined as a study of ratio. Through the use of number, the musical object was first defined 
as an inherently commensurable concept. The concept of space, therefore, was not 
necessary, nor systematized because musical objects moved not spatially but quantitatively. 
However, throughout the history of Western music, philosophical, scientific, and 
technological discourses and interventions have altered the concept of space dramatically.  
My dissertation accounts for these reorientations in intellectual history as they impact the 
critical study of musical sound. 
The document will comprise three main sections, each investigating crucial moments 
in the history of music which shaped the way we think about space.  The second chapter, 
“The Greek Monochord and the Birth of Musical Space,” investigates the epistemological 
ground in which the concept of musical space emerged. Drawing from Andrew Barker’s 
comment on Aristoxenus’s “movement,”3 David Cohen’s work on Aristotelian “directed 
                                                 
3 Barker argues that Aristoxenus’s emphasis on perception suggests categorical difference between 
the meaning of the word “movement” (κίνησις) used in Elementa Harmonica and the contemporary 
understanding of the motion in musical context. The former denotes motion as change of place felt 
by the listener and the latter denotes motion as “physical events or processes that might give rise to 
them.” (1989, 132n37) Cohen (2001) also cites Barker’s note as part of the summary of Greek 
understanding of motion and its application in music. 
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motion” (2001, 139),4 David Creese's work on the role of the monochord in ancient Greek 
harmonic science (2010),5 and Bernard Stiegler’s recent writings on technics, I reinvestigate 
the role that the monochord played in the conceptualization of musical space among the 
earliest Greek writers on music. Used as a “venerated tool of speculative canonics” 
(Christensen 2001, 5) I argue that the movability of the bridge on the monochord's stretched 
string was crucial to the development of a new meaning for motion in the musical context. 
This new meaning of motion, recontextualized by the use of the monochord and 
disseminated by the flourishing of script writing in the early medieval period, contributed to 
the formation of Western pitch space that is still the dominant mode of musical 
conceptualization today. Primary sources will include Plato’s Timaeus (Strunk and Treitler 
1998, 19–23), the “Euclidean” Sectio canonis (Barker 1989, 190–208), Aristoxenus’s Elementa 
harmonica (Barker 1989, 119–198), and Ptolemy’s Harmonics (Barker 1989, 270–391), in order 
to show the broadening definition of “motion” in the musical context and its relation to the 
way the monochord is described. 
A stretched string with a movable bridge, the monochord offers us a bodily basis 
within which motion can be interpreted in terms of space. In the context of the Aristotelian 
definition of motion as an interaction of potentiality and actuality, change of place is one of 
the four species of motion, but was not used in musical contexts. Instead, when the word 
“motion” (κίνησις) was used, it referred to a change of quality (i.e. a man becoming musical). 
As we shall see, even in the Euclidean Sectio Canonis, motion is still not defined in spatial 
                                                 
4 See especially his footnote one for the summary of Aristotelian concept of motion and its various 
application by Pythagoras-Plato, Aristotle, Aristoxenus, and Theophrastus. 
 
5 Creese argues that the physical nature of the monochord instigated geometrical thinking into 
ancient harmonics.  
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terms. The motion described in these documents more closely resembles vibration. It is 
important to note that although these documents discuss the monochord, there is no 
mention of its construction—there is no description of the moveable bridge. Compare these 
with Ptolemy’s Harmonics, which offers a more embodied description involving the shifting 
of a bridge as a way of generating a different ratio–thereby moving to a different pitch. As 
the change of ratio is recontextualized as change of location, a pitch is concurrently 
understood as an entity navigating through pitch-space determined by ratio. Drawing 
attention to the classical and antique definitions of motion—too often read uncritically in 
musicological literature—I aim to demonstrate the critical role that the monochord played in 
the solidification of the concept of space.   
The third chapter, “the Genealogy of Musical Function” investigates the emergence 
of musical function in eighteenth and nineteenth century theoretical treatises. In this section, 
I argue that the rise of function as the organizing principle of musical composition is situated 
with and influenced by the changing mode of production from craftsmanship to industrial 
production. Contrast to the craftsmanship model where one artist oversees the entire 
process of production, the newly emerged industrial production segmented the process of 
production into many steps. This change inspired the metaphorical conceptualization of a 
musical work as a combination of various objects where the quality of the production hinges 
on the lawful behavior of the internal objects.  
To present the conditions that made this metaphor possible, I begin by making the 
distinction between identity and function of a musical object. By looking at music theoretical 
treatises of Jean-Philippe Rameau (1726), Georg Joseph Vogler (1802), and Gottfried Weber 
(1830), I will show the process in which the three terms dominant, tonic, and sub-dominant 
change their meaning. I argue that, in Rameau’s theory, these three concepts did not 
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distinguish where they are located in vertical pitch-space and how they are connected in 
horizontal time-space. This, however, began to change following Vogler’s introduction and 
Weber’s popularization of the Roman numerals. As Roman numeral had exclusively denoted 
a location in vertical pitch-space, the pre-existing terms (dominant, tonic, and sub-dominant) 
became exclusively used for horizontal designation; this eventually made these terms a 
functional designation. With two systems operating at two different spheres, a musical chord 
that both systems refer to was solidified into an inseparable entity thereby becoming a basic 
building block of composition. The primacy of a triad over a note was further increased as 
the concept of the overtone series was adopted by music theory of the time. The two 
observations that a major triad can be represented by its chordal root and the root contains 
the major triad via overtone formed a feedback loop out of which came the notion that a 
triad is a natural phenomenon, not an artificial combination of tones. 
This ontological solidification of a musical chord is met with another, similar, 
process at the other end: the emergence of the musical work-concept. As observed by Lydia 
Goehr (2007) and other historians, a musical composition started to become an entity that is 
regulative where the boundaries of the concept are clearly set. This shifted the focus of 
compositional theory since the eighteenth century from how to emit a consistent affect 
through the rules of rhetoric to how to fit musical objects within the boundaries of a 
compositional framework. In this context, coming up with a logical connection from one 
chord to another and one formal section to another, with the goal of a finished work became 
the main concern. This led to the investigation of the function of each part. 
I conclude this section with the claim that we, as human beings in an industrial 
society, conceptualize a musical composition as an industrial product. A musical chord and it 
function are conceptualized as a worker and a task (respectively) in a factory. The fulfillment 
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of each step generates a product which is designed beforehand. This underlies that the 
behavior of the internal part affects the quality of the final product. And because each step is 
distinguishable, a quality of a composition can be controlled after the process of production. 
This provided the epistemological ground for two seemingly contradictory movements; one 
is Werktreue and the other is the practice of revision. This also provided the ground for the 
ownership of the musical work by the composer, not the publisher. As the internal 
components are considered to be the workers in the factory, the composers saw themselves 
as the rightful owner of the product. 
The fourth chapter, “Reflection on (and in) Strunk’s Tonnetz,” investigates current 
music theory’s reliance on notation. By surveying various branches of Neo-Riemannian 
analysis in light of a jazz music theorist Steven Strunk’s adaptation (Strunk 2003), I show the 
assumption of notationality of musical sound. In Neo-Riemannian analysis, there are three 
major operations (parallel, relative, leittonwechsel) that can be applied to any major or minor 
triad. Although originally defined as vertical inversion of a triad (a “contextual” inversion) by 
Hugo Riemann in the nineteenth century, Neo-Riemannian analysis breaks the bond of unity 
of triad and treats these operations in the realm of voice-leading. Although Neo-Riemannian 
theorists still acknowledge the contextual inversion as the origin of the operations, their 
focus was never the inversion of a triad, but a voice-leading of a chord-tone. The Neo-
Riemannian theorists continued this idea by constructing a geometrical mapping of these 
relations that created a torus-like network, for which they adopted the term Tonnetz. From 
this origin, a Tonnetz became a representational surface where a musical notes are arranged so 
that certain relationship between chords and chord tones are brought out. This meant the 
operation of voice-leading would still be done in a staff notation; only the result is 
transferred onto the Tonnetz. Strunk’s article redefines the three operations without any 
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reference to contextual inversion on staff paper, thereby treating the Tonnetz as an 
operational surface, not a representational one. Rooted entirely in geometrical terms, he 
based his theory not on Riemannian contextual inversion, but on “a college geometry text” 
(49). By doing so, he was able to relate two seventh chords (Major-major and Minor-minor) 
that are not contextual inversions of each other.  
In this chapter, I argue that the unique relationship between notation and music in 
the jazz context led Strunk to rethink the conventional use of the Tonnetz. I believe that 
Strunk’s insistence on proper terminology is informed by jazz performance practice, which 
has an entirely different conceptual origin than that of conventional Neo-Riemannian 
methodology. Instead of relying on notationally-based contextual inversion and 
parsimonious voice-leading (the two “foundational topic[s] for Neo-Riemannian literature”), 
Strunk focuses on the function of the chord—in other words, how the chord sounds in 
context. This consideration for the sonic dimension can be observed not only in Strunk’s 
analysis but also in the field of jazz analysis in general.  By reflecting on Strunk’s use of the 
Tonnetz, I investigate Strunk’s reconceptualization of Neo-Riemannian theory in order to 
shed light on the loose relationship between notation and music in a jazz analysis. 
This chapter is in two parts. In the first half, I investigate the methodological 
difference between the conventional and Strunkian uses of the Tonnetz by focusing on the 
degree to which they rely on notation. Second, I explore the weaknesses of Strunk’s method 
by demonstrating the potential inconsistency of treating the Tonnetz as a purely geometric 
surface, and also its strengths by demonstrating new relations made possible by Strunk’s 
method. In particular, the Strunkian Tonnetz is especially powerful to draw a visual 
connection between two Z-related sets when they are represented as asymmetrical figures on 
10 
a Tonnetz. More broadly, I show that a more geometrically grounded conception of the 
Tonnetz allows us to visualize the inner-interval structure of pitch-class sets. 
I have selected the topics of these chapters because each of them represents 
fundamental assumption of Western music: spatiality, functionality, and “notationality” (i.e., 
the notion that musical sound is representable through staff notation). Among the three 
topics, the spatiality of musical sound is perhaps the most primordial in our musical thinking. 
Without the assumption of spatiality of musical sound, the ontological ground of a note (i.e., 
the background structure that makes the idea of a note possible) falls apart. Without 
spatiality, there will be no note, chord, harmony, notation, and, quite possibly, what we know 
today as “music.”6 The concept of the underlying space turns all change of pitch into the 
motion through the musical space. We no longer hear change from one note to another in 
terms of loosening and tightening as the ancient Greeks did. It is conceptualized as moving 
(of a note) from one place to another. Likewise, the concept of functionality of musical 
motion turns all motion into either functional or non-functional. This function/non-
function dichotomy is perhaps more commonly understood as structure/embellishment 
dichotomy. Under the assumption of functionality, all musical notes are determined as to 
how significant their contribution to the overall form is. When a composition is reduced 
down to its essential voice-leading (and this voice-leading reduction is still considered to 
carry the essence of the composition in some way), the ground for this reducibility of 
musical notes is the assumption of function inherent in the notes themselves; and this 
function is determined according to how they move. And, finally, the criteria for the motion 
                                                 
6 Of course, this is not to say that the artful creation of sound relies on the notion of spatiality—it is not. Our 
prototypical concept of music, however, is dependent upon the spatial reinterpretation of sound. 
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of musical note are set by the staff notation. The musical distance that a note travels can be 
quantifiably measured only because the motion is defined by the note’s notationality. My 
discussion on notationality investigates further the concept of musical motion by looking at 
Steven Strunk’s analysis that does not entirely rely on the notationality of musical motion. In 
this case, the assumption of notationality is proven negatively by studying its counter 
example. The type of music Strunk analyzes (i.e., jazz) somehow forces him to reinvent non-
notational musical motion because its ontological ground is different from that of classical 
music. Because the oral (and aural) tradition of jazz is considered superior to its written 
counterpart, the analysis of jazz must also consider unwritten aspect of its work-concept. 
Given the rise of popular music analysis in recent years in music theoretical discourse, 
Strunk’s departure from the notationality of musical motion can be considered as the 
watershed moment in the music theory scholarship. Ultimately, by investigating in what 
historical context these assumptions were constructed, I hope to show our musical intuition, 
no matter how personal it may seem to us, is shaped by our everyday experience as a social 
being.  
The study of musical space is also the study of space in general. The different ways in 
which musical space has been constructed and conceptualized throughout the Western 
music-theoretical tradition are closely correlated with the history of the metaphysics of 
space. As the discussion of space is rarely at the forefront of musicological writing, my 
investigation of spatial conceptualizations will not only shed light on the concept of space in 
musical discourse, but also provide direct insight into how the concept of space has been 
construed throughout Western intellectual history. As my study will show, the study of 
12 
musical space will elucidate how our musical thought has always been intertwined with the 
development of philosophy, science, technology, and society. 
  
13 
CHAPTER II 
THE GREEK MONOCHORD AND THE BIRTH OF MUSICAL SPACE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation traces how musical sound has come to be understood in terms of 
its location in an imagined musical space. I will trace the concept of musical space from its 
inception in ancient Greece to a branch of twenty-first century music theory commonly 
known as “Neo-Riemannian” analysis. When dealing with historical documents, details such 
as dates, authors, authenticity, the reception of the document, and the document’s 
transmission history usually help anchor the document at a certain time period and place, as 
well as align it within a cultural and philosophical school of thought. This chapter in 
particular demands an additional disclaimer regarding the historiography, or more 
specifically, how I approach Greek and Medieval writings. As with most ancient and 
medieval sources, it is extremely difficult and unsatisfying to try to discover every detail 
possible. It is common that the author of a treatise is either disputed or remains unknown 
when it comes to the early sources.7  
It is for this reason that I do not intend to treat the writings as a product of one 
specific creative mind, or even as a product of one stand-alone discipline, but rather, as a 
product of the given time period. This frees me from ambiguities of authorship and allows 
me to investigate the philosophical thoughts and mental conceptions available at the time, 
                                                 
7 Many scholars of Greek and Medieval music has already commented on the inherent limitations of 
the historical sources. See Treitler 1992, Thomas J. Mathiesen’s “Greek Music Theory” (Christensen 
2002, 112-135), and Barbera 1990. 
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which ultimately shaped the way the music was understood.8 It is, of course, a conscious 
choice of action, but also it is an inevitable choice for two reasons: (1) the aforementioned 
inherent limitation of the historical sources and their authorship, and (2) the amalgamated 
nature of ancient Greek music theory.  
In ancient Greece, the study of music was not delineated as a stand-alone discipline. 
None of the writers on music during that time period wrote exclusively on music. Instead, 
most Greek music treatises were written alongside treatises on arithmetic, geometry, and 
astronomy. These four subjects made up what is known as the Quadrivium, four disciplines 
which could be conducted through number. Even in Aristoxenus’s treatises (such as Elementa 
Harmonica and Elementa Rhythmica), which criticize the idea of generating musical pitches 
from a purely numerical (not sonorous) basis, we cannot readily assume that music was 
treated as a discipline of its own right outside of the Quadrivium because Aristoxenus still 
considered music as part of a larger philosophical context. Therefore, when investigating the 
emergence of the musical space-concept, one must negotiate historical documents that may 
not exclusively discuss music. It is important to consider philosophical and mathematical 
writings at the time to fully understand in what intellectual context the concept of musical 
space emerged.  
For Greek and Medieval music theorists, a simple construction of a monochord, a 
single stretched string with a movable bridge in the middle, made possible the conversion of 
sound into number. Through the division of the string (achieved by moving the bridge at 
                                                 
8 This approach models after the historiography of French philosopher Michel Foucault (1977a, 
1977b, 2002) which he called initially “archeology” and later “genealogy.” Nearly all of his intellectual 
output avoids human agency. Instead, he investigates historical documents to explore what kind of 
knowledge was possible at the time of writing. Therefore, an author’s creative genius is reconsidered 
as a transcription of possible thoughts at the time. 
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different positions), the ratio of 2:1 became an interval of an octave; the ratio of 3:2 became 
an interval of a fifth; and so on. Instead of a wind instrument, which produces different 
pitches depending on the velocity of the air (size of the column of air), a monochord offered 
a controlled environment in which the cause of the sonic difference could be demonstrated 
visually. Although the construction of a monochord was later adopted as a musical 
instrument known as tromba marina around the sixteenth century, for Greek and Medieval 
music theorists, the study of the monochord was never about musical performance but 
rather about numerical relations. To explain the relationship between Greek music theory 
and the monochord more clearly, let me use an analogy employing objects that are familiar 
to us. In many ways, this relationship is similar to that of a computer processor and a 
monitor. A computer processor is a unit which performs calculations and the monitor is just 
an output of the result. Ancient Greek music theory calculates the musical concord with 
numbers and the monochord is just an output of the result. In other words, for Greek music 
theorists, the information flows unidirectionally from ratios to sound, and sound that was 
not a result of numerical ratios was not considered part of the discourse of music. In this 
regard, the treatises on the monochord freely adopted proofs and axioms from earlier 
mathematical treatises while also adopting ideas from treatises on music and philosophy. 
In this chapter, I argue that the physical experience of using a monochord, especially 
the experience of moving the bridge of the monochord, introduced a new conceptual model 
which was far less abstract than the different modes available at the time. This new 
conceptual model was defined by the motion of the monochord’s bridge. As the numerically 
defined musical notes were mapped on to the monochord, change from one note to another 
was reinterpreted as a change of space, rather than a change of number. This reinterpretation 
was not done in any one specific treatise but rather over a significantly long period of time 
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and by multiple authors, whether knowingly or not. As we shall see, the treatises which 
explain music through the monochord began as simple lists of axioms, but, over time, 
developed into more complex and physical descriptions which involved instructions on how 
to construct the monochord and how to move the bridge to generate the desired sound. 
Although the Greek writers did not consider the monochord as a source of new musical 
ideas, mapping different musical notes onto a continuous line (according to their numerical 
properties) nevertheless instigated a new way of thinking through musical sounds. Following 
the alignment of musical notes, what was previously considered as purely numerical change 
became numerical and spatial change. As the derivation of musical notes relied on the 
monochord with growing prominence during the early history of Western music, the musical 
notes gradually became increasingly spatial in nature. Alongside this gradual epistemological 
shift, the interest in spatial representation of musical sound grew, which ultimately lead to 
Western musical notation. Western musical notation, then, is a tool which stripped away the 
explanatory power of the number and ratio in music and gave the power to the visual 
representation of musical sound. Now, the understanding of musical sound no longer hinges 
upon knowing the underlying numerical relations, but instead hinges upon knowing the 
spatial relations of the sonic entities. 
To claim that the monochord played the crucial role in shaping the concept of 
musical space implies that the concept of musical space had not existed before the 
prominent use of the monochord; or, the musical space-concept was different from our 
own. It is difficult to provide the definite proof for this implication, however, close 
observation of how a musical note is described can shed light on how music was understood 
before, and during the early stages of, the dissemination of the monochord treatises. In most 
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Greek writings, a musical note was described as being acute (ὀξύς, oxýs) or grave (βαρυς, 
varys) based on what we would call its “highness” or “lowness.” In some occasions, it was 
described as being black or white. According to the Pythagorean and Platonic understanding, 
the quality of a musical note is determined by its underlying numerical property. When the 
number increases, for example, the pitch becomes more acute or whiter. All of these early 
conceptualizations of musical sound can be understood without referring to the location of 
the musical note. For example, an acute note can turn grave, a white note can turn black, and 
a numerically small note can become large, all the while not invoking any sense of the change 
of place. In other words, these adjectives do not require the concept of musical space. On 
the other hand, the Greek words for “high” such as “ἄνω (ánō)” and “ὑψηλός (hypsēlós)” and 
“low” such “βραχύς (brachýs)” and “ταπεινός (tapeinós)” were not used to describe the quality 
of a musical note.9 The only instance that I could find where the inherently spatial terms 
were used is in Aristoxenus’s treatises where he uses words such as “raising (ἄρσις, ársis)” 
and “lowering (θέσις, thésis)” of a foot to describe a musical beat and also “interval (διάστημα, 
diástēma)” to describe the distance between two musical notes. However, lacking any 
references to vertical space when describing a pitch of a note, Aristoxenus’s musical space 
would be significantly different from ours. (Later in this chapter, I will further investigate 
                                                 
9 Here, I did not consider the note names assigned to the strings of a lyra or other instruments 
because they refer to the specific strings, not the quality of sound. Also, although the common 
translation of the note names, such as the “highest note (ὑπάτη, hypátē),” may seem to suggest some 
spatial connotation, we cannot readily assume that it refers to “highness” in spatial sense. It seems to 
me that the word “highest” in this context may refer to “supreme” or “profound” because the same 
word is often used to describe the Greek god Zeus in Homer’s Odyssey (“supreme ruler,” “ὕπατε 
κρειόντων,” 1.45) and Iliad (“supreme god,” “θεῶν ὕπατος,” 19.258). (Keep in mind that the Greek 
“highest” note is our “lowest sounding” note.) Also, when the pitch is raised from this note it is 
described as “tightening (ἐπίτᾰσις, epítasis)” of the note instead of referring to any vertical motion. 
For example, see Cleonides’s description in section 2.4 later in this chapter.  
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Aristoxenus’s musical space.) According to our current understanding of musical sound, we 
consider a pitch to be “high” or “low” and a melody to be “in motion.” Additionally, a 
harmony is represented and understood as a vertically-oriented sonic simultaneity.10 All of 
these descriptions of musical sound become meaningless if we do not assume the underlying 
space in which these sonic objects are placed. No matter how elemental it may seem to us, 
the Western contemporary understanding of musical sound is not the only way that a 
musical sound is conceptualized in the rest of the world. It is, therefore, not “hard-wired” in 
our brain to hear a sound in exactly the same spatial terms. Therefore, no matter how often 
the Greek words are translated into inherently spatial terms such as “high” and “low,” close 
reading of the original texts always suggests that we cannot impose our spatial understanding 
of musical sound upon the Greek sources. What becomes evident from the treatises that I 
examine is that the Western way of hearing a musical note as an entity in musical space 
emerged alongside the growing popularity of the division of the monochord.  
This chapter is in two large sections containing several small subsections within. 
First, I will sketch the intellectual context of musical sound in ancient Greece by outlining 
two closely related concepts: the Greek concept of motion and the Greek concept of 
number. Second, I will survey the Greek monochord treatises to highlight the growing 
interest in the physicality of the monochord, and I will investigate how this growing reliance 
                                                 
10 We may still use terms that may signify other modes of conceptualization (e.g., sharp and flat, or 
grave and aigu in French). However, these terms are largely used as an attribute to a musical note; and 
the musical note that these terms describe is still considered as a point in a space. Similarly, the 
descriptors of the dynamics such as loud and soft also work as the attributes of spatially defined 
notes. In other words, if we think about exactly what entity is perceived as sharp, flat, grave, aigu, loud, 
soft, and etc., we would arrive at the conclusion that it is the musical note(s) that these adjectives 
describe. Therefore, at the basis of these descriptions, there still lies the inherent spatial 
understanding. 
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on the monochord shifted the epistemological ground of music from numerical to spatial. 
The primary sources that I will look at for this chapter include some early treatises that are 
not solely dedicated to music, but treat music as part of a larger philosophical context, such 
as Plato’s Timaeus (Strunk and Treitler 1998, 19–23), Aristotle’s Physics, Metaphysics, and De 
Anima, and those that are dedicated solely to music, such as Aristoxenus’s Elementa Harmonica 
and Elementa Rhythmica, the Euclidean Sectio Canonis, Cleonides’s Isagoge Harmonike, 
Nicomachus of Gerasa’s Inchiridion, and Ptolemy’s Harmonica. 
The first section is in three parts, and it begins with reviewing the secondary 
scholarship. Although, little research has been done regarding the influence of the 
monochord on the emergence of the concept of musical space during the Greco-Roman era, 
there are significant studies that focus each topic separately. By summarizing these studies 
briefly, I position my research at the intersection of two studies: the study of technology and 
the history of ideas. By doing so, I advocate for the critical reflection on the role of 
technology when considering the history of ideas. I will, then, investigate how music may 
have been understood in the Greek philosophical context by focusing on the usage of the 
word “motion (κίνησις, kínēsis)” in the Greek music treatises. As mentioned earlier, the 
Greek writings on music suggest that music was perhaps understood within an entirely 
different conceptual framework than the present-day understanding. By focusing on the 
word “motion,” which did not mean “change of place” in musical context, I hope to 
highlight the difference between the Greek and the present-day conceptualization of music. 
And by way of comparison, I hope to investigate the Greek conceptualization of music.  
Then, I will examine the Greek concept of number in order to elucidate its influence 
on the early concept of musical note. Throughout the early formation of harmonic science, 
mathematical knowledge incubated musical concepts to grow. This means that in order to 
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understand the Greek musical concepts, one must consider their mathematical background, 
in particular, the Greek concept of number. As we shall see, the Greek concept of number 
directly impacted how the musical notes and concords were understood within the 
Quadrivium. Since the Greek concept of number is based on its countability, the study of 
number did not allow for the possibility of a number in between two integers. For example, 
the number “1.5,” as an entity between the numbers “1” and “2,” would not have been 
possible. This conceptual difference is crucial in understanding the Greek concept of musical 
note because the study of music was the study of proper ratios, a discipline closely associated 
with arithmetic. Together, I will show that the word “motion” in Greek musical context did 
not necessitate an underlying space, or at the very least, the concept of musical space in 
ancient Greece meant something entirely different from present-day understanding. 
Furthermore, I will show that due to its reliance on numbers, Greek musical motion (both 
spatial and numerical) is not a smooth change but a quantized and discontinuous change. 
In the second section, I will argue that the sustained use of the monochord in the 
context of the Quadrivium formed the basis of our current understanding of musical motion 
and the space in which this motion takes place. In particular, two essential concepts: (1) the 
notion that the identity of a musical note is determined by its position in imagined musical 
space (i.e., a note is “high” or “low”) and (2) the fact that what is represented as a note does 
not form a correspondence with the sound itself unless a spatial structure is imposed, would 
not have been possible without the use of a stringed instrument with a movable bridge, as in 
the case of the monochord. I will first show how the study of ratio was associated with 
musical sound. Then, I will investigate how the monochord was employed in early treatises 
to show that, at the outset of its adaptation, it was situated firmly within the study of ratio 
and number. Here, I argue that the physical experience of operating a monochord was, 
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perhaps, considered an inessential at first to the study of number. Then, I will trace the 
growing description of the physical property of the monochord to show that the act of 
generating a different pitch through the shifting of the bridge may have inspired a new 
heuristic interpretation of the cause of the change of pitch.11 Through the use of the 
monochord, the more abstract notion of change of underlying numerical property might 
have mapped onto the more experiential notion of change of place wherein the previously 
preferred ratios became nodes of sonic possibility in two-dimensional space. Finally, I will 
suggest that this spatial recontextualization of musical sound was developed alongside, or 
perhaps even was responsible for, the realization of speech as having both a semantic 
element and a sonic element. As the two distinct properties of a voice were being 
recognized, the role of written words were concentrated as an agent of meaning, and the 
sonic element of speech was rendered meaningless. This recontextualized the upward or 
downward strokes as the signs for intonation of speech, which prefigured the early neume 
scripts. By comparing the semantic structure of various early musical notations traditions 
such as (1) the Greek musical notation from the Epitaph of Seikilos, and (2) the early spatial 
notation from the Carolingian treatises such as Musica Enchiriadis and Aurelian of Réôme’s 
Musica Disciplina, and also (3) early chant notations, I hope to lay bare the influence of spatial 
                                                 
11 This observation is informed by heuristics and biases research in the field of cognitive psychology. 
More specifically, the use of the monochord can be considered within the framework of “an 
attribute-substitution model” designed by Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick (2005). An 
attribute-substitution model of heuristic judgment “assumes that difficult questions are often 
answered by substituting an answer to an easier one.” (269) For example, a hypothetical question 
“what is the numerical relationship between two pitches?” may be substituted by the question “how 
much should I move the bridge to change one pitch to another?” Given the presence of the 
monochord, the second question is far easier to answer. Kahneman and Frederick write, the “process 
of attribute substitution is a general feature of heuristic judgment; that whenever the aspect of the 
judgmental object that one intends to judge (that target attribute) is less readily assessed than a related 
property that yields a plausible answer (the heuristic attribute), individuals may unwittingly substitute 
the simpler assessment” (269). See also Kahneman 2011. 
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thinking instigated by the use of the monochord in the historical formation of musical 
notation, and more broadly, the emergence of the musical space-concept.  
 
2.2. SECONDARY SCHOLARSHIP  
Regarding the scope of this chapter, two branches of secondary scholarship should 
be considered. As we shall see, both branches exemplify a common tendency among music 
scholars to treat tools and technology as somewhat inferior to historical people and their 
writings. Within this intellectual context, the monochord has not been seriously considered 
as a source of new musical ideas, and the role of inspiration has been largely accredited to 
the writers of the music treatises. The two branches of music scholarship are (1) the study of 
the monochord itself and (2) the study of the emergence of the musical space-concept. The 
amount of scholarly interest for the first category is somewhat underwhelming considering 
the long history of the monochord. Perhaps, the relative lack of discourse on the Greek 
monochord in today’s music scholarship more clearly exemplifies the tendency of elevating 
people over tools. For this reason, the study of the monochord was largely considered within 
the study of the monochord treatises. The earliest North American scholarly writing on the 
monochord is the doctoral dissertation by Cecil Adkins (1964).12 This work traces theoretical 
and practical applications of the monochord spanning 2500 years of Western music history 
since Classical Antiquity. As a seminal study seemingly dedicated solely to the monochord, 
his dissertation centers around how the monochord was constructed and used, according to 
                                                 
12 Many scholars point to Wantzloeben (1911) as the first scholarly writing dedicated to monochord. 
In this brief monograph, Wantzloeben discusses how the monochord was used from Classical 
Antiquity to the Renaissance. 
23 
various music treatises. In doing so, however, the monochord itself is never the subject of 
critical reflection. Instead, the research focuses on the practitioners of the monochord and 
how they used it. In other words, the monochord, as a tool, is never considered seriously as 
a source of inspiration. André Barbera’s writings, especially his 1991 book, the Euclidean 
Division of the Canon, explores the Greek monochord through a survey of historical 
transmission of the treatises Sectio Canonis, the first treatises explaining the division of the 
monochord (1991). He summarizes the historical transmission of Sectio in terms of three 
branches: (1) as the semi-independent version written in Greek, (2) as it appears in 
Porphyry’s commentary on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, and (3) as it appears at the beginning of the 
fourth book of Boethius’s De institutione musica. The purpose for his research is clear: to 
construct a critical text and translation of Sectio Canonis. Throughout the book, he carefully 
delineates the three branches by providing separate diagrams used in different source 
traditions and by annotating the translation with an alternate version of the text. Again, his 
research is crucial in understanding how the text of the treatise, Sectio Canonis, would have 
been read by later musicians, but it mostly remains a study of the treatise, not the 
monochord.13 Recently, David Creese, a scholar of classical studies, researched the influence 
of the monochord in Greek mathematics. His work is one of few writings on the Greek 
monochord which does not perpetuate the bias against the influence of technology (Creese 
2010). He observes the challenges and reconciliation of employing a geometric, thus 
                                                 
13 Various other translations of Sectio Canonis, most notably those by Thomas J. Mathiesen and 
Andrew Barker are also primarily studies of the treatise rather than of the monochord itself.  
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continuous, instrument in the context of Greek harmonics, which is a study of discrete 
number. He summarizes his book as follows:  
The geometricisation of harmonics, in its various aspects, was 
the inevitable result of attempts to make compelling 
mathematical arguments for the use of numbers and ratios as 
a language and analytical tool for the investigation of 
harmonic structures with the assistance of an instrument 
which represented numbers and notes as measurable visible 
distances. (Creese 2010, 356)  
 
At many levels, his research is similar to mine, in that he focuses on the change in mental 
conception instigated by the use of the monochord. However, his discovery is mainly in the 
change of mathematical thinking, not the musical one. Therefore, he does not answer the 
question of how the monochord shaped our understanding of music. To summarize, existing 
scholarship on the monochord has not fully considered the musical influence of the 
monochord.14  
The scholarship of the second category, study of the emergence of the musical 
space-concept, also has not considered the influence of the monochord on how we think 
about music. Marie-Elizabeth Duchez (1979) has attempted to understand the 
transformation of musical designations from acute and grave to high and low through 
genealogies of the descriptive terms themselves. I see two limitations when considering 
Duchez’s research in context of the historical formation of musical space. First, Duchez’s 
research considers mostly the change in the usage of the descriptive terms as opposed to the 
change in the underlying episteme. Second, there seems to be a tendency to elevate the 
influence of the written words over the technical tools. Although Duchez acknowledges, 
                                                 
14 In the Cambridge History of Western Music, Jan Herlinger provides an overview of the monochord 
tradition, especially its use in Medieval and Renaissance music treatises. This would be a great starting 
point for anyone who is interested in studying the monochord and its later adaptation. 
25 
very weakly, the slight possibility that the Greek monochord may have played a role in the 
construction of musical space, it is quickly dismissed. (Notice the weak verb tense, “could 
have accepted,” in the following quotation.) 
A côte de cela, la Théorie pythagoricienne des intervalles, 
avec les divisions au monocorde des cordes et des tuyaux, 
aurait pu accepter de dénominations de caractère spatial: mais 
ni les pythagoriciens canoniciens, ni les constructeurs 
d'instrument n'avaient besoin d'images spatiales des sons et 
de leurs relations: théoriquement et pratiquement, les 
nombres, réalités instrumentales concrètes et caractéristiques 
ontologiques des sons, leur suffisaient. (Duchez 1979, 59) 
 
[T]he Pythagorean theory of intervals, with the division of 
strings of the monochord and the division of the tuyaux [a 
kind of measuring windpipe], could have accepted denominations 
of spatial character, but neither the Pythagorean canonists, 
nor the constructors of the instruments needed spatial images 
of sounds and their relations; theoretically and practically, the 
numbers, the reality of concrete instruments, and the 
ontological characteristics of sounds would suffice. 
(translation and emphasis mine) 
 
According to her understanding, the relationship between the technical tools, the 
monochord and tuyaux, and the “ontological characteristic of sounds” only allows the 
influence from ideas to tools and does not afford the possibility of the tools inspiring new 
ideas. Michael Walter (1994) also investigates the historical formation of musical space and 
also focuses mainly on the written words. He investigates the word spacium as it was used by 
different writers of the Medieval era to show the changes of its reference from physical 
space (on a page or on an instrument) to the imaginary musical space. However, he does not 
set out to answer why spatial terms such as spacium and intervallum came to be used in musical 
contexts in the first place. In fact, he separates the terms that had and had not been used in 
musical writing and thus considers the word intervallum (which literally means between walls) 
to be non-spatial in musical contexts. In contrast, I find the word intervallum to be a Latin 
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translation of the Greek word diastema (which means “distance”), which is inherently spatial. 
This over-reliance on the written words blinded the historical musicologists from 
considering the monochord as a source of new ideas.  
The recent reevaluation of technics in the creation of new ideas therefore offers 
much insight into the emergence of the musical space-concept.15 This new trend stems from 
the interest in the influence of technology in the field of critical theory. I have considered 
two main intellectual threads when considering the influence of technology on the way we 
think: Karl Marx and Bernard Stiegler. Marx writes in Capital: 
Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the 
direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also 
lays bare the process of the production of the social relations 
of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from 
these relations. (Marx 1990, chap. 15) 
 
In particular, when looking at Greek musical writings and their transmission of the ideas, the 
study of technics becomes crucial because the music-theoretical ideas of the time were not 
reified and systematized through writing practices. However, the monochord had been the 
most common tool for the Pythagorean-Platonic study of music during the first millennium 
of Western music theory. French philosopher Bernard Stiegler takes Heidegger’s view on 
equipmentality further and observes the importance of looking at the relationship between 
technics and heritage when he writes  
The experience of an animal is lost to the species when the 
animal dies, while in a life proceeding by means other than 
life, the being’s experience, registered in the tool (in the 
                                                 
15 An American historian and philosopher Lewis Mumford is another key contributor for the study 
of the influence of technology. In particular, the word “technics” is first used by him in order to 
adopt associate meaning of the Greek tekhne (Mumford 1934). The word “technics” refers to not 
only technology and the skill necessary for the technology, but also the relationship between the 
society and technology. 
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object), becomes transmissible and cumulative: thus arises the 
possibility of a heritage. (Stiegler 2008, 4) 
 
Musical notation is also a kind of technique that Stiegler would consider to generate a similar 
relationship. However, the lack of stand-alone musical notation in ancient Greece and the 
fact that the practice of notation changed from “aspatial” to spatial during the early history 
of Western music strongly suggests the role of non-notational techniques in the 
conceptualization of musical sound. The monochord, then, becomes a critical element in 
shaping the Western understanding of music because it is the instrument continuously 
referred to throughout the history of Western music theory up to and including the 
Renaissance. 
 
2.3. THE ANCIENT-GREEK CONCEPT OF MOTION 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the suggestion that ancient Greek thinkers did not 
consider a musical note in terms of an underlying space is that there is an abundant use of 
the word “motion” (κίνησις, kínēsis) in Greek music treatises. Motion, as we moderns 
understand it, involves a change of place or position. Even in the case when the word 
“motion” is used metaphorically, as in the case of melodic motion, its meaning is entangled 
with physical motion. In other words, when we say, “the melody goes up,” we are referring 
to an upward physical motion.16 When there is motion, it necessitates, at least, two different 
                                                 
16 There are abundant resources dealing with this conceptual metaphor. See Larson 2012 (61–81), 
Cox 1999, and Zbikowski 2002. 
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points of location: the point of origin and point of destination. In other words, motion as 
change of place is only possible in spatial terms for us.  
The meaning of the word “motion” in Greek contexts, however, was not limited to 
change of place. Instead, it meant broader categories of change as resulting from an 
expression of potential energy. According to Aristotle, motion is “the fulfillment of what 
exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially” (Aristotle, Physics 3.1.200b33-4). This broader 
definition gave rise to different realizations of motion, of which change of place is only one. 
David E. Cohen summarized the Greek concept of motion as follows: 
The word translated as “motion,” kinēsis, was used by 
Aristoxenus’s teacher Aristotle as a general term sometimes 
denoting all four of the species of change (metabolē) that 
Aristotle recognizes (change of substance, quantity, quality, 
and place) but more properly denoting only the last three of 
these, the last of which is what we usually mean by “motion,” 
i.e., change of spatial location or local motion. (Cohen 2001, 
139)17  
 
Because of this broader definition of motion, we cannot readily assume that Greek writers 
thought in terms of an underlying space when they used the word “motion.”18 The only 
case in which motion necessitates this underlying space is when it referred to a change of 
place. Therefore, it is important to pinpoint exactly what each writer meant for the word 
“motion” in each context. At times, it was used to mean something close to the physical 
sense of the word, the physical progression of expansion and contraction of the air, as in the 
                                                 
17 Cohen refers to several passages from Aristotle’s Physics regarding this summary. See Aristotle, 
Physics 5.1, esp. 225a34–b9; 5.2, esp. 226a23 ff.; and idem., Metaphysics, 11.11–11.12, esp. 1067b12–
1068a16; 12.2, 1069b9–13. 
 
18 Of course, we cannot assume that all Greek writers were using the word “motion” as Aristotle 
intended. Perhaps, more sensible way to look at it would be that Aristotle was trying to form a 
coherent explanation of various usages of the word. In either case, it is clear that the word motion 
does not mean change of place exclusively. 
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case of Aristotle’s De Anima: “what has the power of producing sound is what has the power 
of setting in movement a single mass of air which is continuous from the impinging body up 
to the organ of hearing” (Aristotle, De Anima 2.8). At times, it would mean the vibration of a 
string, as in the case of the Euclidean Sectio Canonis (Mathiesen 1975): “of motion, there are 
more frequent and the intermittent; and the more frequent make acute notes, the 
intermittent, grave [notes].”19 Here, since the character of a note is determined by the 
frequency of the motion, the motion would be something like the rate of vibration of the 
string.20 In the case of the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition, movement from one note to 
another would have been considered a change of numerical property, a quantitative change. 
The theoretical structure which enabled the writers in this tradition to attach numerical 
property to sound is outlined by Andrew Barker (1989). He writes,  
[T]he application of mathematical concepts to musical 
phenomena is mediated by a physical theory that re-identifies 
the entities under discussion, perceived in the guise of notes, 
as movements in a material medium. It is to these movements 
that the quantitative characteristics can be attached directly. 
(Barker 1989, 8)  
 
This Pythagorean-Platonic view dominated much of Greek music theory and theorists, 
including the writer of Sectio Canonis, Nicomachus of Gerasa, and Ptolemy. These three 
writers were especially influential to later medieval music theorists because their treatises 
                                                 
19 Although the treatise Division of a Monochord is listed here with Euclid as the author, the 
authorship of the treatise is now contested. For this reason, when I refer to the original text of the 
treatise, I refer it as “the Euclidean Sectio Canonis” throughout this dissertation. 
 
20 As mentioned earlier, “acute” and “grave” are common descriptors of pitch difference which 
corresponds to the present-day “high” and “low.” Later in this section, I will discuss Greek 
conceptualization of pitch difference further. 
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were compiled, adopted, and integrated into Boethius’s De Institutione Musica, possibly the 
most widely read music treatise in the Medieval and Renaissance eras.21 This is important 
because through the numerical interpretation, the musical notes were considered scientific, 
thereby persisting as the unaltered ordering of musical notes in Greek and Medieval music 
treatises. From this investigation, we shall see that, for Greek thinkers, the essence of 
musical notes was numerical in nature. 
 
2.4. ARISTOXENUS’S CONCEPT OF MUSICAL SPACE 
Perhaps Aristoxenus was the one who came the closest to the use of the word 
“motion” in a spatial sense. His clear dissatisfaction with the contemporary explanations of 
music, which were overly dependent on number, may have prompted him to embark on a 
study of music that is purely experiential.22 He was among the earliest, if not the earliest, 
writers on music who used the word “motion” or “movement” as change of location (τόπος, 
topos); he also used the word “intervals” (διάστηματα, diastēmata) to denote the discrepancies 
between two notes. These terms were, however, used in conjunction with non-spatial 
adjectives that were commonly used to describe pitch characteristics: acute (ὀξύς, oxýs) and 
grave (βαρύς, varýs). It is important to clarify the meaning of words that are inherently spatial 
                                                 
21 Calvin Bower (1989) suggests that much of Boethius’s De Institutione Musica is a translation of 
Nicomachus of Gerasa’s lost treatise called On Music. He supports his suggestions on these grounds: 
Boethius frequently mentions Nicomachus in the treatise; Nicomachus’s surviving treatise, Manuale 
Harmonices, is in accordance with Boethius’s work; and it is a known fact that Boethius’s treatise on 
mathematics, De Institutione Mathematica, is a translation of Nicomachus’s mathematical treatise. 
 
22 It is clearly evidenced in his criticism against the harmonicists’ tendency to “close-packing” 
(καταπύκνωσις, katapyknosis) of notes, a tendency to arrange all possible musical notes according to 
their numerical property. Nearly all Greek and Medieval treatises on the monochord ends with a 
diagram of “closely-packed” notes. See Aristoxenus, Elementa Harmonica 1.7.25. 
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in Aristoxenus’s two treatises Elementa Harmonica and Elementa Rhythmica because many later 
treatises such as Cleonides’s Isagoge Harmonike, Aristedes Quintilianus’s De Musica, and 
Gaudentius’s Harmonic Introduction  (Strunk 1998, 66–85) adopt Aristoxenus’s terminology as 
well as the way the treatise was organized. Close reading of Aristoxenus’s treatises will show 
that the spatial terms were originally used metaphorically to describe forward-and-backward 
motion on a “road” (ὁδός, hodós), where each extremities lead to “acuteness” and 
“graveness.” However, these spatial terms were recontextualized as the later treatises 
attempted to reconcile Pythagorean-Platonic tradition with Aristoxenus’s writings. In the 
end, the forward-and-backward motion on a road were reconeptualized as upward-and-
downward motion on a vertical space wherein the height was determined by the numerical 
properties of the musical notes.  
To begin, I cite two passages from Aristoxenus’s Elementa Harmonica. 
First of all, then, the prospective student of melody must 
analyse the movement of the voice, its movement, that is, 
with respect to place [topos], for there is not just one variety of 
this movement. The voice moves in the kind of movement I 
have mentioned both when we speak and when we sing 
(since high [“acute,” ὀξὺ, oxý] and low [“grave,” βαρὺ, varý] 
are obviously present in both of these, and movement with 
respect to place is that through which high and low come 
about), but the two movements are not of the same form. 
(Barker 1989, 127) 
 
First of all, then, we must discuss the different kinds of 
movement with respect to place [topos], and try to understand 
what they are. While every vocal sound can move in the 
manner mentioned, there are two forms of this movement, 
the continuous and the intervallic. In the continuous form the 
voice seems to perception to traverse a space [topos] in such a 
way as never to stand still even at the extremities themselves, 
at least so far as its representation in perception is concerned, 
moving continuously to the point of silence; whereas in the 
other, which we call intervallic, it seems to move in the 
opposite way. During its course it brings itself to the rest at 
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one pitch and then at another: it does this continuously (I 
mean continuously in respect of time), passing over the 
spaces bounded by the pitches, but coming to rest on the 
pitches themselves and sounding them alone, and is described 
as singing, and as moving in intervallic motion. (Barker 1989, 
132) 
 
From these quotations, we can see that there is no doubt in Aristoxenus’s description that he 
was thinking about sound, more precisely the human voice, in spatial terms. However, it is 
also clear that Aristoxenus’s musical space is somewhat too unquantified to resemble our 
own. As it can be observed elsewhere in the treatises, and also is pointed out by scholars, 
such as Andrew Barker and Thomas J. Mathiesen, that the unquantified nature of 
Aristoxenus’s musical space is due to his belief that “the science begins from the data 
presented to perception and grasped by it as musical” (Barker 1989, 4)23 In other words, 
Aristoxenus sought to explain what makes certain sound more (or less) musical. In 
determining the musicality of sound, all he relied upon was his own ears. 
Based on the two quotations above, I will conjecture Aristoxenian conceptualization 
of musical space in order to better understand Aristoxenus’s prose and also to contrast his 
view to the present day conceptualization of musical space. Although the words “acute” and 
“grave” are readily translated as high-pitched and low-pitched, it would be a mistake to 
assume that these words would have any association with verticality to Greek people. It is 
because Aristoxenus does not use “high” and “low” in his treatises on harmony, but reserves 
them for his treatise on rhythm, Elementa Rhythmica. When dividing chronos (musical time) into 
a perceptible unit, or the “foot” (πούς, poús), he describes each unit as involving upwards 
                                                 
23 See also Mathiesen’s discussion (1999, 294-344). 
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(ἄνω, ánō) and downwards (κάτω, kátō) motion.24 It seems that it was the translator’s decision 
to modernize the Greek adjectives. The terms used in Elementa Rhythmica are clearly 
associated with highness and lowness as he later associates them with lifting (ἄρσις, ársis) and 
stepping (βάσις, básis). With vertical space occupied with the rhythmic foot, we are left with 
horizontal (left and right) and sagittal (front and back) spaces to imagine acuteness and 
graveness of a note.25 It is less likely that Aristoxenus had in mind a mapping which 
corresponds left or right with acuteness or graveness because of Greek music notational 
practice. As Greek musical notation was inscribed atop a script, left-and-right space was 
probably associated with temporal progression. This leaves us with sagittal, (forward-and-
backward) space, which is more likely what Aristoxenus’s musical pitch-space would look 
like. Different pitches mapping onto sagittal space correspond to his metaphorical use of the 
word “road” (ὁδός, hodós) when describing the magnitude of intervals. Especially in the third 
book of the Elementa, towards the end (theorems 17–19), he uses the word “road” 
extensively as a way to explain acuteness and graveness. Here, I cite the theorems only, 
without Aristoxenus’s explanations. (All of the available English translations of the treatise 
translated the word “road” as “progression,” and “acute” and “grave” respectively as 
“upwards” and “downwards.”26)  
                                                 
24 Aristoxenus, Elementa Rhythmica 2.17. For original text and translation, see Aristoxenus (1990, 11). 
 
25 Although it may not be entirely historically sensitive, horizontal, vertical, and sagittal spaces would 
corresponds to our x-, y-, and z- axes. 
 
26 This includes both Andrew Barker’s and Henry S. Macran’s. It was Mathiesen’s paraphrase of 
Aristoxenus’s discussion on the size of intervals that I came to notice the literal meaning of the word. 
(1999, 332) 
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17. From the ditone there are two progressions [ὁδoὶ] upward 
[ὀξύ] and one downwards [βαρύ] 
 
18. From a pyknon, conversely, there are two progressions 
downwards and one upwards 
 
19. From a tone there is one progression in each direction, to 
a ditone downwards and to a pyknon upwards (Barker 1989, 
178–9). 
 
With pitch space as oriented forward and backward, we can delve deeper into the earlier 
quotations from page nine. We first need to imagine two different locations that acuteness 
and graveness occupy. As we imagine ourselves standing in front of a road, each end of 
which leads to acuteness and graveness, we can better understand what Aristoxenus meant 
by “two movements” at the end of the first quote (Barker 1984). With this conceptual 
model, the second quote becomes less abstract. The continuous form of the voice, which is a 
speaking voice as opposed to singing voice, “traverses a space [topos] in such a way as never 
to stand still even at the extremities themselves,” which means the voice moves forward and 
backward (i.e., up and down in the modern sense) without resting at a single point. “At the 
extremities,” the continuous voice does not stand still, meaning that a speaking voice does 
not end with a single perceptible pitch. On the other hand, the intervallic voice of a song 
“brings itself to the rest at one pitch and then at another.” It is as if the continuous voice is 
moving on a ramp whereas the intervallic voice moves on stairs where each step is clearly 
separated. 
This observation brings a more nuanced meaning to the word “interval” (διάστημα, 
diástēma) in Aristoxenus’s treatise. Since the word diástēma could mean distance in a non-
musical context, it may carry a similar connotation in musical context. Since we can measure 
the distance when we assume two different fixed points, when the voice moves without 
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resting at one point, the measuring of distance is difficult, if not impossible. Also, it is not 
the musical interval in the way that we conceptualize it today, but a distance between two 
points in a way we think of distance between, say, New York City and Boston. It also 
changes the meaning of the word “motion” (κίνησις, kínēsis) slightly. When moving within an 
interval, Aristoxenus’s motion resembles a walking motion, in which it is the perceiver’s 
body that moves. Referring back to the earlier discussion of the concept of motion, 
Aristoxenus’s use of the word is more physically based. It is not the change of quality, 
quantity, or substance that generates different pitches. It is that we move forward and 
backward on the road of pitches, and when we rest at one point, that pitch where we stand 
becomes perceptible. 
In her dissertation on the medieval remakings of Boethius’s De Institutione Musica, 
Elizabeth Ann Mellon (2011) comments on the section of Boethius’s treatise that is 
equivalent to the quoted paragraphs above. She observes that since Aristoxenus’s 
categorization of voice into continuous and intervallic, nearly every writer paraphrased this 
passage to the point that, “for a medieval reader without access to actual Greek texts, 
essentially all Greek music theory handed down to them contained that passage” (Mellon 
2011, 49). She follows that, however, “after the sixth century, this passage virtually 
disappears from the Western music theoretical tradition” despite the fact that “so many 
[other] arcane details are preserved.” She offers her explanation on the ground that, around 
and after the time of Boethius’s writing, the human voice, especially the verbal nature of 
song, was situated uncomfortably in between two disciplines: music and grammar.27 As the 
                                                 
27 I will discuss later in this chapter that there was another disciplinary competition on the status of 
the human voice, between arithmetic and geometry. The emphasis on the distinction between 
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first chapter of her dissertation shows, in this disciplinary competition, the human voice was 
“more securely grammatical than musical in Boethius’s era” (25). Therefore, Aristoxenus’s 
categorization of voice would no longer be suitable in the discipline of music and music 
treatises of the Late Antiquity and Medieval era.  
Here, I offer additional explanation of the omission of the Aristoxenian 
categorization of voice. From as early as second century C.E., theorists such as Cleonides, 
Nicomachus, and Ptolemy had attempted to reconcile the theories of Aristoxenus and 
Pythagorean-Platonic tradition (concentrated in the monochord treatises). However, amidst 
this reconciliation, some of Aristoxenus’s explanation, especially the aforementioned road 
metaphor, might have not been considered essential, and thus discarded.28 As I will explain 
later in this chapter, this reconciliation nevertheless integrated Aristoxenian spatial thinking 
with Pythagorean-Platonic numerical reinterpretation of musical sound, thereby creating a 
musical space in which its different locations are numerically ascribed; and this is the system 
that was carried over to Late Antiquity and Medieval music treatises. It is clear that by the 
time of the writing of Musica Enchiriadis and other Carolingian treatises (around the tenth 
century), musical space was vertically oriented where each extremity represented “high” and 
“low.”29 Without the access to Aristoxenus’s original text which helps unpack the metaphor 
                                                 
continuous and intervallic also shows Aristoxenus’s attempt to categorize music as arithmetical in 
nature as oppose to geometric. See section 2.3 for in-depth discussion.  
 
28 It is true that in Cleonides’s Isagoge Harmonike and in Nicomachus of Gerasa’s Manuale Harmonices, 
there are no mention of the road metaphor while continuous and intervallic movement of the voice 
are treated in more abstract terms in both treatises. 
 
29 Even though the pitch space began to be vertically oriented by tenth century, there were 
intellectual quandary as to which extremes were oriented at which end. As many of the diagrams of 
the monochord and Greater and Lesser Perfect System during this time period show, what we 
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he used here, a medieval reader would have considered the Aristoxenian division of voice 
overly abstract. Also, as the concept of musical motion became more vertically oriented, the 
sagittal orientation of Aristoxenian motion might have been considered incompatible, or at 
the very least, caused confusion in the readers’ mind. 
Thus far, we have seen different possibilities in which the word "motion" can mean. 
As the realization of an entity's potential energy, the Greek concept of motion includes 
change of substance, quality, quantity, and place. According to the Pythagorean-Platonic 
view of music, it was usually assumed that musical motion was quantitative in nature as 
musical sound is considered a realization of its numerical property. Although the 
Pythagorean-Platonic view dominated many music-theoretical writings in Ancient Greece, 
Aristoxenus offered a contrasting, and compelling, model of musical space which provided 
experiential and phenomenological interpretation and demonstration of musical 
understanding. In this view, musical motion is physical in nature and one can traverse within 
an interval; and based on the way one moves, different "shades" of genera can be generated. 
However, we have to remind ourselves that his musical space does not resemble our own in 
many ways. Our vertical mapping of the pitch difference (i.e., high pitch is “high” and low 
pitch is “low.”) combines Aristoxenian spatial thinking and Pythagorean-Platonic numerical 
relation. Therefore, it is important to investigate the Greek concept of number and its 
influence on the shaping of musical space.  
  
                                                 
consider as “low” pitch was often located at the top and “higher” pitches followed downward from 
it. For extensive historical survey and investigation on the two different orientations of verticality 
during the Medieval era, see Atkinson 2009. 
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2.5. THE GREEK CONCEPT OF NUMBER 
The most relevant, and perhaps most distinctive, difference between the Greek and 
the present-day Western concept of number lies in the possibility of divisibility. We allow for 
a theoretically infinite possibility of numbers in between two integers by using longer and 
longer decimals. In between the numbers “1” and “2,” there is “1.5”; in between “1” and 
“1.5,” there is “1.25”; and so on ad infinitum. However, in the Greek concept of number, 
each number was understood as a representation of a countable object. As we shall see, such 
reliance on countability rendered the division between integers impossible, or at the very 
least, pointless. In this section, I will first present a more detailed description of how the 
concept of number came to be in Ancient Greek philosophy. Then, I will expand the 
description to include the ontologies of Pythagorean and Platonic traditions in order to 
investigate the intellectual context in which the discipline of music was situated. In particular, 
I argue that the use of the monochord intensified the disciplinary contest between arithmetic 
and geometry over which was to be the theoretical foundation of the discipline of music. 
Originally instituted as the study of ratio, music was arithmetical in nature; but the repeated 
use of the monochord and the division of the string challenged the indivisible nature of the 
arithmetic concept of number in favor of the divisible geometric concept of number. 
Perhaps the most extensive analysis on the Greek concept of number was done by 
Jacob Klein in Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra ([1986] 1992, kindle edition; 
this book will be cited with Kindle location number, e.g., Kindle Location 500). In his book, 
he traces the historical formation of the mathematical formal language that is currently in use 
as the basis of modern physics. He criticizes the scholarship on Greek mathematics from his 
time, claiming that it does not acknowledge the conceptual difference between Greek and 
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modern mathematical thought. He writes that, “most of the standard histories attempt to 
grasp Greek mathematics itself with the aid of modern symbolism, as if the latter were an 
altogether external form which may be tailored to any desirable ‘content’” (Kindle Location 
250). As we can see from his criticism of contemporary scholars on Greek mathematics, his 
goal is to “rehearse the actual course of its genesis” (Kindle Location 250) as it would have 
happened. For this reason, he does not rely on modern mathematical concepts when 
analyzing Greek mathematical thought; and he presents the concept of number as the 
ancient Greek philosophers would have understood it. He does this by investigating an 
extensive collection of Greek mathematical writings that includes works by the 
Pythagoreans, Euclid, Plato, Aristotle, Nicomachus, Theon of Smyrna, and Domninus of 
Larissa. I will refer to his research heavily in the following section, as I believe it will provide 
much-needed insight into the Greek concept of number, a seemingly perplexing subject. 
In his discussion on the concept of Greek arithmetic, he cites various passages from 
Greek sources, summarizes them, and provides examples to explain how number would 
have been conceptualized in Ancient Greece. He writes, 
The fundamental phenomenon which we should never lose 
sight of in determining the meaning of arithmos (ἀριθμός) is 
counting, or more exactly, the counting-off, of some number of 
things. These things, however different they may be, are 
taken as uniform when counted; they are, for example, either 
apples, or apples and pears which are counted as fruit, or 
apples, pears, and plates which are counted as “objects.” Insofar 
as these things underlie the counting process they are 
understood as of the same kind. That word which is 
pronounced last in counting off or numbering, gives the 
“counting-number,” the arithmos of the things involved ([1986] 
1992, Kindle Location 1220). 
 
This explanation may not prove so difficult to comprehend because it is largely experientially 
based. For example, when we say there are a dozen doughnuts in a box, we are using one 
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whole doughnut as a unit of measurement to count how much of the unit is present. The 
number “dozen” only applies when we take the unit of measurement to be one whole 
doughnut. If we try to specify the content further by saying that there are four glazed 
doughnuts, four jelly-filled doughnuts, and four apple fritters, each type of doughnut then 
becomes a new unit of measurement. From this practice of “counting-off,” the Greek 
concept of number originated. 
The concept of “pure” numbers began to form as that which enables the act of 
counting. To continue with the example of doughnuts, the fact that there is the same 
number of glazed, jelly-filled, and apple fritter doughnuts brings out the sameness among the 
three types, namely the “four-ness.” And, the fact that we can assign the number four to 
each group of the different types of doughnut inspires the realization that there are two 
domains when it comes to counting: one is the domain in which one assigns the property of 
number to the things being counted, the other domain is the property of number itself. As 
Klein shows, “the continual practice of counting and calculation gradually fosters within us 
that familiarity with numbers and their relations which Plato terms ‘arithmetic and logistic 
art’ and which enables us to execute any operation of counting or calculating we wish” 
([1986] 1992, Kindle Location 1321) The fact that we can “execute any operation of 
counting” on various objects, in other words, that we can assign the property (i.e., the 
number) to countable things, began the study of that which is being assigned. As Klein puts 
it, “of what are these the numbers?” (Kindle Location 1321) 
So began the study of number, arithmetic. In ancient Greece, the core concern of the 
discipline that was called “arithmetic” was not what we now consider to be its core concern, 
namely: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. The distinction between the 
Greek understanding of calculation and arithmetic is summarized by Klein: by compiling 
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evidence from Neo-Platonic sources, such as, (1) the reference of Proclus and (2) of the 
Charmides scholium to Plato’s instructions for teaching children to calculate, (3) the examples 
given in the Olympiodorus and (4) the Gorgias scholium (Kindle Location 329), he concludes 
that, 
In calculation that result alone, which varies as the given 
multitudes vary, matters. But the possibility of calculation is 
grounded in certain immutable characteristics of the numbers 
“themselves.” With these arithmetic deals, which does not 
“calculate” with numbers but studies their properties and 
kinds as they are in themselves, not as they may be read off 
the countable things. Calculation with numbers is nothing but 
the “application” of the facts of “pure” arithmetic; logistic is 
nothing but “applied” arithmetic, which serves, above all, 
practical ends. (Kindle Location 524) 
 
What was considered to be arithmetic was the study of numbers themselves, as in the study 
that involves the proof that certain numbers are prime numbers. In short, it was the study of 
the nature of the numbers. In order to serve a function of being assigned to the objects in 
the world, there needed to be a concept of number that was “empty and pure,” so to speak; 
the core concern of arithmos was the study of these “pure” numbers. In other words, since 
the objects are things that are perceivable, the numbers must be things that are prior to 
perception, or things that exist only in reason. Klein calls this (things that exist only in 
reason) nóesis (“noetic,” in adjective form), from the Greek word νόησις (nóēsis), which 
generally means intelligence and understanding. The act of “counting-off,” as a Greek 
concept, assigned the Greek notion of number not only a noetic nature, but also a countable 
nature. Just as one doughnut becomes a unit when counting doughnuts, the number “one” 
became the noetic unit for all number. For this reason, the Greek concept of number did not 
allow division of the number one. For Greek thinkers, dividing the unit of number is 
pointless and irrelevant to the study of number. To use the doughnut example one again, 
42 
when determining how many doughnuts there are in the box, splitting one doughnut into 
two halves is a meaningless act. The number one was the unit of number, the indivisible 
monad which makes number possible; and through the multiplication of this noetic unit, 
number was conceptualized. As Aristotle wrote in Metaphysics, “number is a plurality of 
units.”30 
With the realization of the concept of the “pure” unit of number, the Pythagorean-
Platonic ontology was founded.31 As Pythagoreans and Platonists saw, order, or “(well-) 
ordered arrangement” (τάξις, táxis), decides “the condition of being a ‘world’” (Kindle 
Location 1623). Conversely, we can order things in the world because “the things ordered 
are delimited with respect to one another and so become countable” (Kindle Location 1623). 
In other words, we can only say things are in order when we can distinguish one thing from 
the other. Since the study of number encompassed what made number possible in the first 
place, the study of number was simultaneously the study of distinguishing things in the 
world. Therefore, the study of number could become the study of the world. As Aristotle 
summarizes the Pythagorean metaphysics, “number is the essence of all things.”32 To 
summarize, because all things are measured with the same unit of number, all things can be 
ordered well in the world.  
                                                 
30 “ἀριθμὸς πλῆθος μονάδων.” Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1053a.  
 
31 Klein distinguishes the two philosophical traits in his discussion. For the current investigation, I 
will use the term Pythagorean-Platonic to denote a philosophical idea that was originated from 
Pythagorean school and later adopted by Platonic school. For more detailed inquiry, see Klein (1986) 
1992, chap. 7. 
 
32 “ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν πάντων." Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.987a.  
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This Pythagorean-Platonic ontology resonated throughout the history of Western 
music until the Renaissance. Especially, the issue of (in)divisibility was situated at the center 
of the music treatises and challenged the writers of the treatises to either face the issue head-
on (as in Ptolemy’s Harmonica), propose a new, non-numerical theory of music (as in the 
works of Aristoxenus), or omit it altogether (as in the Euclidean Sectio Canonis). More 
broadly, this issue placed music in between the two disciplines, albeit somewhat 
uncomfortably: arithmetic (study of the discrete numbers) and geometry (study of the 
continuous magnitudes). Music was, first and foremost, the study of ratio. It was the study of 
the relationship between two discrete numbers. This means that only numerically prescribed 
notes were considered as viable musical possibilities. Although, the monochord can generate 
more musical notes, the concept of number and music limited the potential of the 
monochord. However, the geometric nature of the monochord, as it would be described as 
“the division of the monochord,” continuously challenged the arithmetic nature of music.  
 
2.6. PARAMETERS OF MUSICAL SPACE 
In the present day understanding of musical space, there is a sense in which one note 
can become another through some sort of an operation. In other words, all the musical 
notes are within the same conceptual plane. Since this notion is extremely natural to us, we 
might need a counter example to demonstrate a different method of organization. Consider 
the letters of the alphabet “B” and “C,” for example. With their identity within the alphabet, 
“B” can never become “C.” Although they are part of the same group, they are not 
commensurable to each other as musical pitches are. They can be considered to be 
neighboring letters, but they are still two different entities with different characteristics. 
Now, take the same letters but consider them as musical notes “B” and “C.” In this case, 
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“B” can truly become “C” if we raise it up a half-step, or at least the idea of sound that was 
represented with the letter “B” can become “C.” We can even think of the case which is not 
possible to represent with letters, as in the case of the quarter tone between “B” and “C.”33 
Since the essential domain is a musical sound, all the operations (raising, lowering, or 
remaining) are done to the sound, or the sound imagined. The letters are mere 
representations of the sound, a front-end of the ephemeral event.  
The commensurable nature of the pitched musical sound, that the musical notes are 
conceptualized under the same unit of measure, is interdependent with the spatial nature of 
musical sound. The spatial nature of musical sound manifests two-fold: (1) the distinction 
between two notes are spatially defined, and (2) the identity of a note is determined by its 
location on a space. First, consider the two aforementioned pitches, “B” and “C.” The fact 
that we can imagine an infinite number of sounds in-between the two pitches signifies that the 
two notes are conceptualized as two points on a continuous line, a geometrically oriented 
concept. Contrasting this with the alphabet, which is conceptualized as a collection of 
discrete entities, musical notes are understood as points on a line of possible sounds. The 
line is extended infinitely and there is no gap on the line, at least in theory. Second, we 
identify the notes as being “high” or “low.” Considered this way, how musical notes relate to 
each other is unique and complex; the history goes back to the Pythagorean understanding 
of musical sound. 
Where did the commensurability of musical notes come from? Since when could a 
musical thinker of the Western culture see with his or her mind’s eye one note becoming 
                                                 
33 There is another interesting way to look at what is between “B” and “C.” If you look at a Standard 
English keyboard, there is “V” in between the two letters.  
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another? Also, what conceptual apparatus must one musical note go through to become 
another? I hope to answer these questions by looking at the parameters of our musical space 
and comparing them with what would have been possible with the introduction of the Greek 
monochord to Greek harmonic theories. To begin, we shall scrutinize our present-day 
conceptualization of musical sound. 
It is obvious that we all think differently. However, this should not discourage us 
from pursuing how we, each as an individual but as an individual within a certain cultural 
tradition, think about musical sound. The mere fact that we can communicate and describe 
music with language should indicate that there are common parameters within which we all 
think. The question, then, is realizing what those parameters are. We all become accustomed 
to the parameters without anyone prescribing them. People learn them differently based on 
their musical tastes, as well as in relation to the social and ethnic groups they belong to. It is 
for this reason that the general parameters that can be applied across the board must be, 
well, general. For example, in some Classical traditions (and certainly in an undergraduate 
music theory class), what is called a “leading tone” must resolve up.34 This very prescribed 
and specific parameter applies to a wide range of Classical music, but the repertoire that this 
parameter does not apply to is certainly larger if we consider the music from Western culture 
in its entirety. However, the fact that there is a concept of a note and the fact that a note can 
go up and down applies to most, perhaps all, of Western music. Additionally, an individual 
who grew up in the Western cultural tradition would apply these parameters when listening 
to music even when the music is not necessarily from Western culture. From this, we can 
                                                 
34 This means that the sound that functions as “ti” (as in solfège, do-re-mi-fa-sol-la-ti), has a high 
tendency to be followed by what functions as “do,” a note half-step above. 
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deduce two elemental parameters of Western musical thinking which pertain to the scope of 
this study: commensurability and spatiality. What I mean by commensurability is that one 
note can become another; by spatiality, I mean that the identity of a note is determined by its 
location in an imagined musical space. These two parameters are related, in that, in order for 
a note to become another note, there must be a certain property that defines their identity so 
that one note is distinct from another. At the same time, in order for the range of possibility 
of a note to be realized as a space of some sort, the note that would later be considered as 
being in the space must be changed, or moved, in a way that the space is recognizable. In 
other words, we cannot see or feel space unless there is a motion within that space. And 
through the motion, we can deduce the parameters of the space.35 
 
2.7. MOTION AND THE MONOCHORD IN ANCIENT GREEK MUSIC 
TREATISES 
“Vocum Differentias in Quantitate Consitere” (that difference of pitches consists in 
quantity).36 Boethius’s fourth book of De Institutione Musica begins with the above disclaimer 
followed by an excerpt from the Euclidean Sectio Canonis translated in Latin. Considering that 
the excerpt mostly maintains the original text, the addition of the above disclaimer may 
strike readers as odd because that sentence is nowhere to be found in earlier versions of the 
                                                 
35 Although not directly related to the scope of this dissertation, Henri Lefebvre (2000) summarizes 
this relationship between space and motion. He writes, “Let everyone look at the space around them. 
What do they see? Do they see time? They live time, after all; they are in time. Yet all anyone sees is 
movements. In nature, time is apprehended within space” (95–96). 
 
36 The translation is taken from Barbera 1991 (228–229). Barbera translated the word “vocum” as 
“pitch” because the corresponding Greek word seems to be a polysemic word phthóngos (φθόγγος). 
Depending on the context, phthóngos can mean note, pitch, voice, and sound.  
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Sectio Canonis. Why did Boethius (or the scribe) feel it necessary to add such a disclaimer at 
the beginning of the division of the monochord? Why did he begin the division of the 
monochord with the declaration that it is quantity that results in the difference of pitches? 
In this section, I argue that the growing interest in the physicality of the monochord 
and the increasing reliance on the monochord as a tool to generate musical notes 
recontextualized the identity of a musical note from numerical to spatial in nature. More 
broadly, the growing popularity of the monochord shifted the disciplinary status of music 
from being associated with arithmetic to being more closely associated with geometry. In 
this context, a change of musical note was no longer a change of quantity, but a change of 
location. Throughout the process of this recontextualization emerged the musical space-
concept because the change of location necessitated the underlying space in which the 
change occurred. I believe that the aforementioned disclaimer in Boethius’s De Musica 
signifies that Boethius, as a Neo-Platonist, attempted to maintain the disciplinary status of 
music as arithmetically oriented because it was how the discipline of music was originally 
envisioned in Pythagorean-Platonic tradition.37 The emphasis on quantity in the above 
statement should remind medieval readers that quantity only applies to objects that are 
countable, and the study of countable entities is arithmetic. The above statement should also 
                                                 
37 There is a possibility that the above sentence may not have been written by Boethius. As 
mentioned earlier, this disclaimer could have been written by Nicomachus as Bower (1989) suggests 
that Boethius’s De Musica may have been a translation of Nicomachus’s lost treatises On Music. If this 
is the case, it will show that the anxiety of the geometrical influence on music could be historically 
located around second century C.E. (around Nicomachus’s lifetime) not sixth century (around 
Boethius’s lifetime). In either case, Boethius’s decision to translate the above disclaimer still suggests 
that the anxiety still concerned scholars in Medieval period. Also, Nicomachus would be another 
likely candidate to emphasize the arithmetic origin of music, because he is considered to be a 
philosopher in the Pythagorean-Platonic tradition. Furthermore, as we shall see in the following 
discussion, Nicomachus’s other music treatise Enchiridion demonstrates both the arithmetical use of 
the monochord and interest in the physical property of the monochord. 
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remind us of the four categories of motion in Aristotle’s Physics in which change of quantity 
and change of location are two of these four categories. Announcing that the change of 
pitch is quantitative in nature is an attempt to pre-emptively denounce any other modes of 
conceptualization, which, in turn, suggests that other modes of conceptualization were 
possible at the time. This section of my dissertation looks at ancient Greek monochord 
treatises in an attempt to demonstrate how the description of the monochord changed over 
a long period of time. Here, I will consider five treatises: (1) Plato’s Timaeus (Strunk and 
Treitler 1998, 19–23); (2) the Euclidean Sectio Canonis (Mathiesen 1975); (3) Nicomachus of 
Gerasa’s Manuale Harmonices (Barker 1989), (4) Ptolemy’s Harmonica (Barker 1989), and (5) 
Gaudentius’s Harmonic Introduction (Strunk 1998, 66–85)  
The narrative of the Euclidean Sectio Canonis is composed of axioms and proofs in 
the style of Euclid, and does not offer any instruction on how to build the monochord or 
how to manipulate it as part of the discussion of its division. As the first treatise on the 
division of the monochord, Sectio’s argument is firmly grounded in the arithmetic use of 
numbers. David Creese (2010) observes the following in regard to the style of argument in 
the Sectio.  
The package itself belongs to arithmetic rather than to 
geometry, for only in arithmetic can the division of the unit 
be ruled out with the standard reductio ad absurdum 
argumentation formula. Because the proof of the 
impossibility of the equal division of epimoric 
[superparticular] intervals is predicated upon the indivisibility 
of the unit, the use of the terminology both of “unit” (monas) 
and of “interval” (diastēma) in the Sectio Canonis deserves closer 
attention. The definition of “unit” and “number,” with which 
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Euclid opens Elements VII, shows the primacy of the concept 
of unity to arithmatic:  
1. A unit is that by which everything that exists is said to be 
one. 
2. And a number is a plurality composed of units. (Creese 
2010, 31) 
 
The arithmetic use of the monochord suggests that at least at the time of the writing, music 
was conceptualized in terms of number. In this context, change of musical pitch would be 
underlined by the change of quantity. The musical space-concept had not yet emerged as a 
way of understanding musical sound.  
The absence of the musical space-concept can also be observed in the preface of the 
treatise. In regard to the motion of the string, the anonymous author offers an experiential 
narrative of the cause of musical pitch. The author writes: 
If, therefore, anything is to be heard, it is necessary that there 
first be pulsation and motion. So, since all notes arise from 
some existing pulsation, and pulsation is impossible unless 
first arising from motion—and, of motion, there are more 
frequent and the intermittent; and the more frequent make 
acute notes, the intermittent, grave [notes]—it is necessary 
that there be on the one hand higher [notes] since they are 
compounded of more frequent and abundant motions, and 
on the other hand lower [notes]…(Mathiesen 1975, 239).38 
 
Here, “motion” does not describe a change of place, but rather a vibration of a string. The 
author first notes that motion is what produces the sound and later writes that closely 
packed motion produces high notes and widely spaced motion low ones (they are high and 
                                                 
38 I modified Mathiesen’s translation to portray literal meaning of the description of notes. Mathiesen 
uses “high” and “low” instead of “acute” and “grave.” 
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low in number). In this description, the word “motion" means change of quantity of 
pulsation. Therefore, no underlying space is necessary. 
Instead of axioms and proofs, Nicomachus’s Enchiridion, a later treatise on the 
monochord, provides more descriptive instructions about the act of generating musical 
notes. 
For if you take a long string at a single uniform tension lying 
above a measuring rod [kanon], and fixed away from the rod 
so as not to touch it, and if you compare the note from the 
whole string when it is plucked with that from half of it, the 
string being divided off exactly in the middle by a bridge or 
something of the sort, so that the vibration from the blow 
does not extend further than half-way, you will find that the 
sound from the half string stands at an octave to the larger 
sound from the whole—that is, it is double that sound, being 
qualified in the opposite way to the relationships of the 
lengths (Barker 1989, 262; emphasis mine). 
 
Here, the word “larger” in the phrase “larger sound” means larger in quantity as evidenced 
by the phrase “double that sound.” But the concept of large, and its numerical 
underpinnings enables a kind of non-spatial commensurability. By addition or subtraction of 
number, a small note can become larger and vice versa. Although theorists did not agree as to 
which sonic extremity would be described with the word “large” (for example, Ptolemy 
would call Nicomachus’s “large” note “small” and vice versa) until later in the history of 
Western music, nearly all Greek and Medieval theorists would have agreed that musical notes 
and concords were numerical in nature.  
In fact, we can see that this belief was already commonplace during the time of 
Aristoxenus because he criticized the Harmonicists’ tendency of “close-packing” 
(καταπύκνωσις, katapyknosis) of possible musical notes. It is easy to assume that ever since the 
musical notes were given numerical properties, the Pythagorean-Platonic impulse was to 
organize them according to their numerical underpinning. Nearly all of the monochord 
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treatises, therefore, end with the ordering of musical notes according to their numerical 
property. For example, Theon of Smyrna quotes on Thrasyllus’s division of the monochord, 
which ends with the following statement: “We could also find these things in numbers, 
beginning from nētē hyperbolaiōn, if we assume that it is 10,368” (Barker 1989, 229). He 
continues, “the successive epogdoics and the remainders are taken according to the ratios 
previously stated, which it is unnecessary to set out: it is an easy task for anyone who has 
followed what we have said.” This invitation to the numerical ordering suggests that 
although musical notes were not spatially defined, the frequent practice of ordering could 
have heralded later spatial representation as the numbers were being mapped on to the 
monochord. However, it is important to recognize that without the help of the monochord, 
the Greek and medieval practice of writing large numbers would somewhat disguise the 
direct relationship between numbers.39 
Compared to previous treatises, Ptolemy’s Harmonica offers a far more experiential 
description of the monochord and its division. He begins by advocating for the monochord 
as a superior instrument for the study of ratio to wind-instruments, such as auloi and syringes. 
One of the reasons he provides is that the monochord’s “limits are appropriately placed so 
that the limits of the plucked sections between them, into which the whole length is divided, 
have suitable and clearly perceptible points of origin.” In other words, it is easier to perceive, 
because one can see in front of his or her eyes, what causes the change of pitch. He moves 
                                                 
39 For example, in Sectio Canonis, numbers “262144” and “294912” were written in Greek as “ ̷̷βρυδ” 
and “̷δϠιβ” and in Latin as “CCCLXII̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.CXLIIII” and “CCCXCLLLL̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅.DCCCCXII.” See Barbera 1991 
(147 and 254). 
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on to describe how to construct the monochord—a discussion entirely missing in Sectio 
Canonis. And he explains how to operate the monochord. He writes: 
When something of this kind has been found, and the 
measuring-rod has been divided in the ratios of the concords 
that have been set out, by shifting the bridge to each point of 
division we shall find that the differences of the appropriate 
notes agree most accurately with the hearing (Barker 1989, 
292; emphasis mine). 
 
Here, he introduces an entirely different kind of motion, change of place, into the discourse 
of the derivation of musical notes. In his writing, what causes the difference between notes is 
not only the change of numerical ratios, but also the shifting of the bridge.  
To contrast the narrative before and after the introduction of the monochord 
treatises, consider these two passages: one is from Plato’s Timaeus and the other is from 
Gaudentius’s Harmonic Introduction. 
Plato, Timaeus 
Then, taking the three [what is indivisible, divisible, and 
intermediate], he [the “god younger”] blended them all into a 
unity, forcing the nature of Difference, hard as it was to 
mingle, into union with Sameness, and mixing them together 
with Existence. And having made a unity of the three, again 
he divided this whole into as many parts as was fitting, each 
part being a blended of Sameness, Difference, and Existence. 
And he began the division on this way…(Strunk 1998, 19–
23). 
 
Gaudentius, Harmonic Instruction 
[This follows the Pythagoras-in-a-blacksmith story.]  
But not satisfied only with the experience of these things, he 
[Pythagoras] tested the method in another fashion. After 
stretching a string over a canon and dividing the canon into 
twelve parts, when he plucked first the whole string and then 
half of it—i.e., six parts—he discovered that the whole string 
to the half was consonant in accord with the diapason; just as 
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in the first methods, he perceived it to be in duple ratio 
(Strunk 1998, 66–85). 
 
In Plato’s narrative, what is being divided is a blend of Sameness, Difference, and Existence, 
which is far more abstract than Gaudentius’s “stretched string over a canon.” Plato’s 
division is the division of the soul itself, while Gaudentius’s division is a physical and visual 
division of a stretched string. An experiential narrative of the division, similar to that of 
Gaudentius, is what was ubiquitously adopted by the Theorica tradition, most notably, by 
Boethius. This experiential narrative provides visual, and thus spatial demonstrations of the 
ratios.  
Based on the trajectory of the growing description of, and reliance on, the physical 
properties of the monochord in Greek musical writings, I argue that the interest in visual 
means of demonstration increased. The concept of musical motion which produces pitch 
difference was situated with increasing opportunity to be reconceptualized as a more 
physical and concrete notion. In other words, following the prominence of the monochord, 
the abstract idea of musical motion as change of quantity was replaced with a simpler and 
more material idea of change of place—the change produced in the shifting bridge of the 
monochord. This reconfiguration of musical motion as change of place introduced two new 
concepts to the discipline of music: the entity that moves, and the underlying space in which 
the motion occurs. 
 
2.8. THE INFLUENCE OF SPATIAL REASONING  
Cleonides’s Harmonic Instruction defines an interval (διάστημα, diástema) as that which 
“is bounded by two notes differing as to ‘acuity and gravity’ (όξύτητι και βαρύτητι)” (Solomon 
1980, 145) The use of the word “interval” (literally means “distance”) signifies that the two 
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notes that make up the interval are spatially conceptualized. The term “interval” originates 
from Aristoxenus’s Elementa Harmonica. However, in contrast to Aristoxenus’s rejection of 
the numerical derivation of musical notes, the transmission history of Cleonides’s Harmonic 
Instruction suggests that adopting number as the source of musical notes was not rejected by 
later theorists. This treatise was transmitted together with the Sectio Canonis in thirty-two 
manuscripts, which strongly suggests that these two books were commonly read as a unified 
collection. For a reader, the constant use of the word “interval” and the numerical ordering 
of the musical notes in the Sectio Canonis should inspire a conceptual model in which two 
“bounded” notes are numerically defined. Additionally, the reader would demonstrate the 
derivation of the notes on the monochord, in which the two “bounded” notes are 
represented spatially. Throughout Cleonides’s Harmonic Instruction, there are overtly spatial 
treatments of musical elements. After defining a note and an interval, Cleonides describes 
motion as this: 
 The following matters are to be considered in researching the 
quality of sound; the quality of sound consists of two 
movements—that known as both “continuous” and 
“spoken,” and that known as both “intervallic” and 
“melodic.” Continuous vocal movement renders its 
tightenings and loosenings undistinguishable, and it does not 
stand still until it becomes silent. Intervallic vocal movement 
moves in the opposite way from continuous movement, for 
intervallic movement produces pauses and the spaces 
between these pauses, and it makes these pauses and spaces 
alternately. We call the pauses “pitches,” and we call the 
distances between the pitches “intervals.” Tightening and 
loosening are the processes which produces the difference 
between pitches; the results of tightening and loosening are 
acuity and gravity, for the process of tightening leads toward 
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acuity and the process of loosening towards gravity (Solomon 
1980, 145–146).40 
 
This straightforward description of the pitches, the motion of these pitches, and the space 
created from the motion paints the whole picture of the musical space in Cleonides’s time. 
Most importantly, Cleonides distinguishes between two sorts of motion: “continuous” and 
“intervallic.”41 By referencing Aristotle’s Categories and Aristoxenus’s Elementa Harmonica, he 
describes the sound of speech as continuous motion in opposition to the intervallic motion 
of a melody. By doing so, he draws attention to the sonic property of speech, a supplement 
or part apart from the semantic content. This separation of sound and meaning is instigated 
by the recognition of musical sound as a separate entity, such as the notion of musical note. 
Only after sound is understood as independent can it be separated from speech. In other 
words, the spatial reasoning of musical sound makes possible the differentiation between 
sound and meaning. 
This is a clear departure from the Aristotelian ontology of voice and sound. Aristotle 
writes in De Anima: 
Voice then is the impact of the inbreathed air against the 
'windpipe', and the agent that produces the impact is the soul 
resident in these parts of the body. Not every sound, as we 
said, made by an animal is voice (even with the tongue we 
may merely make a sound which is not voice, or without the 
tongue as in coughing); what produces the impact must have 
soul in it and must be accompanied by an act of imagination, 
for voice is a sound with a meaning, and is not merely the 
result of any impact of the breath as in coughing; in voice the 
breath in the windpipe is used as an instrument to knock with 
against the walls of the windpipe. This is confirmed by our 
                                                 
40 “Highness” and “lowness” in the translation are modified as “acuity” and “gravity.” 
 
41 This distinction should remind the readers of the distinction between geometry and arithmetic. 
Here, by defining melody as intervallic, as oppose to continuous, there seems to be an attempt to 
relate arithmetic with music. 
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inability to speak when we are breathing either out or in-we 
can only do so by holding our breath; we make the 
movements with the breath so checked. It is clear also why 
fish are voiceless; they have no windpipe. And they have no 
windpipe because they do not breathe or take in air. Why they 
do not is a question belonging to another inquiry. (Aristotle, 
De Anima 2.8.) 
 
Aristotle first defines sound as resulting from an impact of two objects which is propagated 
through an empty space. From this perspective, Aristotle necessitated two objects which 
generate voice, a type of sound: a windpipe and the soul. He concluded that voice is, by 
definition, “a sound with a meaning,” and a sound without a meaning is not to be considered 
a voice, even if it is from a soulful being.  
At a more fundamental level, the shift from a-spatial to spatial notation indicates a 
shift in the metaphysical relationship between the signifier and the signified. Without the 
possibility of conceptualizing a melody as something that changes place, the Greek letter-
notation delineates each note by assigning a different character. This means that the moment 
in which one melodic note becomes the other does not allow for a space in-between just like 
the Greek concept of number. Without the recognition of sound as an independent entity 
from the letter it represents, the concept and recognition of sound must rely on how it is 
represented in written form or whether or not it is representable. This, in turn, creates a one-
to-one relationship between the sound and the notation. In this mode of thought, there is no 
meaningless musical note—a musical note, in its definition, always refers to a definite non-
sonic entity, the underlying numerical ratio. On the other hand, the sound that is notated as 
a stroke in the manuscript operates within an entirely different semantic structure. There is 
no longer a one-to-one relationship between sonic material and its semantic content. In 
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other words, the sonic material and the meaning are separated, and the musical notation 
becomes an indefinite signifier.  
It is not hard to find descriptions of arbitrariness in the treatises that discuss spatial 
notation, such as Musica Enchiriadis or De Musica Disciplina. For example, in chapter eight of 
Musica Enchiriadis, the author describes the mnemonic syllables as arbitrary containers of the 
sonic material without definite semantic content: “Noannoeane and Noeagis, etc., we do not 
consider to be words with meaning, but syllables assigned to the intonation” (Erickson 1995, 
12). Also, about Daseian notation, the author writes:  
For example, let some “strings” (chordae), as it were, be 
extended straight out from the individual symbols for the 
tones positioned in order. Moreover, let the lines (chordae) 
stand for the pitches these symbols signify. On these lines any 
melody may be represented…(8; the emphasis on “any” is 
mine). 
 
Here, the Daseian symbols serve as placeholders of different notes, and the symbols are 
further abstracted into horizontal lines that are only distinguishable spatially. Therefore, 
depending on the context, a line can represent different sounds; this possibility of contextual 
difference shows the inherent arbitrariness of the sound represented. The understanding that 
musical entity is an indefinite signifier continues to be observed in the present-day through 
the use of the Western notational practice. As Theodor W. Adorno writes on Western art 
music, “the higher the species of music, the more forcefully they say it…but what is said 
cannot be abstracted from the music; it does not form a system of signs” (Adorno 1993). 
 
2.9. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I showed the conditions under which musical motion came to signify 
a change of quantity. Within the Greek understanding of music as the study of ratios of 
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discrete numbers, moving from one note to the other was understood as a numerical change. 
Through the use of the monochord, the change of ratio was recontextualized as a change of 
location, and pitch was concurrently understood as an entity navigating through a pitch-
space determined by ratios. This newly constructed conceptual framework was the basis of 
the early neume scripts, which later helped to codify modern notational practice. The 
reinvestigation of the origins of musical space demonstrates why the concepts of musical 
sound and the underlying space are so intertwined that they are difficult to inspect 
individually. 
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CHAPTER III 
GENEALOGY OF MUSICAL FUNCTION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1. Clarifying the Relationship between Musical Function and Object 
The seventh note of the major and minor scale (Ti in solfège) is called a leading-tone. 
Upon the dominant to tonic progression (in its proper context), the leading-tone must 
resolve up. According to harmonic theory from the eighteenth century, the leading-tone is 
considered unstable in relation to the stable tonic.42 As Jean-Philippe Rameau famously 
writes, 
The note which completes the perfect cadence is called the 
tonic note, for it is with this note that we begin and end, and 
it is within its octave that all modulation is determined. 
 
The sound which precedes the octave and forms all the major 
dissonance is called the leading tone [Fr. Notte sensible], 
because we never hear one of these major dissonances 
without feeling [Fr. sentir] that either the tonic note or its 
octave should follow immediately. This name is thus 
eminently suitable for the sound which leads us to that sound 
which is the center of all modulation. (1971, 65) 
 
In today’s use, we often use the role of a musical object as a stand-in for what it is. 
The music object that carries out the assigned role is somehow inconceivable without its 
assigned role. The leading-tone is not only functioning as a leading-tone, but it is a leading-
tone; the seventh note of the scale must resolve up, and Ti must go to Do. In all three cases, 
                                                 
42 In addition to Rameau I cite below, the tendency of ti to be followed by do is widely accepted 
among theorists of the eighteenth century. As Thomas Christensen writes, “All theorists agreed that 
the leading tone was critical at cadential points for the definition of the finales or tonique.” He regards 
this as one of the major catalysts for the acceptance of chordal inversions (1993, 69). 
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they all refer to the same note and same tendency. In this regard, the object (the role refers 
to) is inseparable from the role. No matter where Ti moves to, its motion is judged by what 
it is supposed to do, which is to lead to the tonic note.  Given the same dominant to tonic 
harmonic progression, if Ti does not move to Do but, instead, moves to Sol, the leading-tone 
(Ti) is said to be “frustrated.” Any other motion is illegal in the context of tonal voice-
leading because it profoundly violates the inherent tendency of the leading-tone. 
This seemingly inseparable link between the role and the object is not a characteristic 
of a leading-tone alone but a general feature of any musical object that can be analyzed with 
the currently available methods of music analysis such as notes, chords, and formal 
segments. For example, the major triad that is built on the fifth scale degree of a major or 
minor scale is not only functioning as the dominant, but also is the dominant chord. The 
difference becomes clear when we start using the term “function.” Dominant chord 
functions as a dominant; the leading-tone functions as a leading-tone; and the exposition of a 
sonata form functions as the exposition.  
These functions, however, are concepts that are separate from the objects that they 
ascribe to. For example, we can easily imagine a case where the tonic note functions as the 
leading-tone to the new key or the sub-mediant triad functions as the dominant to a new 
key. As we can see in these examples, our understanding of musical functions are considered 
as attributes of the object, and, therefore, possible to be separated from the object. For 
example, the function of a dominant chord is different from a dominant chord. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from the names of the functions that these functions are generated 
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from the object after the fact. In short, musical functions are derived from musical objects 
while they are no longer tied to their originating contexts. 
Today’s music analysis does not leave music as a purely sonic entity. It is constantly 
swayed by our urge to assign functions to musical objects. For example, sometimes as part 
of the discussion of a prolongation and sometimes as part of the discussion of a voice-
leading, music analysis constantly tries to figure out how one isolated musical object 
functions in relation to the context. One cannot claim to understand the music without 
knowing the function of its constituents.  
These various functions are then organized as a family of functions. Tonic, 
Dominant, and Pre-Dominant are grouped together as one family; leading-tone, secondary 
leading-tone, tonic, chordal-seventh, and other tendency tones are grouped together as 
another family. These families of functions are different from musical works. These 
formalizations of functions clarify in which dimension of the musical composition the 
function of a musical object can have its effects. In other words, they become the tools for 
interpretation of the different layers of the composition. When the purpose of each note, 
chord, and formal section are recognized by the analysis, the analyst can finally claim to 
know the music completely albeit the recognized functions of these musical elements may 
differ from one analyst to another. Even in case when an analyst acknowledges possibilities 
of different interpretations, the fact that each of these interpretations promises to lead the 
reader to the complete understanding of the composition does not change. There may be 
many ways to know the music, but each way has its end. In this sense, there exists a finitude 
of knowing any composition; and the finitude is established by the two facts that (1) there 
are limited number of notes in a composition and that (2) there are a limited possibility of 
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functions for the musical objects. In music analysis, similar to Michel Foucault’s observation 
of the analysis of language, therefore, there are only two forms: interpretation and 
formalization—“in fact, we know of no others” (2005, 325). Formalization establishes the 
family of functions and the interpretation applies these functions to the musical work. 
 
3.1.2. Chapter Overview 
This chapter untangles the threads of form, object, and functionality to arrive at the 
discussion of the conceptual basis of the concept of morality in musical context. In today’s 
music theoretical discourse, the concept of morality creates a basis for the meanings of 
music theoretical terms. This meaning is bordered by two sets of dichotomies: (1) musical 
motion is judged between the spectrum of “good” and “bad” or “right” and “wrong” and 
(2) the musical gestures are judged between the spectrum of “chordal color” and “chord 
progression” or “embellishment” and “structure.” Between the embellishment versus 
structure dichotomy, the latter is considered to generate more substance thereby 
contributing to the value of the musical work. Within the boundaries set by these two sets of 
extremities, today’s music analysis navigates to construct musical meaning in terms of its 
functionality and morality.  
Before I go on to the summary of the sections, the concept of morality in music may 
need a short explanation. To say that a certain musical gesture is moral or immoral may seem 
odd because we do not directly refer to morality when we analyze, listen to, compose, and 
perform music. Nevertheless, our understanding of morality creeps in when discussing 
“right” or “wrong” movement of musical elements in the context of common practice 
Western classical music. In other words, it is considered good for musical objects to do what 
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they are supposed to do; and evil to do the opposite. However, the musical objects do not 
feel or are bound by morality—we are. We are the ones who assign roles to musical objects, 
and we are the ones who judge goodness or evil of the musical objects based on their 
behavior. These assigned roles we give to musical objects are inevitably evaluated by the 
quality of fulfillment of the assigned tasks. We realize the functions not just to understand 
what they are doing in context but to reveal what they are supposed to do. It is only when 
these musical objects satisfy their purpose within the harmonic context that the entire 
composition is considered to be perfect and without error. The concept of function of 
musical objects therefore underlies the morality of the musical objects. Only when all 
musical objects of a composition behave according to their function (i.e., behave according 
to the musical moral law) the resulting final form is considered to be beautiful. The moral-
immoral dichotomy of musical objects takes different shapes and forms according to 
context: chord progression versus chordal color, triadic core versus chordal extension, 
structure versus embellishment, rule of counterpoint versus lack of rule of chordal extension, 
and to a certain extent, bass versus treble43 and harmony versus melody. In all of these 
instances, what is under the scrutiny of the morality is that which initiates the motion, and 
the pathway for the motion is prescribed with various music-theoretical rules such as 
harmonic, tonal, and formal functions. Irrespective of the types of musical objects, our urge 
                                                 
43 The morality of bass and treble may need further explanation. In the common-practice Western 
classical music, bass notes are often considered to play more structural role—they are the ones who 
do the work. The treble (e.g., female voices of a choral music, soprano in a four-part harmony, violin 
in a string quartet, the right hand of a harpsichordist especially in the case of thoroughbass 
realization, and so on) is usually considered as an accessory to the structure. Between work and 
pleasure, the bass corresponds to work and the treble would correspond to pleasure. The association 
of work with goodness and pleasure with evil and its influence on the conceptualization of music is 
the main focus of this chapter. 
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to assign functions or our urge to seek the object’s role in a context drives us to a deeper 
understanding (no matter how arbitrarily it is defined) of the organized whole: a musical 
work.  
There are three sections in this chapter. In the first section, I will show how the 
concepts of function and form reciprocally reinforce, and thus solidify, each other. This is 
done by investigating the changing relationship between the concepts of function and form 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century aesthetic theory of Kant and music 
theory of Georg Joseph Vogler and Gottfried Weber. These writings are paired with the 
secondary literature by two scholars: Lydia Goehr’s claim about the emergence of the work-
concept and Jairo Moreno’s claim about the emergence of the autonomous figure of the 
listening subject. In her book The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (2007), Goehr argues 
that the concept of a musical work as fixed and regulative entity emerged during the 
eighteenth century. On the other hand, Jairo Moreno argued in his book Musical 
Representations, Subjects, and Objects (2004) that the concept of listeners who are responsible for 
understanding musical gesture fully emerged during the early nineteenth century. Based on 
these observations, I argue that, along with the emergences of the work-concept and modern 
listening subject came the concept of musical objects as constituents of a conceptually rigid 
formal structure. As the container becomes more rigid, it required the components to be also 
solidified in terms of its ontological standing, thereby creating a nested structure of 
containers at different levels. A note becomes a constituent of a chord, a chord of a phrase, a 
phrase of a section, a section of a movement, a movement of a musical work. At each level, 
there is always clearly defined hierarchy of containers. As a result, the act of making music 
became a process of compartmentalizing musical objects within a fixed, regulative, container: 
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the musical form. This contrasts the earlier mode of composition which allowed a largely 
additive process without the necessity of formal closure. In the earlier mode, the closing 
gesture seemed to be a result of rhetorical necessity, rather than a structural one. This 
understanding of musical objects as conceptually rigid entities made possible the separation 
of musical function from the object.  
The second section delves deeper into the resultant separation of musical function 
from the object. By looking at music theoretical treatises of the nineteenth century, I will 
show the shifting understanding of musical motion from “following the natural law” to 
“following the inherent tendency of the musical object.” For example, the “Ti-Do” motion 
was no longer explained through the laws of gravity, as Rameau did, but explained through 
the assigned function of the leading-tone (Ti). Following the ontological solidification of the 
musical objects, music theoretical literature began to consider musical objects (e.g., note, 
chord, and formal segment) as entities capable of possessing their own agency. In the earlier 
mode of conceptualization, the musical work becomes the mediator between the composer 
and the listener. In the later modes, the composer becomes the mediator between the will of 
the tones and the listener; the job of a composer is to realize the tendency of the tones and 
let them do their job. In other words, “free” them to act upon their nature. This separation 
of musical function from its originating object and the reassignment of the function to the 
musical object enabled the metaphorical understanding of the musical objects as the laborers 
within the process of industrial production.  
The third section investigates social conditions in which the metaphorical 
conceptualization of a musical work as an industrial product emerged. During two-hundred 
years of Western history of music theory between Rameau and Hugo Riemann 
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(approximately 1700–1900) Western society underwent tremendous changes in social 
structure, mode of production, and method of scientific inquiry. The notion that sound (or 
represented sound in a form of notation) functions in certain ways is constructed with a 
complex network of metaphors, ontology, and reflection of society because sound, as a 
purely sonic and ephemeral event, does not rise up to the status of a being that can function. 
In short, sound does not work unless we first acknowledge it as an entity that is capable of 
having an autonomy. Then, how come do we readily accept the notion of functionality as 
some ground of knowledge about musical composition? In this section, I argue that the 
notion of functionality emerged as the ground for knowledge when the industrial mode of 
production, most notably Adam Smith’s division of labor, became the primary mode of 
manufacturing in the nineteenth century.  
 
3.2. RECIPROCAL SOLIDIFICATION OF FORM AND FUNCTION 
The concept of form and function are inter-dependent. As they are understood 
today, one cannot exist without relying on the other, and vice versa. When we say “X 
functions as Y,” we first notice the behavior of X as recognizable. In a musical context, for 
example, when we say “the G major chord functions as a dominant,” we are recognizing the 
G major chord in isolation in order to apply the category of functions (in this case, the 
dominant) that are previously known to us. This means that in order for us to have a 
concept of function, we first need a foundation that allows us to delimit and discern a part 
that is distinguishable from the whole. In other words, we need to be able to point out the 
object which will be assigned a function. Only then, we can apply the functions. When 
recognizing certain musical behavior as functional, the possible behaviors for that musical 
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object must be known (or potentially knowable). If it is not previously known, the behavior 
will not be considered in terms of functionality but of identification. The possible behaviors 
do not account for all of the possible ones but only the meaningful. These meaningful 
behaviors (that are socially, culturally, and historically defined) are formalized as a group of 
functions that operate within the equivalent conceptual level of analysis. For example, in the 
context of harmonic function, there are three prototypical types: Tonic, Dominant, and Pre-
Dominant. In the context of musical formal functions, there are various families of functions 
such as James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy’s functions as shown in Elements of Sonata Theory 
(2006) or William Caplin’s Theory of Formal Function in Classical Form (1998). In the 
context of structural voice-leading function, there exist Schenkerian and Post-Schenkerian 
voice-leading reduction which takes into account the function of structural and embellishing 
notes. All of these theories of musical analysis formalize the family of functions so that they 
can be applied in the interpretation of musical works. This means that as the concept of 
functions of musical elements are being articulated, one acquires a growing number of 
possibilities to isolate the musical elements within a musical composition. In other words, 
our knowledge of function provides us with an analytical scalpel with which we can dissect 
the musical work into its constituent parts.  
On the other hand, this concept of musical function generates the centripetal force 
among the constituent parts. Only by the recognition of its function can the musical part be 
recognized as a constituent of the unified whole. To refer back to the earlier example, the 
statement “the G major triad functions as the dominant” not only singles out the G major 
chord, but also refers to its background structure; it is the musical context that makes the 
behavior of the G major chord dominant-functioning. The observation that any chord is 
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functioning as dominant must arise from its musical context that made the dominant 
function possible. In other words, the G major chord by itself does not project any 
functionality (or, it always projects tonic function); only when it is considered in relation to 
its surroundings (i.e., within a musical phrase) can the dominant function be recognized. 
Therefore, the act of recognizing the function of the musical element ultimately solidifies the 
structure of the musical whole. 
 
3.2.1. Musical Form as a Concept with Hard Boundaries 
Given this inter-dependence of form and function, the dual emergences of musical 
work and musical function around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century seem 
inevitable. Many scholars have provided convincing historical evidence that the concept of 
musical work as we understand it today emerged around the turn of the century. Lydia 
Goehr summarizes our understanding of musical work which continues from the previously-
mentioned turn of century.  
We do not treat works as objects just made or put together, 
like tables and chairs, but as original, unique products of a 
special, creative activity. We assume, further, that the tonal, 
rhythmic, and instrumental properties of works are 
constitutive of structurally integrated wholes that are 
symbolically represented by composers in scores. Once 
created, we treat works as existing after their creators have 
died, and whether or not they are performed or listened to at 
any given time. We treat them as artefacts existing in the 
public realm, accessible in principle to anyone who cares to 
listen to them. And when called, finally, to give examples of 
works, we usually look to the tradition of western, European, 
classical, ‘opus’ music, to works, in other words, of a ‘purely 
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instrumental’ or ‘absolute’ sort. (2007, Kindle Location 68–
69) 
 
In short, the musical work is considered as a new and distinct creation separated 
from the composer’s earlier efforts. The properties of musical work that Goehr summarized 
suggest that the ontological status of the musical work-concept resembles that of a physical 
object. Similar to how we treat a craftwork or an art object, a musical work is considered as 
an individual entity that is capable of being possessed and also capable of being copied. If we 
consider that the musical work is purely sonic in nature and is only perceived through our 
sense of hearing, these properties of musical work would not have been possible. For 
example, without the aid of recording technology or written notation, the purely sonic object 
is not graspable to be possessed. To say that a person can possess the musical work implies 
that the work of music is not considered as purely sonic but understood as if it is a physical 
object.  
This is why scholars such as Roman Ingarden, Lydia Goehr, and Nelson Goodman 
all emphasize the role of notated score (a physical object) when considering the emergence 
of the musical work-concept. Erinn Elizabeth Knyt summarizes these writers as follows: 
Ingarden believed a fixed text recorded at a set time based on 
a single author’s creativity to be an essential requirement for a 
composition to achieve work status… Ingarden’s overall 
vision of the work concept includes a notated score 
originating at a set time from the creative impulse of a master 
creator and a series of novel sound constructs organized 
tonally. (2010, 5)44  
 
[Lydia Goehr’s] historical approach pinpoints 1800, the 
general time when notions of originality gained importance, 
                                                 
44 She refers to The Musical Work and the Problem of its Identity (Ingarden 1986). Elsewhere in Ingarden’s 
book, he extends this idea of physicality of musical sound as the basis of musical work-concept to 
include the development of a recording technology. 
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as the period when the musical work concept began to rise in 
prevalence. Based on the emergence of the term “work” 
around 1800 in conjunction with new notions of plagiarism 
and the growing understanding of scores as fixed and 
unalterable entities to be revered by performers (i.e., notions 
of Werktreue), she identifies the nineteenth century as the 
period in which the work concept became “regulative,” as she 
puts it, for the production of musical pieces. It created the 
expectation that a work would feature novel combinations of 
tones created by a single composer that were recorded in a 
score and realized in performance. (6)45 
 
[Nelson Goodman] considers a work to be created by a 
composer and notated with a fixed set of symbols at a 
specific time. …He differentiates between features like 
pitches that he considers integral to “the work,” and more 
ambiguous tempo markings that he finds superfluous. (6)46 
 
Although Knyt’s writing centers around Ferruccio Busoni and the time when Busoni 
was active (late nineteenth and early twentieth century), I adopt Goehr’s position regarding 
the time of the emergence of the work-concept which is approximately a century prior. 
The particular role that the notated score played in the emergence of the work 
concept needs further explanation because musical notation was around long before 1800. 
Goehr explains that notation made possible, among other things, the separation of music 
into work and its performance. Citing Jacques Attali, Goehr claims that “development in 
copyright laws and publication helped ‘institutionalize’ works as commodities separable from 
their performance” (2007, Kindle Location 2533)47 This commodification of musical work 
                                                 
45 She refers to The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works (Goehr 2007). 
 
46 She refers to Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Goodman 1976). 
 
47 Her quotation of Attali is as follows, “in order for music to become institutionalized as a 
commodity, for it to acquire ... monetary value ... it was necessary to establish a distinction between 
the value of the work and the value of its representation, the value of the program and that of its 
usage” (1985, 51).   
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and the emergence of the work concept will be explored later in this chapter. For now, it is 
important to recognize that Europe during this time was undergoing tremendous social, 
cultural, and economic change known as the Industrial Revolution. In this historical context, 
the concept of commodification of musical work must be understood. 
 
3.2.2. Separation of Function from Identity  
When discussing the history of musical function, perhaps the most frequently 
mentioned music theorist would be Hugo Riemann and theorists who influenced him such 
as Moritz Hauptmann, Arthur von Oettingen, and Hermann von Helmholtz. This would 
seemingly put the date of the emergence of musical function around the late nineteenth 
century. However, the concept of musical function predates the use of the word “function.” 
As observed by Brian Hyer, “the function theories begin with prior assertion of a referential 
tonic;” and this would put Rameau as one of the earliest theorists of musical function. Be 
that as it may, the treatment of musical function as a separate concept from the identity of 
the object points us to the discussion of Mehrdeutigkeit by Abbé Georg Joseph Vogler and 
Gottfried Weber.  
The names of the three harmonic functions (tonic, dominant, and sub-dominant) 
come from Rameau’s description of the dominant and tonic (and later sub-dominant). 
However, the way these terms are used by Rameau and by Vogler and Weber differs slightly 
in its orientation, and clarifying the difference between the two will clarify the distinction 
between musical object and its function.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the concept of musical function is 
perhaps best understood as an abstraction from the commonly occurring musical gestures. 
72 
Just like how the abstract concept of number has its basis in the act of counting, and how 
the abstract concept of height of musical note has its basis on the numerical proportions of 
the monochord, the concept of musical function has emerged as the inherent property of the 
musical objects that are involved in common musical gesture. In other words, the recurring 
pattern of one sonority changed into another in a similar way inspired a causal explanation of 
the change.  
In this context, Rameau treated the dominant to tonic pull as a manifestation of a 
natural phenomenon and thus this pull played a role of generating principles of all musical 
motion. This resulted in a concept of dominant and tonic that resembles what Foucault calls 
“a double-entry system which could be read exhaustibly either from the point of view of the 
role it played…or from that of its morphological variables (form, magnitude, arrangement, 
and number).” In other words, a dominant chord is simultaneously recognized as both the 
identity of the sound it represents and the behavior of it. Lacking a systematized 
organization of chordal identity separate from chordal function (such as Roman numeral), 
the dominant, tonic, and sub-dominant played a role of identifying chords as well as 
explaining their behavior. This is different from today’s understanding of chordal identity 
and chordal function where being a dominant chord is separated from, say, being a V chord. 
The two systems of designation (Roman numeral and function) each play different roles so 
that one applies to identity and the other applies to function. This separation is only possible 
when two systems of designation are firmly established. This is why the concept of function 
emerged as a separate entity after Vogler and Weber popularized the Roman numeral.  
Following the use of Roman numerals, the identity of the chord was defined by its 
location on a scale which operates within the vertical level, whereas the functional labels of a 
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chord lost its vertical orientation. This can be observed from the changed meaning of the 
prefix “sub” in the word “sub-dominant.” As it is used today, the “sub” in sub-dominant 
exclusively refers to the vertical location of the chord. It means “beneath” or “lower.” 
However, in non-music theoretical context, the prefix “sub” often extends it meaning 
metaphorically and means “secondary” or “subordinate.” Therefore, the term “sub-
dominant” could mean not only its vertical location on a musical scale but also a sort of 
musical power-relation.48  
In Rameau’s definition, the latter meaning would certainly be one of the reasons why 
he maintained the use of the prefix “sub” (sous) in the later treatises. But, make no mistake 
that the spatial location on a scale is still the main reason why he first used the prefix.49 For 
                                                 
48 Some theorists refer to the sub-dominant function as “pre-dominant” function. The word “pre-
dominant” is a relatively new term that gained the popularity in twentieth century by North American 
music theorists. The distinction between the two designations could elucidate further the changing 
meaning of the prefix “sub-.” Until the late twentieth century, the term “subdominant” was used to 
designate both the fourth scale-degree and the function of a chord that precedes the dominant. Not 
only Riemann but also Schenker use the term subdominant as not only a spatial designation but also 
a functional one. I hypothesize that the word “pre-dominant” took over the functional meaning of 
subdominant as the study of musical phrase becomes formalized during the late twentieth century, 
most notably, by William Rothstein.  
 
49 David E. Cohen observes similar dual meaning of the word sous in Rameau’s use of the word sous-
entendre.  Not only the use of the word sous refers to a spatial orientation (dessous), it also refers to a 
passive behavior (2001, 71). He writes, “The verb sous-entendre, a compound of sous (“below,” 
“under”) and entendre (“to intend, understand, hear”) which is attested in French texts since c. 1650, is 
defined as meaning “to have [something] in the mind without explicitly saying [it], to let [it] be 
understood,” “to suggest,” This sense is evidently based on the meaning of entendre in the sense of 
“intende,” so that sous-entendre is an act performed by the speaker. The opposite sense, however, is 
suggested by the cognate late-Latin words subaudire and subintellegere (sub, “under” or “below,” plus 
audire, “to hear” or intellegere, “to understand”), both of which denote an act performed by the hearer 
(or reader) and mean “to understand or supply in thought (a word implied but not expressed).” It is 
in this latter sense that Rameau uses and indeed defines sous-entendre as denoting an act performed by 
the hearer—more precisely, by the “ear” of the musical listener—at the same time interpreting the 
word in a more literal way as referring directly to hear (entendre), and indeed to the “hearing” of the 
fundamental bass “below” (dessous) the actual bass.” 
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example, in Nouveau Système, Rameau simply describes that “one names the principal sound 
of the cadence as the principal sound or tonic note; fifth above it, Dominant, and fifth below 
it, Sub-dominant” (1726, 38)50 The metaphorical use of the word “dominant” would 
certainly imply a hierarchical relation where an entity that is placed above presides as a 
dominator of the lower. The location of a note and its power-relation therefore create two 
types of cadences according to the flow of dominance: perfect and irregular (Cadence parfaite 
and Cadence irréguliere). When the dominant (fifth above) dominates (precedes) the following 
note, it is considered a perfect cadence. When this is reversed (i.e., when a note that is fifth 
below precedes the following note), it is an irregular cadence. Rameau’s use of the same term 
to refer to both location and behavior creates a confusing passage later in the treatise. He 
writes, “The note A is denoted as the tonic note where it ends the perfect cadence (note B to 
A) and the irregular cadence of C to A” (see Figure III-1). He continues, “The note B is the 
dominant that, in turn, becomes the tonic note of the modulation because of the irregular 
cadence that ends; meanwhile the tonic note becomes the sub-dominant.” From this, we can 
see how Rameau used the terms tonic, dominant, and sub-dominant in two different ways, 
as a name for the notes in their spatial location in the scale as well as the name to describe 
the behavior of these notes.51 It seems that Rameau referred to the each note by a separate 
                                                 
50 On appelle Son principle ou Note tonique, le Son principal de la Modulation; sa Quinte au-dessus, 
Dominante; & sa Quinte au-dessous, Sous-dominante. 
 
51 There is yet another meaning the prefix “sub” could take. For example, in nineteenth-century 
music theory treatise by Pierre Rigaud (1846, 6), the “sub-dominant” would mean a note that is one 
scale step below the dominant. For him, the sub-mediant is therefore the second scale step: Re. He 
uses all twelve notes as the basis and refers to the major scale as consisting of first, third, fifth, sixths, 
eighth, tenth, and twelfth notes (think post-tonal integer notation plus 1). He write, “suppose that 
one would start from the first note and continues to third, fifth, sixth, eighth, tenth, and twelfth. The 
first note is called tonic, the third note sub-mediant, the fifth note mediant, sixth note sub-dominant, 
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name (e.g., A, B, C) and added a musical example to avoid confusion from the admixture of 
function and identity. In some ways, the note names play a role of fixed identity in Rameau’s 
example. The same role cannot be given to a chord because a chord was still considered as a 
mixture of three (or more) notes. In other words, the concept of a chord did not have a 
clearly defined ontological boundary to take on any role. It is only after the recognition of a 
chord as a single entity (as well as a mixture) with a definite name, that the role of a fixed 
identity could be assigned to a chord.  
 
Figure III-1. Excerpt from Rameau's Nouveau Systême de Musique Théorique (1726, 39) 
The dual reference becomes understandably separated when a new set of systems to 
recognize chords as a unified entity took over the role of giving chordal identification. This 
is the role the Roman numeral system played in relation to the emergence of harmonic 
function. It facilitated the discussion of function independent from that of identity. We no 
                                                 
eighth note dominant, tenth note sub-leading-tone, and the twelfth leading-tone.” (Supposons qu'on 
veuille partir du son No. 1 de la 1re série, on fera succéder les sons Nos. 3, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12. Le son No. 
1 s'appellera par conséquent tonique, le son No. 3 sous-médiant, le son No. 5 mèdiant, le son No. 6 sous-
dominant, le No. 8 dominant, le No. 10 sous-sensible, et le No. 12 sensible.) 
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longer need to call a chord “dominant” if it no longer functions as such. Conversely, the 
dominant function is no longer tied to the fifth motion of the fundamental bass. In addition, 
this separation of function and identity occurred in musical motions in general. Not only the 
functions of the dominant, tonic, and sub-dominant were recognized as independent, but 
also the function of leading-tone was decontextualized. This separation of function and 
identity is at the basis of Vogler and Weber’s Mehrdeutigkeit. It is with the establishment of 
the stable system of identification that the construction of multiple meaning became 
possible. From this separation, however, emerged a concept that had been hidden behind 
function and identity: a purely sonic object as an arbitrary sign. 
In Vogler’s use of the word, Mehrdeutigkeit results from the interaction of two 
elements: fixed notes and changed context. Perhaps the most telling example of these two 
elements in action is his “nine leading-tones” (neun Leittöne) example (1802, 57–58).52 In this 
example (see Figure III-2), what is fixed are the notes G# and A in the soprano voice. The 
bottom three voices are the ones that give multiple meanings to the leading-tone (G#) to 
tonic (A) motion. Being recognized as leading-tone within various harmonic contexts, the 
concept of leading-tone is separated as leading-tone-function that is independent from the 
actual notes being involved. Later in the chapter five, he explores further on the topic of 
Mehrdeutigkeit at the level of chords by implementing enharmonic respelling of the chords. In 
all of these cases, the musical notation confirms the meaning of the sound. The sound in 
isolation will be understood as the relationship between the fixed notes and the referential 
                                                 
52 The following figure is adopted from Floyd K. Grave and Margaret G. Grave’ In Praise of Harmony: 
The Teachings of Abbé George Joseph Vogler (1987, 35). 
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tonic and key. And, in order for this meaning to be known, the listener (or the listener’s ear) 
must know the relationship between a chord and its relation to the key. 
 
 
Figure III-2. The nine leading tones imagined by Vogler 
In Vogler’s discussion of Mehrdeutigkait, we see a new concept emerging that is 
separate from identity and function—it is the concept of sound itself. In his rejection of 
immediate intelligibility of sound (in other words, when rejecting that only one meaning is 
possible for a given sound), he revealed a moment in which the sonic object was not yet 
assigned its meaning. The concept of meaningless sonic object can be also observed in his 
detailed employment of the enharmonic spelling of the chords. The act of spelling notes 
enharmonically would solidify not only the concept and implied behavior according to the 
different spellings, but also confirm the sameness of the entity that is being assigned 
different spellings. This concept of a sonic object as an indefinite signifier had been 
effectively hidden either behind the behavior of the note (e.g., being a dominant) or the 
originating source of sound (e.g., sound of a violin). This realization of purely sonic entity 
resembles Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution in many ways. But it would be a mistake 
to assume that Vogler’s discovery of Mehrdeutigkeit is informed by Kant’s philosophy. 
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Instead, in his description of the Mehrdeutigkeit we see influences of another philosopher a 
generation earlier than Vogler: Moses Mendelssohn. On Merhdeutigkeit, Vogler writes,  
In music, as in rhetoric, there are cases where one can put 
multiple meanings to one opinion. The theory of 
Mehrdeutigkeit determines, once and for all, all possible cases 
where either the very same harmonies seem to the sense of 
hearing as different, or different harmonies seem as the same. 
(1802, 6)53 
 
The phrase “as in rhetoric” in the opening sentence may be puzzling to today’s 
readers because the “cases where one can multiple meanings to one opinion” does not seem 
to be directly related to rhetoric. Vogler’s reference to rhetoric, therefore, suggests that it 
could refer to a more specific view rather than rhetoric in general. In this regard, Moses 
Mendelssohn’s categorization of rhetoric among the “arbitrary” signs helps us contextualize 
Vogler’s position within the discourse of eighteenth century rhetoric. Mendelssohn divides 
signs as “natural” and “arbitrary” (1997, 177). Signs are “natural if the combination of the 
sign with the subject matter signified is grounded in the very properties of what is 
designated.” For example, the crying of a hungry baby would be considered a natural sign 
because it is directly connected to the hunger. For this reason, Mendelssohn places music as 
part of natural signs alongside painting, sculpture, architecture, and dance because sounds, 
gestures, and movements that express an emotion are all connected to the passion (179). On 
the other hand, sings are arbitrary if “by their very nature [they] have nothing in common 
with the designated subject matter, but have nonetheless been arbitrarily assumed as signs 
                                                 
53 My translation. “In der Tonsprache, so wie in der Redekunst kommen Fälle vor, wo man einer 
Meinung mehere Deutungen unterlegen kann. Die Lehre der Mehrdeutigkeit bestimmt ein für alle 
Male alle möglichen Fälle, wo entweder dieselbigen Harmonien dem Gehöre wie verschiedene, oder 
verschiedene dem Gehöre wie dieselbigen vorkommen.” Janna Saslaw’s transcription from 
frakturschrift erroneously added umlaut over the word “Male” of “für alle Male” in the second 
sentence (1990–91, 76). 
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for it” (180). Within this category falls rhetoric and poetry because they “express objects by 
means of arbitrary signs, perceptible sounds, and letters.” Vogler’s theory of Mehrdeutigkeit 
can, therefore, be understood as his attempt to reaffirm the potential arbitrary signs of music 
into the realm of the natural sign. By determining “once and for all,” all possible cases of 
ambiguity, Vogler clarifies that music, after all, is an art which deals with natural signs. 
Vogler’s doctrine of Mehrdeutigkeit, as well as his system of Roman numeral, therefore, 
resonate strongly with what Foucault observes as the fundamental task of Classical 
discourse, that is, “to ascribe a name to things [nomenclature], and in that name to name 
their being [taxonomy]” (2005, 132) However, this does not mean Vogler’s attempt was 
successful.  
Weber’s description of Mehrdeutigkeit is markedly different from that of Vogler’s. 
Whereas in Vogler the concept of indeterminate sonic object was effectively hidden from the 
discussion, Weber, now armed with Kant’s philosophy, seems to have found comfort inside 
the space of ambiguity. Instead of treating the functional ambiguity of the sonority within 
the realm of one’s sense of hearing, Weber writes that “Multiple meaning is what we call the 
possibility of explaining a thing in more than one way, or the quality of a thing, whereby it 
can be considered sometimes as this, sometimes as that” (Saslaw 1990–91, 75).54 The most 
important distinction I make in Weber’s definition in relation to Vogler’s is the use of the 
word “a thing” (ein Sache).55 During approximately the twenty years between Vogler and 
                                                 
54 Saslaw’s translation. “Mehrdeutigkeit nennen wir nämlich die Möglichkeit, Eine Sache auf mehr als 
Eine Art zu erklären, oder die Beschaffenheit einer Sache, wonach sie bald für Dieses, bald für Jenes 
gelten kann” (Weber, Versuch einer Geordneten Theorie der Tonsetzkunst 1830, 42). 
 
55 Moreno makes a similar point by emphasizing the use of the words “this,” “that,” and “or” but he 
does not point out the word “a thing” as part of his observation. Moreno’s emphasis is on the role of 
autonomous listener who can determine if “a thing” is “this” “or” “that” (2004, 137). 
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Weber, the concept of “a thing” found its place as a reference to a musical sound. Once 
again, after its initial appearance during the Carolingian era in the treatises such as Musica 
Enchiriadis discussed in the earlier chapter (see page Error! Bookmark not defined.), the 
idea of musical sound as arbitrary sign re-emerged. But this time, it is not “syllables without 
meaning,” but the sonic object itself stripped of any intelligible designation. 
Of course the emergence of the sonic object did not happen independently. On the 
other side of the spectrum, there exists the emergence of the listening subject. Jairo Moreno 
refers to the same passage of Weber as part of his detailed historical account of the 
emergence of the subjectivity of listeners (2004, 128–159). His philosophical investigation of 
the emergence of subjectivity begins from Descartes’s assertion at the opening pages of his 
Compendium Musice, that “it’s [music’s] object is sound.”56 From this, Moreno observes that 
“…music (i.e., as sound) had to be brought into the fold of the cogito by the analysis of 
perception. This was made possible by understanding the natural physico-acoustic materiality 
of sound, newly established as “object” of knowledge” (2004, 131). And understanding the 
object was only possible, as observed by Moreno, by the reference to nature. For example, 
remember how Rameau explained that certain musical motion happens because of the 
gravitational pull. Here, gravity would be the natural force. For a person to claim that he or 
                                                 
56 “Huius objectum est sonus.”  
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she knows a musical work, therefore, he or she must be able to recognize the natural forces 
at work in music. 
From Weber’s music theory on, however, the invocation of nature is replaced by the 
subjectivity of the listener. Moreno observes that:  
By assigning the jurisdiction of multiple meaning to the 
subject’s cognition (i.e, as a domain of explanation) and 
designating it as a quality inherent in the musical object, 
Weber shifts the epistemological balance further away from 
an order of things dictated from without. This is an 
epistemological gesture that could only have happened in the 
wake of Kant’s “second Copernican revolution”: the 
fundamental conditions for both understanding and the order 
of knowledge are conceived by Weber from the perspective 
of the consciousness that attains it. It is the subject who may 
explain a thing “as this” or who may instead consider the 
thing “as that.” (2004, 138) 
 
Along with this departure from nature came the tripartite structure of the musical 
object. A musical sound could be identified as various concepts; and these concepts could 
function as different constituents of a musical whole. Moreno summarizes that the 
“indeterminacy with regard to knowing subject and known object” is  
grounded on three preconditions, which the definition 
presumes and links together: (a) sensory certainty—as 
immediate awareness of sense-objects (i.e., “things”)…(b) 
perception of these objects—as a mediated knowledge of 
things on the basis of recognizing some properties (i.e., 
“qualities”); (c) understanding—as knowledge of things (i.e., 
“explanation”) that manifest some underlying order. (2004, 
137) 
 
To adopt these three preconditions into my observation which is oriented on the 
side of objectivity, the first part corresponds to the sonic object prior to any identification; 
the second part to the labeling system which determines aspects such as key area, Roman 
numeral, and leading-tone; and the third part to the function of the object. Therefore, in the 
82 
structure of musical objectivity, the three parts are not merely linked together but each part 
is built on the confirmation of the earlier step. One can claim to know the musical work 
when one (1) hears the music (hearing), (2) recognizes its identity (identifying), and (3) 
investigates the relationship between the recognized parts with the entire musical work 
(analyzing). Conversely, this also means that the contemplation of the latter two steps resides 
outside of the listening experience. The investigation of musical function, for instance, does 
not concern from what medium does the sound come from. It no longer matters what 
instrument is used to produce the sound in question. The three steps are not coexisting but 
the termination of one step is required to advance to the next. Therefore, during the 
investigation of musical function, one must sever the connection of the sonic dimension. It 
is clear now how the concept of musical function was originally ascribed to the behaviors of 
the musical object. The identification of the musical object occupies the vertical axis of 
musical work while the motion of the object occupies the horizontal, thus temporal, axis of 
the musical work. It is the temporal progression that completes the musical work, not the 
identification of vertical sonority. 
 
3.3. EMERGENT AGENCY OF MUSICAL OBJECTS 
3.3.1. Concept of a Chord as a Regulative Entity 
The tripartite structure of a musical object as well as the popularity of the Roman 
numeral system gave the regulative power to the identification of a musical chord. 
Particularly, the change of labeling system from figured bass to Roman numeral shows that 
the musical chord was no longer identified descriptively (as a figured bass system would), but 
prescriptively (as the Roman numeral system does). With Roman numeral, the three notes 
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that make up a diatonic triad formed a boundary in which any vertical sonorities are judged. 
In this respect, the conceptual order of the first two of the three-step process—i.e., (1) 
hearing, (2) identifying, (3) analyzing—is reversed. One no longer identifies what one has 
heard; one listens for identifiable sonority among that one hears.  
Although the two systems are separately used in theory and practice to some extent, 
the introduction of Roman numeral in music theoretical writings effectively demoted the 
figured bass numbers to attributes for Roman numerals. This is not to say that figured bass 
became a useless tool, as its popular use in today’s music theoretical literature shows. 
However, figured bass did lose its designating power (i.e., determining what the chord is) to 
the Roman numeral system. In this section, I will investigate the different modes of 
conceptualization that underlie the two systems and the implication of the popularity of 
Roman numerals in music theoretical writings of the nineteenth century. As we shall see, the 
shift of popularity from figured bass to Roman numeral was not merely a rise of popularity 
of the new tool, but signifies the changing relationship between nature and the musical work. 
The figured bass number emerged out of the long history of the Western concept of 
harmony. The concept of harmony implies an admixture of two or more sonic elements. 
And the foundation of these sonic elements is at vibrating string which generates them one 
note at a time. The additive process of creating a harmony therefore makes all harmony a 
result of an addition. In other words, a triad, although recognized as a special combination, 
was still understood as a combination of three notes or two intervals. The figured bass as a 
tool to account for these added notes, therefore, does not hold a regulative power over the 
notes. It was the study of ratio and, more generally, mathematics that regulated the 
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formation of harmony. In other words, it was the numerical property that determined some 
chords as consonant and some as dissonant. 
This way of thinking about a triad began to change with Rameau’s concept of 
fundamental bass, Vogler’s naming of triads as Roman numerals, and, the growing discovery 
and inclusion of the overtone series in musical theoretical literature. At each step of the way, 
the concept of triad became more solidified as a single indivisible entity. Consequently, the 
ontological status of a triad became stable enough to grant the triad its own agency and 
desire. Simply put, Rameau’s theory of fundamental bass made it possible to represent a 
harmony with a single note and Vogler’s Roman numeral provided categorical distinction 
between a note and a chord. Nevertheless, between the progressively hardening boundaries 
of the musical work-concept at one end and the physical reality of musical note generated by 
a vibrating string at the other end, the ontological stance of a chord was still relatively weaker 
than the concept of musical work and a musical note. The concept of a chord would still 
reside somewhere in between the two well defined concepts (a note and a musical work). A 
chord would be still considered as a combination of notes and the process of combination 
still relies largely on the mathematics. 
This, however, began to change as more and more music theoretical writing 
incorporates the discussion of the overtone series.57 The progressive containment from a 
musical work to a single note would have been generally accepted unless the study of 
overtone series exploded a single note back into a chord that is generated by the first five 
                                                 
57 Detailed historical account of acoustics would include discussion on seventeenth century (or 
perhaps earlier) instrument makers up to twentieth century study of acoustics. Burdette Green and 
David Butler’s chapter in Cambridge History of Western Music Theory presents one such account (2002).  
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partials. The discussion of overtones formed a feedback loop between a note and a chord 
which eventually granted a stronger ontological standing ground for a chord, as the study of 
acoustics moved towards the realm of empirical science. The loop goes something like this: 
(1) a chord is a combination of different notes, (2) among these different notes, there is a 
note that is more fundamentally important than the other, (3) this fundamental note has 
empirical reality within a sounding body, and (4) this sounding body not only generates the 
fundamental note, but also generates the other non-fundamental notes of the chord. And the 
fourth step will revert back to the first step. As this loop circles around the concept of note, 
chord, and the overtone series, a new membrane is formed that divides what is considered 
nature and what is considered human rationalization. Prior to the popularity of the overtone 
series, a note was the first abstraction of nature where the sonic materiality first meets the 
mental faculty of a human being. The status of a note was changed when the overtone series 
became the generating principle of a chord. Since then, the chord became the first 
rationalization of nature because the major triad became the unavoidable reality of any 
sounding note. This feedback loop, with its new empirical reality, ultimately demoted the 
status of a note as a fundamental building block of the musical work and replaced it with the 
status of a chord.  
A musical phrase was no longer considered as combination of notes, but a 
progression of chords. And each chord was defined with clear boundaries that facilitated the 
separation between inside and outside of the chord. For example, when C, F, G, and B 
sound simultaneously (or are notated vertically), one can form a chord with G, F, and B and 
treat C as an outlier of the chord that needs resolution. This process of excluding one note 
from the sonic simultaneity shows the regulative power of the concept of chord. Just like 
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how the limit was set at the fifth partial of the overtone series when determining a chord, the 
same operation would delimit notes as being part of the chord or not. This newly emerged 
concept of a chord gains intelligibility from two different sources. One is vertical and the 
other is horizontal. In a vertical space, a chord becomes intelligible when it conforms to the 
identifiable configuration, i.e., a diatonic triad built on each scale-step. In a horizontal space, 
a chord becomes intelligible when it conforms to the identifiable progression, i.e., a fifth 
motion of the (fundamental) bass. This vertical and horizontal aspect of a chord and the 
regulative concept of Roman numeral solidified the concept of a chord as an entity which 
has clear ontological boundary. 
What came out of the dual solidification of musical work-concept and musical chord 
is the systematic regulation of how the objects fit together inside the musical work. Musical 
objects were no longer the building blocks of potentially endless musical composition; they 
have to fit snuggly inside the musical work because the combination of the objects must 
produce a finished work. And this process of completion imposed a new set of rules upon 
the behaviors of the musical objects. This transformed what it means to function for a 
chord. The overarching question on function was no longer “how this chord functions in 
relation to the referential tonic?” but “how this chord functions in relation to the phrase?” It 
is in the latter meaning of the function that the word “function” was actually used later in 
Hugo Riemann’s theory of musical function (funktionstheorie). 
 
3.3.2. Form, Function, and Organic Unity 
The relationship between a finished work and the progression that leads to its 
completion was the subject of investigation not only in music, but also in philosophy and 
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biology. The fact that the concept of musical work and musical object are both clearly 
defined with their new ontological boundaries, and the fact that they (i.e., musical work and 
object) are both non-physical and abstract (e.g., they are neither visual nor project repeatedly 
consistent emotion) made the conceptualization of a musical form particularly susceptible to 
adopt metaphors from less abstract domains. Just like we project our understanding of 
family to conceptualize more abstract concepts of country and government (e.g., 
“homeland,” “mother tongue,” “forefather”), the conceptualization of musical form was 
heavily influenced with the ideas available at the time that provided less abstract and 
conceptual models for a form. In this section, I will briefly investigate discussions of form in 
Kant’s aesthetic theory and Georges Cuvier’s comparative anatomy (by way of Foucault’s 
observation). It is clear from the music theoretical writings posterior to this period in 
question (ca. 1800) that both biology and aesthetic discussion on form influenced how the 
musical work was conceptualized. This investigation, however, will eventually face more 
challenging question: what influenced what when they first emerged? The timing of the three 
similar investigations (of form in music, aesthetics, and biology) does not help us to 
determine the direction of influence (if it is, at all, possible). However, the nearly 
simultaneous emergence of reconceptualization of form and function in all three disciplines 
does point us to a broader investigation of the social condition of 1800. The investigation of 
this section, therefore, will conclude with the discussion on the Industrial Revolution and 
modes of industrial production.  
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Kant, in his Critique of Judgement, famously discussed the relationship between form 
and function in terms of “purposiveness” (Zweckmäßigkeit) (2000, 105).58 Kant defines the 
word purposiveness as “the causality of a concept with regard to its object” (idem.). 
Elsewhere, he also provided description of purposiveness as the “lawfulness of the 
contingent as such” (2000, 20).59 Kant’s view puts a concept (e.g., a musical composition) in 
a position where the concept’s existence relies upon the lawful progression of the concept’s 
internal components. As a result, the concept at any given time would mark the end of the 
progression that made the existence of the concept possible. In order for this progression of 
the internal components to arrive at the intended product (i.e., the concept), the 
component’s behavior must be considered in terms of its result. In other words, the 
“lawfulness” of the contingent would be determined according to the contribution of the 
component to its final form. This idea of purposiveness applies to a musical work in 
following ways. A musical work with its finished form is composed of musical objects. How 
the internal objects, such as notes and chords, are put together can be judged by their 
“lawfulness” of their composition. In other words, the behavior of the internal musical 
object is now considered to have effect on the composition of the whole. As the quality of 
the composition is determined by its internal components, regulation of the internal 
                                                 
58 The discussion as to what Kant meant by the word “purposiveness” is still on going. For the scope 
of my chapter, however, I am only pointing out that there exists a relationship between finitude, 
contingent, rule, and organic unity. For more in-depth survey on this topic, see Hannah Ginsborg’s 
entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014). 
 
59 There is debate on how to see this statement in relation to purposiveness. Some scholars claim that 
this statement is another definition of purposiveness while others claim that this statement is an 
aspect of purposiveness.  
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components became the main subject of the inquiry when discussing a compositional theory 
or analysis of a composition.  
Kant continues his discussion on the relationship between the purposiveness and the 
concept to investigate the “beautiful art” as a concept and its relationship to the contingents. 
He writes,  
In a product of art one must be aware that it is art, and not 
nature; yet the purposiveness in its form must still seem to be 
as free from all constraint by arbitrary rules as if it were a 
mere product of nature. On this feeling of freedom in the 
play of our cognitive powers, which must yet at the same time 
be purposive, rests that pleasure which is alone universally 
communicable though without being grounded on concepts. 
Nature was beautiful, if at the same time it looked like art; 
and art can only be called beautiful if we are aware that it is 
art and yet it looks to us like nature. (2000, 185)  
 
Kant’s reference to natural form as an ideal structure for a product of beautiful art provides 
the framework in which the finished work can be compared with “nature.” This requires an 
additional criteria for beauty of the finished work. Not only the “arbitrary rules” must seem 
natural, but also “art” must “looks to us like nature.” In musical terms, not only should the 
chord connection follow the rules, but also the musical work should resemble a natural 
form. 
Prior to Kant’s idea, the finished work of art was considered to be a mere 
combination of objects, or Ars Combinatoria. The final form, therefore, does not impose any 
regularity to its constituents so long as the end result does not create logical incoherence; 
what was more important was the logical combination of one object to the other. This idea 
was most famously attributed to Gottfried Leibniz. For Leibniz, the final form, such as a 
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plant, an animal, or an idea, is a mere combination of essential parts. In paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 
and 11 of his Monadology, he writes, 
1. The monad, of which we will speak here, is nothing else 
than a simple substance, which goes to make up compounds; 
by simple, we mean without parts. 
 
2. There must be simple substances because there are 
compound substances; for the compound is nothing else than 
a collection or aggregatum of simple substances. 
 
3. Now, where there are no constituent parts there is possible 
neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads 
are the true atoms of nature, and, in a word, the elements of 
things. 
 
11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural 
changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because 
an external cause can have no influence on its inner being. 
(Leibniz 1989) 
 
This Leibnizian separation between an “external cause” and “its inner being” leads to the 
systemization of the inner components and treats the product as natural outcome as long as 
the mechanical connection between the internal parts are natural. Just like when knitting a 
scarf with the same pattern, the resulting scarf is guaranteed to be perfect no matter how 
long it becomes, as long as the pattern is followed correctly. This has a significant musical 
corollary in the eighteenth century where mechanical connection between two chords 
becomes the main concern of the composers and theorists.60 The only criteria for the 
judgement that concerns the entire musical work is the coherence of the affect. As long as 
the finished composition projects the same types of affect, the coherence of the composition 
                                                 
60 Rameau’s theory is certainly part of this camp as Thomas Christensen observes, “With Rameau’s 
new method, continuo playing was purely a mechanical process of chord placement and finger 
movement, or, as he proudly noted, just a ‘mécanique des doigts’” (1993, 60). 
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would considered to be achieved. An extreme example of this is the “musical dice-game” 
(Musikalisches Würfelspiel), a popular compositional game throughout the eighteenth century.61 
In this type of compositional game, the chance element will determine the progression from 
one segment to the other. The outcome of this game would still be considered as a musical 
composition because, as Leonard Meyer observes, it would still result in “the claims of taste, 
coherent expression and propriety, given the genre of work being composed” (1989, 193). 
The musical form as a regulative entity was not discussed in music theoretical writing until 
the mid-eighteenth century with the works of Joseph Riepel and, later, of Heinrich 
Christoph Koch. The rise of regularity at the phrase level, therefore, marks the decline of the 
Leibnizian mode of formalization and the rise the Kantian mode. 
With the coherence of affect as the regulative force of the musical work, the 
compositional theory of the eighteenth century sought its organizing principle from rhetoric. 
However, Kant’s invocation of nature as the judgement of the finished form, later met with 
the systematized abstraction of life forms which was fueled by the rise of comparative 
anatomy and modern biology. As the conceptualization of a form in-general was going 
through this transformation, the way musical form was conceptualized also changed. 
Consequently, the tight relationship between the musical form and its internal components 
began to be understood in terms of a relationship between a living organism and its internal 
organs. The turn to organic structure as a guiding principle to understand musical form 
                                                 
61 For example, Johann Philipp Kirnberger’s Der allezeit fertige Menuetten- und Polonaisencomponist (1757 
and revised 1783), C. P. E. Bach’s Einfall einin doppelten Contrapunct in der Octave von sechs Tacten zu 
machen ohne die Regeln davon zu wissen (1758), Maximilian Stadler’s Table pour composer des minuets et des 
Trios à la infinie; avec deux dez à jouer (1780), and most famously, W. A. Mozart’s Instruction to compose 
without the least knowledge of music so much German Walzer or Schleifer as one places, by throwing a certain number 
with two dices (K. 516f, 1787). 
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around the early nineteenth century has been observed by many music historians. For 
example, as Jack Boss summarizes, Mark Evan Bonds’s observation that “the early 
nineteenth century’s celebration of absolute, instrumental music as an autonomous 
entity…caused a split between inner, generative concepts of form … and notions of form as 
general categories that contain large groups of pieces (which he calls ‘conformational’ 
approaches)” (Boss 2014, 14)  
The development in biology during this period, therefore, form a discursive 
relationship with the conceptualization of musical form. As observed by Foucault, Georges 
Cuvier’s  
analysis of organisms, and the possibility of resemblances and 
distinctions between them, presupposes, therefore, a table, 
composed not of the elements, which may vary from species 
to species, but of the functions, which, in living beings in 
general, govern, complement, and order one another: not a 
polygon of possible modiﬁcations, but a hierarchical pyramid 
of importance. (Foucault 2005, 290) 
 
Foucault observes that as Cuvier’s comparative anatomy lays bare the commonality 
among all animals, he could reorient the classification of an internal organ based on its 
function. For example, under the function of digestion, different shapes of digestive organs 
could be classified across different animals. Under the function of circulation and respiration 
various organs from different animals could be thought of as residing in the same respective 
categories. This eventually shifted the focus away from what actual shape and form is the 
organ in and towards what function does the organ perform. This function-centric view of 
life forms generated the hierarchy of organs between the ones that are essential to life (e.g., 
heart, stomach, and lungs) and the ones that are of less importance (e.g., fingers, hairs, 
limbs). Foucault argues that this eventually lead to a new understanding of the living being 
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which is no longer seen “as a certain combination of particles bearing different characters.” 
Cuvier’s comparative anatomy “provides the outline of an organic structure, which maintains 
uninterrupted relations with exterior elements that it utilizes (by breathing and eating) in 
order to maintain or develop its own structure” (Foucault 2005, 298). This effectively 
distinguished the living being from its background environment and made possible the idea 
of a starting and ending point of a living being (i.e., the concept of extinction). Foucault 
continues this argument to claim that the concept of “historicity” of a living being was first 
introduced from this new mode of thinking alongside that of wealth and of language. 
Considering the timing of Cuvier’s theory (Leçons d'Anatomie Comparée published in 
1800), similar epistemic shifts between biology and music theory (as well as economy and 
language, as Foucault includes) strongly suggest that these shifts of conceptualization were 
not localized for individual fields but were ramifications of the society which incubated such 
interest in functionality. In this regard, the influence of organicism in nineteenth-century 
musical theoretical writings may not be as strong as what theorists believed it to be. A source 
domain of the conceptual metaphor must prove to be more experiential and physical 
compared to the target domain. The investigation into the organic growth of an idea in 
nineteenth century philosophy (e.g., works by Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhaur, 
whose connection to compositional theory are well summarized in Boss) (Boss 2014, 15–20) 
may have been originally influenced by the study of life forms, which can have more 
experiential basis, but the philosophical introspection of it effectively eliminated the 
possibility to become a physical interaction with the life forms. Furthermore, the study of 
biology itself, from strong influence of Cuvier’s theory, began to investigate aspects of living 
beings that are beyond visible. As Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire writes, “Organic structure is 
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becoming an abstract thing … capable of assuming numerous forms” (Foucault 2005, 287). 
Cuvier’s theory, which became the foundation of today’s biology, directed our attention 
from an organ (a visible thing) to the function (an abstract, non-visible concept). Foucault 
summarizes Cuvier as follows: “it is an error to believe that ‘everything is important in an 
important organ’; our attention must be directed ‘rather upon the functions themselves than 
upon the organs’; before defining organs by their variables, we must relate them to the 
functions they perform” (Foucault 2005, 288). 
For this reason, I argue that it is industrial production—as a more visceral experience 
of form and its internal components—that became the source of the metaphorical 
conceptualization of the musical work beginning from around the mid-eighteenth century. 
The newly emerged industrial mode of production (e.g., the division of labor and use of 
machinery) became the framework in which any musical form began to be understood. In 
the following section, I will delve deeper into this metaphorical conceptualization of musical 
work as an industrial product and contrast it with the mode of conceptualization from the 
earlier period. 
 
3.4. MUSICAL WORK AS AN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT 
3.4.1. Introduction 
With the popular use of the terms such as “music production,” “music industry,” 
and “music business,” there is no doubt that we consider some musical works to be an 
industrial product. But can we say that our understanding of any musical form is based on 
our understanding of an industrial product? I argue that, not just a musical form, but any 
abstract understanding of form that implies the function of its components is shaped by our 
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everyday experience as human beings in an industrial society. A musical work, as an 
inherently abstract concept, demonstrates this tendency visibly, but I believe that underneath 
our conceptualization of musical form lies a more fundamental framework in which we 
create meaning of concepts such as form, components, function, and ultimately the morality 
of contingents.  
This mental framework emerged as the mode of production shifted from that of 
craftsmanship to the division of labor. In this section I will first investigate the new 
conditions in which the concept of functionality could have risen as the central idea of 
formal organization. I will then revisit the concepts discussed in the previous section in light 
of their counter parts in the industrial mode of production. This will show that what 
triggered the reconceptualization of form was the mechanization of human labor and the 
resultant replaceability of workers by machines. As workers are faced with the competition 
of machine labor, the worker’s behavior begins to be situated within stricter regulation 
because, for the person who would ultimately possess the product, it is only the functionality 
that counts as potentially value-creating. This section will end with discussion of the concept 
of morality as it relates to the creation of value and its musical implication. 
 
3.4.2. Rise of Functionality 
Chinese political leader Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote, “It doesn’t matter whether 
the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice,” quite ironically, epitomizes the ideology 
of industrial society by stating the importance of functionality over identity. As the value of a 
product becomes quantifiable through the necessary labor-time (which itself is made 
possible through the quantification and standardization of time), it became possible to seek 
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maximal value by controlling the process of production. This created value is crystallized 
when the product enters into a market. This ultimately separated the concept of value from 
the product (from which the value originated), whereas, previously, the concept of value is 
somewhat hidden from cognition as it is entirely dependent on the product. In an older 
economic system that was largely based on exchanging of goods, for example, the value of a 
product is realized outside of the user at the moment of exchange. In other words, as two 
(or more) people agree on the value of the goods in exchange, the concept of value becomes 
external to the person. However, as soon as this moment passes, this value of the goods is 
back to becoming private to the person who owns and uses them.62 In this system, therefore, 
the ending of production does not coincide with the determination of value. The value 
would be determined not only by the skills of the creator but also by the conditions of 
exchange (e.g., scarcity of the product and techniques of the merchants).  
The change of the economic system transformed all of these relations. The new 
system considered value to be independent from the scarcity of the object. Foucault 
summarizes,  
Eighteenth-century economics stood in relation to a mathesis 
as to a general science of all possible orders; nineteenth-
century economics will be referred to an anthropology as to a 
discourse on man’s natural ﬁnitude. By this very fact, need 
and desire withdraw towards the subjective sphere – that 
sphere which, in the same period, is becoming an object of 
psychology. It is precisely here that in the second half of the 
                                                 
62 The distinction between the values of an object as something useful (“use-value”) and something 
exchangeable (“exchange-value”) is famously made by Karl Marx in Capital (Marx 1990) I adopt 
Marx’s summary economic theory of his time in this section. 
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nineteenth century the marginalists will seek the notion of 
utility. (Foucault 2005, 280) 
 
As “need and desire” becomes an object of psychology—the study of mind that is internal 
and private to the person—their tie with scarcity and scarcity’s tie with value are 
simultaneously uncoupled. This effectively causes the determination of value to occur at the 
end of the production. This means that the process of production gets to be under stricter 
regulation as it is the sole determining factor of the value of the product. In this context, 
more attention would be given to the productivity and functionality of the workers, rather 
than the personality of the workers themselves. In the new economic system, therefore, the 
concept of functionality subsumed the identity of the individual workers. The personality of 
the workers “no longer matters” as long as they “catch mice,” so to speak. The concept of 
function rises up to be the organizing factor of a product. 
Attention to function, therefore, characterizes the society that makes it important; 
any discussion of function carries the vestiges of industrial production. Investigation into 
musical function, likewise, models after the industrial mode of production. In this context, a 
musical work becomes an industrial product, a commodity, and an object of value. As an 
industrial product, a musical work is understood to be a product of division-of-labor-like 
process of its internal components (i.e., any objects that are identifiable as objects such as 
note, chord, and formal section) where each part relates to the final form through its 
functionality. As a commodity, a musical work became intimately tied with ownership. As 
discussed earlier, this concept of ownership solidified the musical work-concept as a 
regulative entity. As an object of value, the process of creation of a musical work—that is, 
actually composing music as well as imagining its compositional process through analysis—
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became understood as the process of creation of value. This, in turn, carried the notion of 
maximizing profit by stricter regulation into the realm of music theory.  
In music theoretical literature of the eighteenth century, we can observe this turn 
from craftsmanship to industrial production as a conceptual model for a musical creation. 
Along this industrial turn, we can see the rise of musical function as the organizing principle. 
I will briefly compare two popular treatises during this period that demonstrate this change. 
A musical work as a result of the craftsmanship of the composer is best exemplified in 
Johann Joseph Fux’s popular compositional treatise on counterpoint Gradus ad Parnassum 
(originally published in 1725). This treatise is useful particularly because it does not rely 
heavily on the rules of rhetoric to determine what a good composer should do to create 
beautiful music: “I have given very little space in this book to theory and much more to 
practice…” (Fux 1965, 18)63 In this treatise, Fux looks back at more than a century prior to 
his time as the source of musical knowledge, as he states that Palestrina’s style is a model for 
a good composition and as he employs a dialog form for a treatise, a reminiscence of ancient 
Greek writings. Structured as a dialog between Aloys (the master) and Joseph (the pupil), the 
entire treatise focuses on the skill building of the pupil. In this context, the quality of the 
composition is entirely dependent upon the technical competency of the composer which is 
only attained through tireless work: “to allow no day to pass without a line written” (Fux 
1965, 48). In order to master the art of counterpoint, the pupil must follow the four 
fundamental rules of counterpoint which are introduced in book one of this treatise (book 
                                                 
63 In the original Latin edition of this treatise, however, the dialogue is the part of the second book, 
which is preceded by the first book on the proportion and division of the monochord. The popular 
English version of this treatise, translated by Alfred Mann, omits this entirely. For the translator, 
Fux’s treatise was entirely about counterpoint which provides a fundamental stepping stones for the 
study of fugal technique. 
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one is omitted in the popular English translation by Alfred Mann). As these rules are 
discussed as part of the first book, which discusses the arithmetic nature of the consonances 
and dissonances, they are not to be considered as rules that govern the behavior of the 
composer nor the musical intervals, but as logical extensions of natural laws. These are not 
the rules that describe what things should be, but describe what things naturally are. In this 
context, the pupil is the one who places notes above or below the cantus firmus according to 
the natural law. Similar to how gravity is considered to be a force that governs all objects 
with mass, this natural law of music is external to all musical objects and governs all musical 
motion.  
This mode of conceptualization soon began to change as musical work became 
thought of as a result of the lawful behavior of the internal components. As musical objects 
become considered as independent entities, natural law began to be internalized to the 
musical objects themselves. The rules that the composer must observe are changed into the 
tendencies that the musical notes possess. Nearly all of the music treatises since the late 
eighteenth century consider music to be this way. Perhaps one of the earliest examples is 
Heinrich Christoph Koch’s 1782 treatise, Versuch einer Anleitung zur Composition and his 1802 
treatise, Musicalisches Lexikon. Koch’s treatises differ significantly from Fux’s. In addition to 
the obvious difference in terms of musical styles they model, what is particularly important is 
the orientation of the musical rules. They are no longer posited as the laws of nature (which 
are to be observed by the pupil) but as laws akin to grammatical rules where the notes 
themselves are under the jurisdiction. As Scott Burnham observes, 
Koch worked hard to demonstrate that musical phrases were 
analogous to grammatically sound sentences. Like sentences, 
musical phrases are both self-sufficient and flexibly 
configured; they possess subjects and predicates and are 
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articulated by different strengths of punctuation; they can 
accommodate a variety of interpolations, extensions, and 
compressions without sacrificing their fundamental 
coherence and comprehensibility. (Burnham 2002, 881) 
 
This reference to grammatical rules may seem like an extension of reference to rhetoric from 
the previous period (this is certainly what Burnham suggests), but it shows a markedly 
different relationship between the composer and the works. Put simply, the rules of rhetoric 
apply to the orator but those of grammar apply to the words. A similar distinction separates 
the musical rules from Fux’s and Koch’s treatises.64 Fux’s musical rules are extensions of 
natural laws whereas Koch’s rules are extractions from music compositional practice.65 While 
Fux’s treatise presents the rules for the (prospective) composer, Koch’s treatise investigates 
logical ways to align musical objects according to the tendencies of the musical objects 
themselves.66 (This should remind us of Kant’s definition of purposiveness as “lawfulness of 
contingent as such” discussed in page 88.) The law applies to the contingent, not the artist. 
This notion of the tendencies of the musical objects eventually granted the agential power to 
the musical notes.  
Treating musical objects as having their own agency rests on two epistemological 
grounds that emerged during the eighteenth century. One is the aforementioned 
                                                 
64 This does not mean Koch did not apply any organizing principle from classical rhetoric as Joel 
Lester observes the similarity between Koch’s three stage plan for a composition (Anlage, Ausführung, 
and Ausarbeitung) and classical rhetoric’s disposition, elaboration, and decoratio (Lester 1992, 297). 
 
65 Burnham writes, [Koch] “extracts some generalized rules for continuations after various types of 
phrase-ending” (Burnham 2002, 881). 
 
66 It would be interesting to consider Joseph Riepel’s theory treatises in light of this which was 
published between years 1752 and 1768, the period between Fux and Koch. Set in a dialog form (an 
obvious homage to Fux’s treatise), Riepel’s theory show heavy influence of Fux’s idea; at the same 
time, Riepel’s theory is closely associated with Koch’s ideas in today’s scholarship on the history of 
musical forms. Riepel’s theory might prove to be situated as the role of a composer is changed.  
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solidification of musical object and the other is the metaphorical understanding of musical 
work as an industrial product. Contrasted to a craftsman who is in charge of the production 
from the beginning until the end, a factory worker (or an industrial machine) is only 
responsible for a single task but with higher efficiency. In this context, each step towards the 
completion of the production becomes visible to the cognition and articulated as functions 
towards a goal of manufacturing. In this regard, manufacturing of a product (or completion 
of an idea) is recontextualized as series of steps where each step is fulfilled by lawful 
behavior of the workers. In musical terms, the workers are not the composer but the musical 
objects with an imagined power to move and the prescribed pathways for a possible motion. 
A musical work is no longer a result of one un-segmented compositional process, but a 
result of the pre-determined steps, while each step is recognized by its purposes. Just as an 
industrial product does not assume one craftsman’s skills, but a combination of specialized 
skills of different workers, a musical work is understood to be the result of the lawful 
behavior of the musical objects.  
As soon as musical objects, with their agential power, are held responsible for 
creating music, the role of the composer is changed from that of the creator to the operator. 
This mental detachment of a composer from the work itself strengthens the possibility of 
ownership of musical work by the composer. As a manager of a factory which produces a 
musical work, the composer became the rightful owner of the musical work for which he 
oversaw its production. Composers saw themselves as the commander of musical objects; 
they began to equate their status to that of a factory owner. This provides the conceptual 
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framework to understand the emergence of the work-concept and the rise of copyright laws. 
Goehr observes that 
In the early eighteenth century, publishing houses acquired 
copyright over music, at least insofar as sheets of music were 
produced. For most of the eighteenth century copyright 
remained so defined. In 1793, however, copyright laws were 
passed in France to transfer ownership away from publishers 
to composers. Germany and England followed suit some 
years later. Though the new laws were not universally 
accepted, the rationale behind them was clear. The new laws 
reflected the basic idea that composers are the first owners of 
their works, for it is they who put the works in permanent 
form. (Goehr 2007, Kindle Location 2415–2417) 
 
This change of ownership from the publishing house to the composer, according to Goehr, 
is due to the fact that “music came to be seen as a free person’s labor” (Goehr 2007, Kindle 
Location 2413–2414). Her analysis only provides half of the explanation—that is the 
relationship between a composer and the society that sees him or her “as a free person.” The 
other half, I argue, concerns the internal relationship between the composer and the work. 
Following the rise of industrial production and the reconceptualization of musical work as 
an industrial product, composers saw themselves as the rightful owner of music where the 
product is created by the labor of the musical objects—that is the fulfillment of function by 
the proper motion of the musical objects. 
The concept of function of musical object made all musical objects resources for 
manufacturing. As an entity with agency, a musical object is considered as a worker in a 
factory; but as an entity that makes up a composition, a musical object is also treated as 
musical raw material; a raw material for which the manufacturer needs to know their 
property to efficiently use. Similar to how realizing tungsten’s natural chemical tendency led 
to the modern incandescent lightbulb and how realizing the combustible nature of oil led to 
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oil refineries and the production of gasoline, realizing natural tendencies or functions of a 
musical object led to a more effective musical product. For example, in the late nineteenth 
century American English translation of Gottfried Weber’s treatise, The Theory of Musical 
Composition (Versuch) the translator praises Weber’s approach for its practicality. 
The subjects which he [Weber] takes up, he treats. He makes 
us fully understand them. He leads us all around them, and 
shows us how they look on every side. If they are buried up 
in rubbish, he clears them of that rubbish, and lets us see 
them in the naked light of simple truth; if they are beset with 
difficulties, he is sure to notice the fact, and either to remove 
those difficulties or to tell us how to estimate them. The 
effect of all this is to give us clear, well-defined, and practical 
ideas—a species of knowledge which we can use. It is only 
this full and perfect grasp of a subject that can give us a 
commanding power over it, and enable us to make a practical 
appropriation of it… (Weber 1851, vii) 
 
In this regard, the analysis of the relationship between human and technology by 
Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler provides a broader context for the changing 
relationship between the composer and the work. Adopting Simondon’s position that the 
separation of human and technology (or sometimes referred to as just “matter”) is based on 
a poor understanding of both; the tools that we use not only show the human’s creative 
power and tendency to cultivate nature, but also it shows the tools’ shaping of human 
culture where the tools themselves become the carrier of the cultural norm. Instead of 
treating a culture as entirely human production, therefore, a culture is created with the 
ensemble of human and technology, for which both philosophers adopt a Greek term technē 
(τέχνη) and, its adopted form, technics, to describe it. According to both, deep understanding 
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of human life, therefore, comes from critical reflection on the tools that are used. Stiegler 
writes, 
To know the essence of the machine, and thereby 
understanding the sense of technics in general, is also to 
know the place of the human in “technical ensembles.” There is 
general agreement on the change in technics since the advent 
of the Industrial Revolution, insofar as it causes the 
appearance of machine apparatus of production that call into 
question the traditional relation of the human to the 
technical. (Stiegler 1998, 66) 
 
The relationship between human and technology changed with the appearance of “industrial 
technical object,” which “appeared somewhere in the eighteenth century” along with the 
Industrial Revolution (Stiegler 1998, 66). Stiegler summarizes Simondon’s claim that 
In the explanation of technical evolution by the coupling of 
the human to matter, cut across by the technical tendency, an 
essential part of this tendency, coming from the ethnic 
interior milieu as intention, remains anthropologically determined. 
Simondon has this interior milieu becoming diluted. The 
tendency no longer has an anthropological source. Technical 
evolution stems completely from its own technical object. 
The human is no longer the intentional actor in this dynamic. It 
is the operator. (Stiegler 1998, 62) 
 
As the object began to be produced by machine (i.e., another object), humans began to 
recede into the background of the process of production. For Stiegler, this does not mean 
devaluing of human agency. It simply replaces one type of human agency with another, that 
is, from that of a commander to that of an operator. He later elaborates as follows. 
The industrial technical object has brought us to the 
suppression of the intentional anthropological part of the 
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techno-logical dynamic. But a part still remains, namely that 
the living, who no longer commands, operates. (Stiegler 1998, 78)  
 
In the actual physical relation between human and matter, Stiegler’s (and Simondon’s) 
analysis would be enough to describe the nature of the changing relationship.  
This new dynamic between human and matter became the dominant mode of 
understanding musical works through metaphorical adaptation. The rise of functionality of 
musical objects reflects that of industrial production where efficiency became the goal of the 
production. In the industrial production where human work is monotonous and repetitive, 
the introduction of machinery into the assembly line became a real threat to the labor 
market. This threat is still visible in today’s society (e.g., computerization of a grocery store 
counter) but it first emerged with the Luddite movement around the late eighteenth century. 
This new relationship made the machine more human-like (so that it can replace error-laden 
human labor) and the human more machine-like (so that it can compete with the machine’s 
precision and earn wages). And the two are both under the jurisdiction of functionality; 
whichever fails to be functional is discarded.  
 
3.4.3. Organic Unity as Industrial Object 
One remaining issue when claiming that a musical work is metaphorically 
conceptualized as an industrial product is the existence of a competing metaphor which 
adopts a living organism as a source of understanding the musical work. I argue that, 
however, this apparent competition between two conceptual models, in fact, converges as 
the functionality of the organism became the dominant mode of understanding. In other 
words, the concept of organic unity is understood, also, according to industrial production. 
As both musical work and living organism are viewed through the lens of functionality, the 
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competition of metaphor dissolves. I have discussed the emergent concept of function as 
organizing principle in the earlier section in light of Foucault’s analysis of Cuvier’s 
comparative anatomy.  
Perhaps a detailed analysis of the influence of industrial production on the 
conceptualization of life forms is outside of the scope of the current discussion. However, it 
is within the scope to look into what features of organicism music theorists and composers 
adopted to be relevant to the study of music. As Scott Burnham observes, “one of the 
principal methodological manifestations of the organicist perspective [for music theorists 
and composers] is the analysis of formal functions” (Burnham 2002, 892). He continues to 
explain that “Musical form is here ﬁgured as an organism in which every part has a speciﬁc 
function” (Burnham 2002, 892).This somewhat dilutes the musical adaptation of organicism 
because the concept of musical organicism as well as the concept of organic structure itself 
are both interested in the functionality of internal parts. And the concept of functionality 
leads to the agency of each part. An internal component can only function as long as it is 
imagined to be capable of the act of functioning.  
A telling example of treating a living organism as an industrial product is the German 
physician Fritz Kahn’s infographic, Der Mensch als Industriepalast (1926). In this diagram (see 
Figure III-3), human body is depicted as an industrial complex where each section performs 
their own duty to maintain the life of a man. Under its assigned role, each organ is reduced 
to its function. For example, a liver (Leber in German) breaks down sugar (Zuker) and 
transports it to a kidney (Niere) or makes bile (Galle).  
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Figure III-3. Fritz Kahn, Der Mensch als Industriepalast (Man as Industrial Palace). 
Stuttgart, 1926. Chromolithograph. National Library of Medicine 
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In this diagram—and to a large extent, in the naïve understanding of the public—this is all 
that matters to the sustenance of life. Other features of the liver do not matter as much 
because they do not count into the function of a liver. This way of thinking made possible a 
diagnosis of diseases according to the function of the internal organ. For example, a liver 
failure is considered to be a form of disease that mainly concerns a liver. Wherever the 
function breaks down stands out as the identity of the disease. So is the case of cancer where 
the type of cancer is determined by where the tumor is located, for example, lung cancer, 
skin cancer, and so on. 
A musical parallel for this type of diagnosis emerged as a musical composition is 
considered to be a collection of different functioning parts. This led to an impulse to revise 
earlier composition; a tendency that seemingly contradicts the Werktreue movement, but is 
nevertheless founded on the same epistemological ground. Both Werktreue and revision 
movements underlie the assumption that a change in a part affects the quality of the whole, 
an “organicist” view of musical composition. In case of Werktreue, this assumption works as 
a regulative force. In case of the revision movement, this assumption works as a diagnosis of 
a disease where it must be cured to restore the quality of composition. For example, when 
Carl Czerny inserted a measure in J. S. Bach’s C Major Prelude in book one of the Well-
Tempered Clavier, his intention was clear in terms of voice-leading (see Figure III-4). The 
awkwardness of bass motion from F-sharp to A-flat is fixed by the addition of G in 
109 
between.67 This notion that one can fix a malfunctioning part is not readily available in one’s 
encounter with a lifeform without a mechanistic understanding of the part. 
 
Figure III-4. Czerny's Revision of J. S. Bach's Well-Tempered Clavier Book 1 Prelude in C 
major. 
 
3.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have investigated the philosophical, social, and historical context in 
which the concept of musical function emerged as the central idea of organization for a 
musical work since the eighteenth century. My main claim is that a musical work, reimagined 
as a result of industrial production, started to be understood in terms of the lawful behavior 
of its internal components. This shifted the focus of music’s theoretical investigation from 
what things are (in relation to either nature or the tonal space) to what things do (i.e., how 
do they function in relation to the formal boundaries). Along this shift towards functionality, 
emerged the uncoupling of location and function. In the earlier mode, a musical object is 
assumed a role purely by where it is located in the musical space; whereas in the new mode, a 
musical object is expected to move according to the prescribed pathways, but the actual 
                                                 
67 The same passage also bothered Heinrich Schenker for the same reason. He, however, did not 
insert an additional measure. Instead, he claimed that the F-sharp does not move to A-flat, instead 
moves to G in the next measure. The Ab is considered an inner-voice (Schenker 2012, 37).  
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movement is considered to be the responsibility of the object, not the composer. This 
eventually reconfigured the relationship between a composer and his or her musical work. 
Under the new mode, the composer was no longer a craftsman who is responsible for the 
entire process of creation, but a factory operator who oversees the behaviors of the musical 
objects. This reconfigured relationship granted a sense of ownership to the composer. The 
institution of copyright law in the eighteenth century marks this change. And the continued 
existence of the copyright law and the industrial production solidifies this new relationship 
between the work and the creator. 
In the realm of musical objects, the rise of functionality introduced two related 
concepts: structural motion and colorful elaboration. Conceptualized as the workers in the 
production line, a musical object’s behavior is judged according to that object’s prescribed 
function. Only the functional progression is considered value-creating and other non-
functional progression is considered as either simply wrong or colorful (thereby not 
moving). Since only the functional progression contributes to the completion of the product, 
the musical work is considered to maintain its essence even if the non-functional progression 
is eliminated. The functional/non-functional divide and the resultant essentiality of musical 
object operate within a similar mental framework as industrial production. 
In both musical and industrial production, all contingents are necessary to create the 
finished form. However, within these contingents, some are more essential than others 
because the essential parts are considered to be contributing more to the production. 
Inessential parts are replaceable and replacing them does not affect the overall quality of the 
product. In the meantime, it is preferable to minimize the use of inessential materials 
because it would result in unnecessary use of labor and resources. This is why the sentences, 
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for example, “all the notes in this music are there for a specific purpose” and “there is no 
excess of notes in this composition” qualify as praise, not a testament for the lack of 
flourishing. 
As the history of modern music theory coincides with the development of industrial 
society, the functionality of the musical object became the dominant mode of understanding 
a musical work. To analyze a musical work became synonymous with knowing the function 
of the internal musical objects. As Hugo Riemann observes,  
Es bedarf wohl nicht des Hinweises, dass der eigentliche 
Wegweiser durch den Labyrinth der moglichen 
Harmoniefolgen seit Aufstellung der Funktionsbezeichnung 
nicht mehr die Nomenklatur der Harmonieschritte sondern 
vielmehr diejenige der Funktionen ist. 
 
It goes without saying that since the introduction of the 
taxonomy of function, the actual signpost through the maze 
of possible harmonic successions is no longer the 
nomenclature of root-interval progressions but rather that of 
functions. (Rehding 2008, Kindle Location 617–618) 
 
This provides an opportunity to critically reflect on today’s music theoretical discourse. Can 
today’s music theory stand without the concept of function? Given the inter-dependent 
relationship between form and function, what can we say about the growing interest in 
musical form such as Sonata Theory? Isn’t Schenker’s notion of fundamental structure 
(Ursatz) a particularly industrial way of looking at a composition? For example, when he says 
all (good) music is a composing out of the fundamental structure, how much of his idea of 
the relationship between the fundamental structure and composing out resembles the 
relationship between designing of an industrial product and execution of the design?  
How about the case of non-functioning chords? In today’s music theoretical 
discourse, are they, perhaps, serving a function of “not-functioning”? Within this dichotomy 
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of functioning and non-functioning, every musical object operates. Arnold Schonberg’s 
criticism of the term “non-harmonic tones” and his emancipation of dissonance can be 
reconsidered in light of this dichotomy as many music theorists have observed. Perhaps he 
was envisioning a mode of conceptualization that does not reduce musical elements down to 
their functions, thereby accessing beyond what functional analysis can offer. Be that as it 
may, the recent discussion of the prolongation of atonal music shows how strong our 
assumption of functionality is because even in the music that is potentially composed to do 
away with functionality, or at the very least, composed with dimensions of functionality that 
transcends the conventional notion of prolongation and elaboration, some music analysts 
still try to find the functional relationship of structural and embellishing notes in the 
conventional sense.  
More broadly, the assumption of function is not limited to musical objects. We can 
consider it as a ramification of our everyday assumptions within industrial society. For 
example, we do not leave a tree as its own being but treat it as a functioning object by 
focusing on its process of photosynthesis or its use as a raw material for manufacturing. 
Food is not merely something we eat, but now we consider it as a source of nutrients and 
energy as well as diseases. We ourselves are also under the domain of functionality. Every 
single member of the society is serving social functions. We readily determine who we are by 
what we do or what we are supposed to do. This can be applied to Karl Marx’s famous 
“social division of labor,” but can also be applied to more naïve description such as being a 
teacher or a father. When we say someone is a teacher, we refer to that person’s role in a 
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community, in other words, a social function; and by realizing that he or she is a teacher, we 
claim to know something about who he or she is.  
However, being a teacher does not fully correspond to the being of that person. It 
only highlights one aspect of the person. Nevertheless, knowing the function of a person 
satisfies our curiosity to a certain extent. Similarly, knowing the function of a musical object 
may not fully correspond to the knowing of what the musical object is, but it nevertheless 
satisfies our desire to know music. Consequently, since knowing the function of a musical 
object satisfies our urge to know the musical object, it does not drive us further to seek what 
the musical object really is. In other words, knowing the function of a musical object does 
not lead to the sonic nature of the musical object; the investigation for the knowledge of 
music, therefore, does not account for the aspects of musical sound that are not formalized 
as the family of functions such as timbre and dynamics. In this account, the analysis of 
musical function always falls short.68 Yet the existence of function passed the threshold of 
positivity. We no longer question whether or not there is a function; we question what the 
function of a musical object is. Even in the case that the function is not clearly recognizable, 
we do not release the object from the network of functionality.  
This may make us feel that perhaps our tendency to look for functionality is hard-
wired to our brain—but, this is not the case. There are instances that we do not impose 
functionality upon a series of ordered objects such as in the case of a rainbow. Even though 
Western culture recognizes seven different colors of a rainbow in an ordered succession, we 
                                                 
68 This discussion is modeled after Martin Heidegger’s discussion on Dasein. Against the strong 
presence of the other mode of being (Present-at-hand and Ready-to-hand) the Dasein always recedes 
into the background making it harder to grasp (Heidegger 2001, 402). 
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do not impose function onto the colors. No matter how transitory the color indigo may 
seem, for example, we do not assign that indigo’s function is to transit from one color to 
another. 69 By comparing this with our understanding of the function of a leading-tone, we 
can see that our concept of function is culturally, and we will soon see historically, 
constructed. 
Coming back to music theory, the fact that the discussion of function is only 
possible after the identification of the musical object, and the fact that, once at the stage of 
analyzing functional relationship between musical objects, we avert our attention away from 
the identity of the musical object, may explain the lack of interest in the study of timbre and 
other sonic features of music. I believe that the pervasive discussion of musical function 
does not lead us back to the stage where the critical investigation of identification occurs. 
The heavily systematized theoretical model of musical motion and relative lack of analytic 
tools for investigation of timbre, chordal color, and other “non-functional” objects in 
today’s music theoretical discourse shows that, perhaps, it is time for us to move away from 
finding and constructing function in music. 
  
                                                 
69 It is interesting to see how much our ideas of color are different from earlier periods. For example, 
Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of the Power of Judgement, relates the color indigo (the sixth color) with 
“constancy.” The seven colors from red to violet, as written by Kant, “seem to suggest the ideas of 
(1) Sublimity, (2) Audacity, (3) Candor, (4) Friendliness, (5) Modesty, (6) Steadfastness, [and] (7) 
Tenderness.” In this case the associated ideas of color is different from our understanding of 
function because these ideas do not form a relationship between each other as a function would 
(Kant 2000, 181). 
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CHAPTER IV 
REFLECTION ON (AND IN) STRUNK’S TONNETZ70 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
During my personal meeting with Steven Strunk in 2011 at the national meeting of 
the Society for Music Theory at Minneapolis, he told me that the use of the word “flip” in 
the contemporary Neo-Riemannian literature needs to be rethought.71 He said that nowhere 
in the world of geometric operations do we find the word “flip.” Instead, he advocated the 
use of terms such as “translation,” “rotation,” and “reflection,” borrowed from the field of 
transformational geometry, when describing operations on the Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz. In 
his article, “Wayne Shorter’s Yes and No: An Analysis” (2003), he applies this rethought 
version of the Neo-Riemannian operations to a post-bop jazz composition, which, according 
to a jazz music theorist Henry Martin, “pioneered the application of Neo-Riemannian 
concepts to jazz theory” (2012, 2). Strunk treats the Neo-Riemannian operations (parallel, 
                                                 
70 I presented an earlier version of this chapter at the 2011 meeting of the Music Theory Society of 
Mid-Atlantic.   
 
71 In his article, Strunk also expresses his frustrations over theorists’ use the term “flip” without a 
proper definition (2003, 49n21). Perhaps the most famous example of using the word “flip” in the 
context of Neo-Riemannian literature is David Lewin’s article “Cohn Functions” (1996). Lewin 
defines the term Cohn flip as follows: “A mod N function is Cohn flipped when an exchange of 
different (NB) values at adjacent (NB) arguments gives rise to a rotated retrograde of the original 
function” (Lewin 1996, 183). Take a C-major triad for example. Cohn-flipping it will generate two 
minor triads: C minor and E minor (strictly speaking, E-minor triad in second inversion). In the case 
of C major to C minor, E is “exchanged” with the “argument” that is “adjacent”: Eb. The result is a 
C-minor triad, which is a rotated retrograde of C major (the major third and minor third from the 
bass note is now a minor third and major third). The Cohn flip is based on the operation called 
contextual inversion, which was conceived as part of harmonic dualism in nineteenth-century 
German music theory. The contextual inversion of a C-major triad will generate the above two minor 
triads, as well as an A-minor triad. However, in the case of C major to A minor, G is exchanged with A. 
This operation is not a Cohn flip because G and A are not adjacent in mod-12 space. Later in this 
article, I will discuss contextual inversion in depth. 
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leading-tone exchange, and relative) as operations on a purely geometric surface instead of 
treating them as operations on the surface of a musical staff. In this way, Strunk envisions a 
musical space that is different from the one corresponds to notation, which I consider the 
“next step” in the development of the musical space historically. Instead of referring to the 
music theoretical writings which formed the basis of Neo-Riemannian analysis, Strunk refers 
to a college geometry text when introducing his version of Neo-Riemannian analysis. Since 
“Strunkian” method of the Tonnetz application preserves the appearance of the operations on 
paper, the difference between the two methods may not seem obvious. The difference 
hinges on the preservation of the set-class. The conventional method of applying P, L, and R 
operations maintains the set-class of the chord before and after the application of the 
operations, whereas Strunkian maintains the function of the chord; the set-class may or may 
not change after the operations, but it does not matter either way. In other words, although 
he kept the appearance of the Neo-Riemannian operations, he altered what these operations 
can do.  
In this chapter, I argue that the unique relationship between notation and music in 
the jazz context led Strunk to rethink the conventional use of the Tonnetz. I believe that 
Strunk’s insistence on proper terminology is informed by jazz performance practice, which 
has an entirely different conceptual origin from that of conventional Neo-Riemannian 
methodology. Instead of relying on notationally based contextual inversion and 
parsimonious voice-leading (the two “foundational topic[s] for Neo-Riemannian literature”) 
(Straus 2011, 44n7), Strunk focuses on the function of the chord—in other words, how the 
chord sounds in context. This consideration for the sonic dimension can be observed not only 
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in Strunk’s analysis but also in the field of jazz analysis in general.72 By reflecting on Strunk’s 
use of the Tonnetz, I investigate Strunk’s reconceptualization of Neo-Riemannian theory in 
order to shed light on the loose relationship between notation and music in a jazz analysis. 
This chapter is in two parts. In the first half, I investigate the methodological 
difference between the conventional and Strunkian uses of the Tonnetz by focusing on the 
degree to which they rely on notation. Second, I explore the weaknesses of Strunk’s method 
by demonstrating the potential inconsistency of treating the Tonnetz as a purely geometric 
surface, and also its strengths by demonstrating new relations made possible by Strunk’s 
method. In particular, the Strunkian Tonnetz is especially powerful to draw a visual 
connection between two Z-related sets when they are represented as asymmetrical figures on 
a Tonnetz. More broadly, I show that a more geometrically grounded conception of the 
Tonnetz allows us to visualize the inner-interval structure of pitch-class sets.  
 
4.2. PRELIMINARY QUESTION: HOW DO WE ANALYZE JAZZ? 
Before we go further, we first need to consider the overarching characteristics of jazz 
analysis. To analyze jazz, a theorist must transcribe. This process of converting sound into 
notation pries open the connection between the act of notating music and the act of making 
                                                 
72 This is not to say that the conventional Neo-Riemannian analysis does not consider the sonic 
dimensions of their subject. However, Strunk is the only theorist among the Neo-Riemannian circle 
who supported his theoretical extension with performance practice. To give a brief example, he 
writes that his extension of the Neo-Riemannian operations to include seventh and ninth chords is 
“reasonable for the analysis of jazz, because in jazz, the degree to which a chord is extended is 
variable and is determined on an ad hoc basis by the pianist (or whoever is playing the chords)” 
(Strunk 2003, 48). Later in this article, I will investigate the foundation of Strunk’s Tonnetz application 
in detail. 
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it.73 Therefore, in a jazz context, a musical work is not represented by its written notes, but 
by something more non-visual in nature, such as the recorded performance, a chord-
progression, or an improvisation. In any case, the material basis crucial for the formation of 
work-concept is unstable in jazz compared to classical music. If we treat the concept of 
musical work as an amalgam of various constituents (such as notation, performance, sound, 
background historical information, etc.), a large part of what constitutes a jazz composition 
would depend upon the specific performers and the sounds they create. For example, the 
essence of Miles Davis’s “So What” lies not in the notated score (if there is any) but in the 
recording that appears on the first track of Kind of Blue—in the sounds performed by his 
group. In any case, notation rarely plays a role in the representation of a jazz composition. 
On the other hand, in conventional music analysis, the notated score is often considered the 
sole representation of the musical work. For many, the notation is the musical work. In the 
context of classical music, the performance becomes an interpretation of the musical work; 
in the context of jazz music, however, the interpretation of the musical work is actually the 
transcription. Even a most detailed transcription of a jazz performance cannot diminish the 
status of the performance.74 
In short, analyzing jazz music usually involves applying analytical tools that were 
originally developed for the analysis of classical music. Practically speaking, this means that 
                                                 
73 There is a significant amount of discussion regarding the use of notation in jazz. Many scholars, 
including Larson (2005), Prouty (2006), and Rinzler (2008), approach the issue in light of an 
improvisation–versus–composition dichotomy. This discussion of notationality can be seen as a part 
of a larger discussion of theory versus practice. Henri Martin (1997) was perhaps the first scholar to 
recognize this distinction when he categorized music theory as “musician-based” and analytical.  
 
74 It is not a coincidence that a similar argument has been made in the field of historical performance 
practice. For both jazz and historical performance practice, improvisation plays a crucial role. In a 
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the analysis of jazz music often requires the notated score. The sounds need to be written 
down. At the same time, applying these “classical” tools in the analysis of jazz music requires 
adapting them to a new context. This adaptation transforms both the tool and the music. 
The fact that an analytical tool is being applied to a type of music that it was not originally 
designed for brings out a new potential for the analytical tool that was not previously 
explored. In other words, if we recognize classical music and jazz music as two different 
objects, the interaction between the analytical tool and each style should also be considered 
as fundamentally different.75 Steve Larson’s Schenkerian analysis of jazz music, for example, 
transformed Schenkerian analysis itself as a tool applicable to jazz music . To be more 
specific, within the space created by the interaction of Schenkerian analysis and jazz music, 
the ninths, elevenths, and thirteenths of a chord (or the sounds represented by these names) 
became unresolved suspensions. By doing so, the sounds that were recognized as suspension 
                                                 
recent book, Barthold Kuijken advocates that notation “direct[s] itself toward the wrong physical 
sense: toward the eye instead of the ear” (2013, 12). The title of the book (The Notation is Not the 
Music) should be enough to clarify his position on notation. 
 
75 This description of the relation between two objects (an analytical tool and a musical style) may 
resemble the philosopher Graham Harman’s understanding of the relationship of objects named 
“vicarious causation” (Herman 2007). He maintains that “every relation is itself an object” (2007, 
207). When I encounter a pine tree, for example, the two separate objects (the pine tree and me) 
reside “on the interior of a third [object]: the [Husserlian] intention as a whole” (2007, 197). Within 
the space created from this encounter, I sense the pine tree. However, the pine tree that I experience 
is not the fully accounted being of the pine tree. There will always be a certain aspect of the pine tree 
that is beyond my senses. Therefore, the pine tree within this intentional space is merely a sensual 
being. The real pine tree stays outside of this space. This intentional space usually contains one real 
object (me) and one sensual object (the pine tree). Since the third object—the intention—is defined 
by its constituents and the hierarchy of the constituents (i.e., which one plays the dominant role by 
being the real object), different objects create the different intention. Applied in the context of my 
argument, the interaction between analysis and classical music generates conventional analysis which 
is independent from both the analytical impulse and classical music; the interaction between analysis 
and jazz music generates a jazz analysis which may be considered as a sibling of the conventional 
analysis, but nevertheless different from it. 
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are stripped of their (Herman 2007) stylistic origins. It no longer matters if one hears the 
sounds (i.e., the suspensions) in classical or jazz contexts once they are identified as objects 
independent from their backgrounds.76 Through the use of the Schenkerian analysis, the 
sound of the unresolved suspension is isolated from its contexts and becomes a quality that 
is recognizable through our (i.e., the readers of Larson’s articles) perception. This, I believe, 
is the relationship between an analytical tool and music. An analytical tool casts a ray of light 
into its musical raw material to illuminate a quality embedded deeply in the music; a quality 
that is, perhaps, not yet available to our perception. Through the application of the new 
analytical tool, listeners are given new ears to hear the music differently from before; and 
hearing the music differently requires a new analytic tool. This interaction between the tool 
and music therefore reveals new aspects of both. This brings us back to the question: “How 
do we analyze jazz?” My answer is, by reinventing both analysis and jazz. Strunk’s reinvented 
Neo-Riemannian theory stands as a testimony for the uniqueness of the relationship 
between analysis and jazz.  
                                                 
76 This observation is inspired by the phenomenological analysis of color perception by the French 
philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponti (2002). Throughout the book, he frequently offers his analysis 
on color as a representative for a sense perception in general. According to Merleau-Ponti, our 
concept of color emerges from our encounters with different colored objects. Therefore, there is no 
pure concept of color independent from our perception. For example, he writes, “If, on looking at a 
mountain scene, we adopt a critical attitude and isolate part of the field, then the colour itself 
changes, and this green, which was meadow green, when taken out of its context, loses its thickness 
and its colour as well as its representative value” (Merleau-Ponti 2002, 364–365). In other words, the 
greenness of the meadow and, say, the greenness of a traffic signal are two different qualities. 
However, when they are taken out of their respective contexts, a relatively general concept of 
greenness emerges, which is different from meadow green and traffic-signal green. Applied in 
context of my argument, the sound of the unresolved suspension in context of classical music and 
that of jazz music are two fundamentally different objects, and they contribute to the emergence of 
new concept of the sound of the unresolved suspension that is detached from its backgrounds. 
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4.3. METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE 
4.3.1. Notationality in Conventional Neo-Riemannian Literature 
To investigate the methodological difference between conventional and Strunkian 
use of the Tonnetz, we first need to understand how integral the role of notation is in Neo-
Riemannian theory. Only then, can we appreciate the idiosyncrasy of Strunk’s application of 
the Tonnetz. In this section, I will first show the prevalence of contextual inversion and 
parsimonious voice-leading in the Neo-Riemannian literature and then show their reliance 
on notation. I will continue by demonstrating the mechanism in which the Tonnetz operates 
in conventional Neo-Riemannian analysis. As we shall see, although the Tonnetz seemingly 
provides a new system of visualizing musical sound, it is still heavily dependent upon 
notation because the Tonnetz, in its original form, is the visualization of parsimonious voice-
leading and contextual inversion, two operations that are grounded on notation. Finally, I 
will end the section by analyzing Strunk’s methodology and contrasting it with the 
conventional use of the Tonnetz.  
As mentioned earlier, contextual inversion and parsimonious voice-leading are the 
two foundational topics of Neo-Riemannian theory. Nearly all of the early Neo-Riemannian 
literature begins by considering either or both of these two concepts. We can deduce the 
foundational role they play when we look at theorists’ attempt to expand the analytic 
potential of Neo-Riemannian theory. The reason why these new attempts are considered as 
extensions of the original and not a new theory altogether is because they maintain the use 
of contextual inversion and/or parsimonious voice-leading.  
Adrian Childs (1998), for example, treats parsimonious voice-leading as a generating 
principle for new relationships between seventh-chords. He devised eight new 
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transformations that preserve two notes of a seventh chord while moving the other two into 
either similar or contrary motion by a half-step. Each transformation is defined based on 
which two notes are held and which two notes are moved. Richard Cohn (1996) developed a 
new system of organization based, also, on parsimonious voice-leading. His “hyper-
hexatonic system” categorizes all available major and minor triads into four groups based on 
four hexatonic super-sets which can produce the six distinct major and minor triads. Edward 
Gollin (1998), on the other hand, based his theory on contextual inversion when considering 
a network of dominant and half-diminished seventh-chords. The result is a three-
dimensional Tonnetz within which the two seventh chords are related according to the 
conventional Neo-Riemannian operations: P, L, and R (Figure IV-1).  
 
Figure IV-1. Three-Dimensional Tonnetz (Gollin 1998, 198) 
The main reason why these two chords are used is not just because they are commonly used 
sonorities in tonal music, but also because they are applicable within the same mechanism of 
contextual inversion. In other words, the system that generates the relationship is left 
untouched and only the raw material is changed from the triad to the seventh chord. For 
example, the root-position dominant seventh-chord consists of major-, minor- and minor-
third from the bottom up; and the root-position half-diminished seventh chord has the same 
intervals from the top down. As a result, flipping one chord type will generate the other type. 
Some of the other commonly-used seventh chord sonorities, such as the minor-minor 
123 
seventh chord, may not involve two distinct sonorities because they consist of a symmetrical 
ordering of the intervals (for minor-minor seventh, the inner-intervals are minor, major, 
minor thirds from the bottom up).  These chords will generate the same sonority upon 
contextual inversion because of the vertically symmetrical structure of the intervals (see 
Figure IV-2). 
 
Figure IV-2. Contextual Inversion of G minor Seventh Chord 
Joseph Straus also adopts contextual inversion as a generating principle for a Tonnetz and 
constructs what he calls the “contextual-inversion space for trichords” (Straus 2011). He 
later applied this to create a Tonnetz based on a set-class (014) and uses it to analyze the 
second movement of Anton Webern’s Concerto for Nine Instruments, op. 24. Considering how 
Neo-Riemannian theory first began, Straus’s analysis resides far from the early forms of the 
theory. However, the operational consistency between Straus’s work and early Neo-
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Riemannian theory generated a Tonnetz that looks nearly identical irrespective of the musical 
style. (see Figure IV-3 and Figure IV-4) 
 
Figure IV-3. “Tonnetz for sc(014)” (Straus 2011, 55) 
 
Figure IV-4.“Oettingen / Riemann Tonnetz” (Cohn 1997, 15) 
Depending on the theorist, the definitions of contextual inversion and parsimonious 
voice-leading can change slightly. However, the underlying assumption remains mostly 
unchanged; both are defined as operations on a notated score. For the scope of this article, I 
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will only consider the versions of parsimonious voice-leading and contextual inversion which 
are closely related to the Tonnetz that Strunk used in his analysis. This version of the Tonnetz 
is one of the most commonly used by theorists such as Brian Hyer (1995), Richard Cohn 
(1997), Robert Morris (1998), and Julian Hook (2006). The contextual inversion flips the 
chord upside-down by taking a triad as a single, unified entity (so that the notes within the 
triad do not move independently). As a result, the inner-interval structure of the chord 
(major- and minor-third in the case of a major triad) is also flipped. (see Figure IV-5) No 
matter how the result may seem, it is important to remember that the contextual inversion is 
originally conceived as an inversion of a chord, not a stepwise motion of a chord-tone. Since 
the operation only rearranges the intervals within the chord, and does not create a new 
interval of a different size, the process preserves the set-class and the interval-vector before 
and after the operations.  
 
Figure IV-5. Contextual inversion of C major triad 
The pervasiveness of the contextual inversion in Neo-Riemannian theory can be 
observed from the term “flip” because the motion it describes more closely resembles 
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contextual inversion on a staff than reflection in a Tonnetz. The term flip captures the nature 
of the implied motion of the Neo-Riemannian operations because the one-dimensional, 
vertical orientation of a chord on a staff resembles a flip of a coin (even though there can be 
different versions of the flip).  If the operations were to be conceptualized geometrically in a 
two-dimensional space, however, the term flip would not have been the first word that comes 
to mind, because the associated gestures that result from the Neo-Riemannian operations do 
not depict an action that we colloquially associate with the word flip. We can highlight this 
distinction by imagining the different actions associated with “turn a page” and “flip a page.” 
Flip generally describes an action which takes an object, reverses its orientation, and puts it 
back to its original location. Of course, the relationship between the word and the harmonic 
motion described as P, L, and R is not strictly causal. However, the widespread use of the 
word does hint at the origin of the Neo-Riemannian operation, which is the contextual 
inversion on a musical staff.77   
Parsimonious voice-leading originally began as a concept dependent on contextual 
inversion. Instead of focusing on the inversion of the chord in its entirety, parsimonious 
voice-leading focuses on the resultant offset of the chord tone. For example, in the case of 
L-transformation of a C-major triad, instead of considering the mapping of all three notes (E 
to G, G to E, and C to B), the parsimonious voice-leading embraces only the C to B 
mapping. Since E and G map onto each other, there is no net effect of the motion of the 
                                                 
77 When introducing the term “Cohn-flip,” Lewin does not use a staff, but uses letter names (1996, 
181–182). But the mental image still follows the logic of contextual inversions in that he treats the 
letter names the same way as notes on a staff. 
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two pitches (see Figure IV-5).78 In the literature that concentrates on parsimonious voice-
leading, its contextual-inversion origin is sometimes omitted altogether.79 The premise of 
parsimonious voice-leading is that with just a few half-step motions of the chord tones, the 
chord can travel to a harmonically distant area from its origin. For example, just with the two 
half-step motions generated by the L- and P-transformation (in order), a C-major chord can 
become an E-major chord, a chromatic mediant from the original chord. If the same pair is 
applied again to the E-major chord, the outcome will be a G#-major chord. Underneath this 
concept of parsimony lies the concept of voice-leading distance. To say that a certain voice 
moves parsimoniously means that the chord takes less effort to travel a long distance. In this 
case, the chord is metaphorically understood as the object that moves, and the note as the 
object that leads. If the chord quality were to change before and after the operation, the 
operation no longer generates a motion, let alone a parsimonious voice-leading, because the 
concept of motion is disintegrated as the object in motion is altered. For example, only when 
the shape of a triad is maintained before and after the operation can the triad be considered 
as moved. In this context, the set-class plays a role of identity. If, for any reason, the set-class 
is different before and after the operation, the underlying condition of parsimonious voice-
leading would not be fulfilled. There is no motion. It is as if when a pebble turns into a tree, 
their location is of less importance. Only when a pebble is still a pebble after the movement, 
can we perceive it as having moved. Parsimonious voice-leading, then, works like a portal. If 
we consider that the energy it takes to move a chord is determined by the degree of 
                                                 
78 Cohn calls this “double common-tone retention” (1997, 2). 
 
79 In one of Cohn’s articles which focuses on parsimonious voice-leading, he (perhaps unknowingly) 
redefines the P, L, and R operations by only showing the movement of the voices (1997). 
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transposition of each chord tone, parsimonious voice-leading offers a far-more energy-
efficient motion of a chord. For example, to transpose a C-major triad up a major third, it 
takes total of twelve half-steps (four half-steps per chord tone). However, the L- and P-
transformations will generate the same E-major triad but with only two half-step motions. In 
the end, efficiency is calculated by the distance on the musical staff. Without the underlying 
space and energy, the concept of parsimonious voice-leading is not possible. 
In fact, the terms “inversion” and “voice-leading” would not make sense if Western 
musical notation were not spatially oriented. It is only because spatial musical notation is 
considered as the a priori mode of representing musical sound that any terms with spatial 
connotation can be considered meaningful. The combination of these two concepts is at the 
foundation of the conventional Tonnetz operation. Therefore, any operation on the Tonnetz is, 
in fact, performed on the musical staff and the result is re-represented onto the Tonnetz. The 
conventional Tonnetz is not the surface in which Neo-Riemannian operations take place. The 
Tonnetz is merely a representational surface within which these operations are visualized. And 
these operations are devised to target specific types of harmonic relation. In other words, the 
theory began with the intention to relate chords that are relatable with P, L, and R 
operations—to generate some new mechanism that encompasses the chromatic mediant 
relationship. This is why the Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz operations do not include a reflection 
over the antidiagonal axis (i.e., the line generated by the equation “y= −𝑥”). If the 
conventional Tonnetz is a truly a geometric surface, this exclusion would seem highly irregular 
(see Figure IV-6).  
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Figure IV-6. Exclusion of reflection over antidiagonal axis 
Furthermore, although P, L, and R are considered as operations within the same category, 
the Tonnetz representation of the P operation takes one step less than the other two.80 For 
example, the L operation on a C-minor triad is represented as the reflection of the isosceles 
right triangle over the horizontal axis. However, a reflection alone would generate the 
trichord {0, 3, 11} as it is reflected around the 0–3 line. It must be followed by another 
reflection over the vertical axis to arrive at the desired Ab-major triad.81 (Figure IV-7) The 
reason why there is discrepancy between how the P, L, and R are conceptualized as equal 
and how they are represented on a Tonnetz as unequal is because it did not concern the 
theorists who devised the system. The P, L, and R operations are not meant to be performed 
on the Tonnetz but on the musical notation.   
                                                 
80 Robert Morris also points out that a single flip-operation is not enough to map the operations L 
and R (1998, 187). He calls the motion in the Tonnetz “flip-with-twists” (1998, 187). Strunk was aware 
of the twist as he explicitly mentions Morris’s description (2003, 50n23). 
 
81 In earlier Neo-Riemannian literature, there were two configurations of a Tonnetz. One treats a triad 
as an isosceles right triangle (1998, 172), and the other represents a triad as a (quasi-) equilateral 
triangle with major and minor thirds having an equal length without a right angle. When we just use 
the Tonnetz as a surface in which to represent an operation that is done on a staff, this difference does 
not affect the outcome of the analysis. 
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Figure IV-7. L-operation on C minor triad as two-step process 
 
4.3.2. Strunk’s Reconceptualization of the Tonnetz  
From the foregoing investigation, it is most important to remember that the set-class 
must be preserved to maintain the integrity of the motion. In order for a chord to be 
considered as moved, the chord itself must remain unaltered. In this respect, the Strunkian 
Tonnetz operations are groundbreaking because they alter the set-classes of a certain chord 
group before and after the operation. For example, he establishes the relationship between a 
minor-minor-seventh chord (set-class 4–26) and a major-major-seventh chords (set-class 4–
20) via P, L, and R operations in his 2003 article (Strunk 2003). (Figure IV-8) This is possible 
because he introduced the Tonnetz operations as geometrical in nature. Instead of referring 
back to the contextual-inversion origin and the retention and motion of chord tones, he 
defines the operations according to interval class when he first introduces the Neo-
Riemannian operations. As a result, the two set-class-preserving operations (contextual 
inversion and parsimonious voice-leading) were not taken into consideration of the P, L, and 
R operations. He writes, “The parallel operation holds interval class 5 invariant between the 
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two chords, the relative holds interval class 4, and the leading-tone exchange (or 
Leittonwechsel) holds interval class 3” (Strunk 2003, 47).  
 
Figure IV-8. P, R, and L operations for seventh chords; A = major seventh, B = minor 
seventh (Strunk 2003, 47). 
Nowhere in his introduction of the Neo-Riemannian operations has he referred to the 
original contextual inversion on a staff or parsimonious voice-leading. This introduction 
shifts the emphasis from the points to the lines. What was previously invisible (i.e., the 
intervals in a musical notation) is made visible as the emphasis shifts from the points to lines 
of a Tonnetz. This shift leads to the later, more geometrically oriented, use of the Tonnetz.  
When applied to a triad, this re-grounding does not seem to result in an outcome 
that is different from the conventional way.  However, when extended to incorporate 
different pitch-class sets, the discrepancy between the conventional and Strunkian becomes 
evident. To highlight the methodological difference, I will apply the two different versions of 
the P-operations to a G major seventh chord. (Figure IV-9) The conventional P-operation 
will generate an Eb major seventh chord because the P-operation in this context holds the   
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Figure IV-9. Contextual inversion of G major seventh chord 
notes G and D on a staff as a constant and inverts the intervals around it.82 The Strunkian P-
operation, however, generates a G minor seventh chord because the Strunkian P-operation 
reflects the chord over the G-D line of the Tonnetz. In this case, G and D are mapped onto 
themselves (not flipped to each other) while B moves to Bb and F# moves to F. As a result, 
the set-class is changed from 4–20 (0158) to 4–26 (0358). At the heart of this set-class 
alteration, lies the transformation of interval-class 3 into interval-class 4, resulting from the 
geometric reflection. 
Strunk’s treatment of the Tonnetz as the operational surface (as opposed to treating it 
as the representational surface as in the case of the conventional method) enabled the 
transformation of one interval-class into another.83 As long as any two intervals are 
visualized as same length on a Tonnetz, we can relate them with various geometric operations. 
In case of the particular Tonnetz-orientation that Strunk used in his analysis, the interval-
                                                 
82 This method is identical to Gollin’s application (1998). 
 
83 The concept of the operational surface is similar to Robert Morris’s concept of “the compositional 
space” (1995). Morris defines the compositional space as “out-of-time structures from which the 
more specific and temporally oriented compositional design can be composed.” The main difference 
between my operational surface and Morris’s compositional space is that mine is a descriptive surface 
with the purpose of analysis while Morris’s is a prescriptive surface with the purpose of composition 
or improvisation. 
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classes 3 and 4 are relatable as well as the interval-classes 1 and 5 because each interval in the 
pair is visualized as occupying the same distance. Any reflection over the diagonal axes will 
transform interval-class 3 to 4 and vice versa; any reflection over the vertical or horizontal 
axes will transform interval-class 5 to 1 and vice versa. For example, we can hypothetically 
represent the C-major seventh chord and a pitch-class set {0, 1, 4, 5} as a reflection over the 
C-E line. (Figure IV-10) It is rare in the music theoretical literature to have an operation 
which treats these two pitch-class sets as relatable and, thus, equivalent at some level.84 
Particularly for this rarity, an operation on a Tonnetz without the reference to the notation 
may seem arbitrary.  
 
Figure IV-10. C major seventh chord into {0, 1, 4, 5} 
Underneath this feeling of arbitrariness lies music analysis’s reliance on notation. 
Throughout the history of Western music, notation has been the primary mode of 
representing musical sound. This made notation a symbol of the music itself. The Tonnetz 
                                                 
84 However, the pairing of interval-classes 1 and 5 (the two interval-classes that are involved in this 
operation) in post-tonal music has gained meaningful scholarly attention. See Brown (2013) and 
Heetderks (2011). On the other hand, Clifton Callender (2007) devises an operation that treats the 
two perfect fifths within a major seventh chord (e.g., C-G and E-B) as slide-able pair. Therefore, in 
his theoretical model, C major and C minor seventh chords are relatable if we slide the E-B pair 
down a half-step. A possible extension of this method would be to slide the pair even further to 
arrive at C-G and Db-Ab. 
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representation of a musical sound, in this context, must be mediated by the notational 
consistency because the operations on the Tonnetz are always tethered to the musical 
notation. In other words, the validity of contextual inversion, parsimonious voice-leading, 
and the P, L, and R operations all hinge upon the preservation of set-class because all of 
these operations are not direct manipulations of the musical sounds but manipulations of the 
musical notation. And the set-class stands as the way to verify that the pitch content is 
essentially unaltered before and after the operations. In the conventional flow of operations, 
no operation on a Tonnetz can bypass its music-notational operation. Strunk’s Tonnetz 
operations upset this flow. The transformation of a C major seventh chord into a pitch-class 
set {0, 1, 4, 5} does not make any notational sense because it violates the preservation of the 
set-class, while it is represented beautifully in the Strunkian Tonnetz. If we consider the 
conventional Tonnetz as a computer monitor (i.e., a representational surface) and the notation 
as the CPU (i.e., the operating mechanism), Strunk’s operations are painting on a monitor. 
This, however, is the strength of Strunk’s Tonnetz operations. Influenced by the jazz 
tradition’s privileging of sound over notation, Strunk could liberate the Tonnetz from its 
notational underpinnings. 
In Strunk’s use of the Tonnetz, the role of the set class as the identity-granting 
property is replaced by the function of the chords, that is, how the chord sounds in context. 
A chord is considered as essentially identical when the function remains unchanged. 
Sometimes the set-class may also remain unchanged, but it does not play as critical role as 
the chordal function. Strunk’s decision to consider the chordal function instead of the pitch-
class content is a clear and conscious departure from the conventional method, but more 
importantly an inevitable extension to suit jazz performance practice. He writes, “Riemann 
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dealt only with triads, and the extensions of transformations to the seventh chords explored 
in recent publications do not discuss the functional equivalences desirable for the analysis of 
jazz” (Strunk 2003, 48n19). In a jazz performance, the piano or guitar player treats major-
triad, major-seventh chords, and major-ninth chords interchangeably when they function as 
a tonic. Similarly, minor-triad, seventh, and ninth chords are used interchangeably when 
functioning as II chord in a major key. Strunk writes, “Because of this interchangeability of 
voicings [in the jazz performance practice], a correspondence between neo-Riemannian 
operations relating those triads, seventh chords, and ninth chords which function 
equivalently in jazz contexts is highly desirable” (Strunk 2003, 48). In other words, it is of 
less importance what exact notes were used for chords as long as the function of the chords 
is clearly articulated. Strunk’s emphasis on the functional equivalence of a chord, therefore, 
led him to redefine the Tonnetz operations as purely geometrical because the set-class can no 
longer provide the consistency of his theoretical model. And this is why he refers to a college 
geometry text. Since he can no longer rely on the geometry of the notation, he co-opted the 
mathematical geometry to ground the internal consistency of his theory that takes functional 
equivalence into account. In the meantime, as the operations are redefined as purely 
geometric, the objects are also redefined as purely geometric in nature.  
This recontextualization, in turn, shows the status of notationality in a jazz analysis. 
Because the notation itself is seen as an interpretation of the musical work in a jazz context, 
the conceptual closeness between the notation and the music would be similar to the 
conceptual closeness between the Tonnetz representation and the music. The music is simply 
transcribed onto the Tonnetz instead of the notation; and doing so does not evoke the sense 
of arbitrariness previously mentioned. We can observe the loose sense of notationality in 
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Strunk’s article. Early in this article, he writes that “When attempting to analyze jazz, one 
music first locate the thing that is to be analyzed” (Strunk 2003, 40). He, then, goes on to 
consult four sources: the Library of Congress copyright deposit, The Real Book, Jamey 
Aebersold’s Wayne Shorter Jazz Classics, and the first recording of the composition, Juju (1964, 
Blue Note B248514, CDP 7243 8 37644 2 6).85 If any music notational representation of the 
composition were to be thought of as authoritative, the Library of Congress version would 
suffice to begin his analysis. His considering of the other three (two of which include the 
recorded performance86) could be thought of as considering the performance of the 
composition. For Strunk (and many other jazz music theorists), one notational 
representation is not enough to capture the essence of the composition. By considering the 
sources that the jazz musicians would consider when preparing for the performance, Strunk 
attempts to more closely establish the “thing that is to be analyzed” (2003, 40). Even with 
this effort, he admits that his transcription is “perhaps arbitrary” (2003, 41). It is not because 
he was not thorough in constructing the lead-sheet (any jazz performer would consider his 
version as a fair representation of the tune), but because of the inherent arbitrariness of the 
notation in the context of jazz tradition. The same intellectual impulse which questioned the 
suitability of Schenkerian analysis for jazz music is now giving more flexibility to the Neo-
                                                 
85 He gives following bibliographical information for The Real Book and Aebersold’s version.  
The Real Book, 5th ed. Illegal fake book, No credits, 1988; Jamey Aebersold, Wayne Shorter Jazz Classics, 
New Albany, IN 1985 (Strunk 2003, 40). 
 
86 Jamey Aebersold’s version accompanies a cd which provides the rhythm section performance 
without the lead instrument. 
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Riemannian analysis of jazz music; it is the impulse which grows out of the promiscuous 
relationship between music and the notation in the jazz context.  
 
4.4. WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS OF STRUNK’S METHOD 
Treating the Tonnetz as a standalone notation independent from the staff notation 
brings a new set of weaknesses and strengths. In this section, I will first show the inherent 
problems of Strunk’s method and then show the potential strengths of it. By highlighting 
both weaknesses and strengths of Strunk’s method, we can hone in what kind of musical 
behavior this new approach is most suitable for. 
One of the biggest challenges comes from the fact that it is impossible to construct a 
Tonnetz on a two-dimensional plane whose grid lines are segmented proportionally to the size 
of the interval. In order for the Tonnetz to be reasonably useful without being too 
complicated, the Tonnetz most commonly incorporates four lines: horizontal, vertical, 
diagonal and (often unarticulated) antidiagonal. Each of these lines are segmented and the 
different lengths of the line segments are treated as the size of the interval. However, it is 
geometrically impossible to construct a Tonnetz on a two-dimensional surface so that the 
proportional length of each line segment matches the size of the interval. As seen in Figure 
IV-11, if we call the two line segments that are created by the intersection of the grid lines as 
“X” and “Y,” we can manipulate the length of X and Y by adjusting the width of the lines. If 
we call the diagonal line connecting the two points created by the intersection (bottom-left 
and top-right) as “Z,” the length of Z can be adjusted by the angle in which X and Y 
intersect. Since the length of the antidiagonal line segment—which I will call “W”—is also 
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determined by the same angle and inversely proportional to the length of Z, we can only 
control the length of either the diagonal or the antidiagonal line segment.  
  
   
Figure IV-11. Manipulating the length of X, Y, and Z 
Now we need to determine the angle in which the length of Z is proportional to the implied 
intervals. In the case of any Tonnetz representation, the musical interval represented by Z 
equals the addition of the musical intervals represented by X and Y. This means that in order 
to represent this music-notational relationship without distortion, the lengths of X plus Y 
should be equal to that of Z. The only angle which satisfies this relationship is 180 degrees, 
which does not form any geometric shape other than a line. In order to form a polygon, the 
length of Z must be smaller than X+Y (Figure IV-12). In other words, it is impossible to 
construct a Tonnetz that is proportional to the size of the interval without approximation. 
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Figure IV-12. “Z must be smaller than X+Y.” 
This means, any geometric operations on a Tonnetz will eventually generate 
inconsistent results. Additionally, the fact that the Tonnetz is in mod-12 space further 
contributes to this inconsistency. For example, in Strunk’s Tonnetz, reflection of a C fully-
diminished seventh chord over the diagonal axis will result in a C augmented triad. (Figure 
IV-13)  
 
Figure IV-13. Transformation of C fully diminished seventh chord into C augmented triad 
Also, some line segments end up representing multiple intervals. For instance, if we call the 
diagonal line segment which is bounded by 0 and 2X+Y and the translation, reflection, and 
rotation of it as “V,” V represents the (unordered) interval-classes such as 1, 2, and 5. 
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(Figure IV-14) One could even consider the transformation of interval class 3 into 4 and 1 
into 5 as an inconsistency of the method although Strunk uses this property advantageously.  
 
Figure IV-14. Multiple interval classes representation of “V” 
Since the difference between conventional and Strunkian methods is in the application of the 
Tonnetz, and not how the Tonnetz is configured, this inconsistency is also present in 
conventional use. However, because the Tonnetz is used only as a representational surface, 
the inconsistency of representation is not articulated in the conventional method. In order 
for the Strunkian method to become a truly reliable analytic tool, there needs to be a well-
thought-out regulation that can mediate these inherent problems. Strunk seems to be aware 
of the necessity for such regulation because he mentioned that “passages making use of 
other types of seventh chords would require further theoretical underpinning” (2003, 48). 
Despite this inconsistency, Strunk uses the Tonnetz because of its strengths as a tool for 
visualization of the chord progressions that are not easily explainable through Schenkerian 
and post-tonal set-class analyses. The strength outweighs the weakness. Every analytic tool 
has weakness and strength in terms of its explanatory capability; and we do not need to 
abandon this tool for having a weakness.  
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The strength of Strunk’s method is that he treats the function and the preservation 
of shape as the deciding factors of his operation. To explore the new possibilities of his 
Tonnetz, we first need to clarify which precepts of the conventional methodology are altered 
by the Strunkian method. The foregoing discussion shows that the preservation of set-class 
is no longer observed in Strunk’s method as long as the two chords are functionally 
equivalent. Additionally, Strunk’s method also suggests that the chords that are represented 
on the Tonnetz are no longer limited to triads, but can be extended to seventh and ninth 
chords. Since he treats the chords as directly representable on the Tonnetz without the 
mediation of notation, the fact that certain chords are triads, seventh chords, and ninth 
chords no longer seems to matter. In other words, we can treat the Tonnetz as a standalone 
spatial representation of musical sound in which any pitch-class sets can be represented, not 
based on staff notation but in place of it, so to speak. Taking these two new rules, we can 
represent any pitch-class sets with similar functions on the Tonnetz.  
The word function can mean different things in musical context, but as Strunk used 
it, it implies how a certain sonic element sounds in context.87 Taking the word function as 
how the chord sounds, we can expand the potential of the Strunkian Tonnetz to draw new 
relationships between two chords. In particular, the Strunkian Tonnetz operation can 
                                                 
87 For example, he writes that the major triad, seventh, and ninth chords will express “tonic function” 
which describes the role of these chords play in context of a phrase, as part of a phrase model. He, 
later, writes that the minor triad, seventh, and ninth chords can function as “II in major.” In this 
case, the fact that it is not called the “pre-dominant function,” implies that these chords are 
conceptualized not as part of a phrase model, but as part of the scale-step (2003, 48). 
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represent some Z-related pairs as identical shapes in reflection.88 There are nineteen Z-
related pairs of tetrachords, pentachords, and hexachords. Among them, six Z-related pairs 
can be represented this way.89 For example, take 4-z15 (0146) and 4-z29 (0137), one of the 
Z-related pairs within this category. We can represent these two tetrachords as identical 
shapes in reflection over the vertical axis because, upon reflection, the interval-class 1 (the 
antidiagonal line segment) and the interval-class 5 (the diagonal line segment) switch places 
and this results in no net effect on the inner interval structure. (Figure IV-15) The other five 
Z-related pairs work similarly. When these types of Z-related pairs are used in music, we can 
easily visualize the progression on the Tonnetz clearly. (See Figure IV-16 and Figure IV-17) 
 There are five Z-related pairs whose two pitch-class sets are not represented as 
identical geometric shapes.90 The reason for this is that every set in this group is represented 
as a symmetrical shape on the Tonnetz, which, upon reflection, generates itself in translation. 
(see Figure IV-18) The remaining eight pairs (they are all hexachords) create a complex of 
four hexachords which are in Z-relationship as well as interval-similarity relationship (Figure 
IV-19). 91  
                                                 
88 A Z-related pair is a pair of two pitch-class sets whose set-classes are distinct but have identical 
inner interval structure. 
 
89 The six pairs in this category are: 4-z15/4-z29, 5-z17/5-z37, 5-z18/5-z38, 6-z6/6-z38, 6-z11/6-
z40, and 6-z19/6-z44. 
 
90 The five pairs in this category are: 5-z12/5-z36, 6-z12/6-z41, 6-z17/6-z43, 6-z23/6-z45, and 6-
z28/6-z49. 
 
91 The eight pairs in this category are: 6-z3/6-z25:6-z36/6-z47, 6-z4/6-z26:6-z37/6-z48, 6-z10/6-
z46:6-z39/6-z24, and 6-z13/6-z50:6-z29/6-z42. I wrote these in a way that the pair in each side of 
the colon shares the same geometric shape on the Tonnetz while the pairs which are written with same 
typeface are in Z-relation. For example, in the first entry, 6-z3 and 6-z25 are represented as an 
identical shape on the Tonnetz; 6-z3 and 6-z36 are in Z-relation. 
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Figure IV-15. Tonnetz representation of 4-z15 and 4-z29 
 
Figure IV-16. Alban Berg, 4 Gesänge, Op. 2, No. 4 “Warm die Lüfte,” mm. 19–22. 
 
Figure IV-17. Strunkian Tonnetz  Representation of the Above Passage 
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Figure IV-18. Symmetrically represented pitch-class sets 
 
Figure IV-19. Z- and interval-similarity relationship between four hexachords 
 In Figure IV-19, the two hexachords 6-z3 and 6-z25 are represented as identical geometric 
shape in reflection. The interval-class 5 in 6-  work in such a way that the one geometric 
shape represents two non-Z-related pitch-z3 is transformed into interval-class 1, thereby 
generating 6-z25, a hexachord which is not in Z-relationship with 6z-3. In the meantime, 
their Z-related partners also share an identical geometric shape. The main reason why we can 
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form a complex of two Z-pairs is because the two hexachords involved are complements of 
each other.92   
In general, the reflection over the horizontal or vertical axes exchanges the 
cardinality (i.e., how many times the given interval is contained inside the pitch-class set) of 
interval-classes 1 and 5. The reflection over the diagonal or antidiagonal axes would 
exchange the cardinality of interval classes 3 and 4. However, this operation is more prone to 
inconsistency for two reasons. First, the ordered pitch-class interval 9 will map into the 
ordered pitch-class interval 12 and vice versa, which ultimately eliminates the interval from 
the pitch-class set (as shown in the transformation of a fully-diminished seventh chord into 
an augmented triad in Figure IV-13). This means that when a pitch-class set is represented 
on the Tonnetz, the represented shape should not contain two nodes that are three steps apart 
horizontally or vertically. Second, the behavior of the line segment V (e.g., the line between 
C and Bb) is more stable with the vertical/horizontal reflections than diagonal/antidiagonal 
reflection. As mentioned earlier, V can represent the interval-classes 1, 2, and 5 (Figure 
IV-14). Upon reflections over vertical and horizontal axes, interval-class 1 can become 5 and 
vice versa, and interval-class 2 maps onto itself. (Figure IV-20) As a result, reflections of V 
over the vertical and horizontal axes generate a net effect that is identical to the reflection of 
the other line segments W, X, Y, and Z: the exchange of cardinality of interval-class 1 and 5. 
On the other hand, the reflection of V over the diagonal and antidiagonal axes will transform 
the interval-classes 1 into 2 or 5, 2 into 1 or 5, and 5 into 1 or 2. (Figure IV-21)   
                                                 
92 Blau’s hexachord theorem proves that any two hexachords that are complements of each other 
must share the same interval vector (Blau 1999). 
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Figure IV-20. “Stable” transformations of V over vertical and horizontal axes 
 
Figure IV-21. “Unstable” transformations of V over diagonal and antidiagonal axes 
The resultant transformations therefore interfere with each other because interval-class 2 can 
be transformed into either interval-class 1 or 5. Therefore, the result of reflection over the 
diagonal and antidiagonal axes is not always consistent.  
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4.5. CONCLUSION 
What is clear from Strunk’s method is that the status of notation cannot be taken for 
granted. As jazz performance practice considers harmony as a concept that is separate from 
actual notes that are involved, the one-to-one relationship between notation and sound in 
conventional music analysis is no longer assumed in jazz analysis. This does not mean that 
there is some other non-notational visualization that satisfies the one-to-one relationship. 
Instead, any stable visualization which creates a direct relationship between sound and the 
representation would go against the underlying principle of the jazz voicing, that is, a chord 
can be—and ultimately should be—articulated with different notes in order to 
spontaneously respond to the musical sound of the collaborating musicians or the mood of 
the performance space. If you hear a live jazz performance being performed the same way 
over and over again, you would hear it as somehow less sincere and genuine.  
Reflecting on Strunk’s treatment of the Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz, in turn, shows how 
deeply ingrained the concept of notation is in conventional music analysis. As the analytical 
tools that are developed within the conventional canon necessitate written notation, the 
application of these tools in a jazz context is always at the risk of being an analysis of the 
transcription rather than the analysis of the music. This raises a critical question to all music 
analysts regardless of their background and interest: how much of our analysis can we call an 
analysis of the music, and how much can we call an analysis of the notation? Strunk’s flexible 
adaptation of Neo-Riemannian theory and constant consideration for jazz performance 
practice suggest that analysis, performance, and notation are always in flux creating and re-
creating the musical experience as they influence each other. More broadly, Strunk’s own 
thoughts embedded in his analysis force us to rethink the way that particular forms of 
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notation afford certain analytical normativities. The conventional Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz 
operations, for example, visualize the chromatic mediant relationship; the Strunkian 
operations visualize the chord progression commonly used in post-bop jazz; my extension of 
Strunkian operations visualize intervallic relationship between two Z-related (and possibly 
other) sets; and, finally, notation visualizes sound. As Strunk shows in his adaptation of Neo-
Riemannian theory, we music theorists have a duty to critically inspect the foundations of 
our analytical methods, including those that are rooted in somewhat arbitrary graphisms we 
adopt to represent music. Strunk might answer the above question regarding analysis, 
notation, and music with another question: “Aren’t they all music?” 
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CHAPTER V 
CLOSING REMARKS 
The three chapters of this dissertation cover a vastly long history of Western music 
theory. This consequently left large gaps of history between each chapter. This, in turn, 
shows the historical depth of today’s music theoretical thinking. Every musical idea, no 
matter how benign it seems, is constructed through humans’ interaction with nature and 
society. And a musical idea, once constructed, goes through a transformation as the society 
goes through philosophical, technological, and social change. The fact that we consider 
certain musical sound to be angelic, demonic, soothing, complex, and so on does not mean 
that these qualities are within the musical sound but are within our heritage as a social and 
musical being.  
The three main chapters of this dissertation can be summarized as the study of the 
three essential concepts: spatiality, functionality, and notationality of musical sounds. Of 
course, there are other essential concepts that form the basis of our understanding of 
musical sound. For example, there was a definite conceptual shift during Renaissance period 
when so-called “Arabic numerals” began to spread among the European public—a change 
that was first instigated by the merchants of Italy. Because music was still largely considered 
as part of Quadrivium (the study of numbers), the change of conceptualization of number 
inspired by the new system also changed how musical notes and intervals are conceptualized. 
I believe that these changes could be clarified by investigating the music theories following 
this period (such as Nicola Vicentino’s L'Antica Musica Ridotta alla Moderna Prattica, 1555 and 
Vincenzo Galilei’s Dialogo della Musica Antica et Musica Moderna, 1581). Likewise, as we 
continue our investigation into the historical dimensions of the essential musical concepts, 
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we will discover even more seemingly primordial assumptions that we bring when we listen 
to music. Moreover, the historical dimensions of these assumptions will show that any 
musical meaning that we construct, no matter how personal or empirical it may seem, has 
within itself the embedded historicity. Musical ideas, in this context, become an engraving 
surface for an ideology that reflects the society, philosophy, and technology of the time.  
In each chapter, I investigated how some of the most fundamental musical ideas 
were constructed and how these process of construction absorbed the ideologies of the 
historical periods in question. In the chapter on spatiality, I showed how the Western world 
developed its distinct conceptualization of musical sound as an entity in space that is capable 
of being located “high” or “low” and move “up” or “down.” I investigate the early stages of 
this formation: (1) institution of numerical basis of sound by Pythagorean-Platonic ontology, 
(2) Aristoxenian introspection of sound as an entity in its own right independent from words 
and number, (3) combination of these two philosophical strands with the introduction of the 
Greek monochord, (4) the physical experience of shifting the bridge of the monochord and 
its influence on the reconceptualization of musical motion as change of quantity into change 
of location—this is my central claim, and (5) the emergence of the underlying space as a by-
product of this reimagined musical motion. From these steps, I argue that the Western 
spatial organization of music is not the a priori mode of understanding music, but a 
historically constructed idea. This assumption of the spatiality of music is often too 
uncritically accepted by the academic community. Even some recent research publication 
that claims to be an empirical study of perception takes the spatiality of musical sound as 
universal for all human perception. The uncritical adaptation of spatiality of music will not 
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only lead to the false data, but it will also place what is the particularly Western mode of 
conceptualizing as the norm—a potentially devastating political claim about music.  
In the chapter on functionality, I showed how the Western world developed its 
distinct conceptualization of musical form and function. Here, I presented the historical 
construction of the notion that a musical element has a purpose (i.e., a function) as 
constituents of a musical work. To show that the adaptation of functionality in music has its 
basis on the mode of thinking newly emerged along the industrial production, I discussed 
that: (1) function is not inherent in the object, (2) recognition of function is only possible 
when the identity of the object is previously recognized, (3) the function and identity were 
originally merged as one unified concept, (4) the separation emerged as Roman numeral 
system was implemented as a primary systems for chordal identification, (5) between 
function and identity, the function became the primary avenue to the understanding of a 
musical work, (6) it is because musical work is metaphorically conceptualized as an industrial 
product—this is my central claim, and (7) all other abstract conceptualization of organic 
structure models after our understanding of an industrial product. From these steps, I argue 
that our extensive analysis of the function of musical objects only partially explains the 
musical work. Moreover, since the function of a chord is defined according to the horizontal 
motion of the chordal root, the root-motion takes the place for the essential event. All other 
musical behaviors are considered as subsidiary and elaborative. Our preoccupation on the 
functionality—which perpetuates itself as we live in the industrial society—often leads to a 
false characterization of musical work. In particular, some people’s prejudice towards the 
musical work that does not involve functional motion of the chordal root as a work with less 
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value or a “garbage” has its basis on the assumption that function is intrinsically tied to 
value-creation.  
In the chapter on notationality of musical sound, I showed how modern 
configurations of musical space assume staff notation as the a priori basis for musical sound. 
I did this by close-reading Strunk’s implementation of Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz. Strunk, as a 
theorist sensitive to jazz tradition, began his analysis of Wayne Shorter’s Yes and No by 
compiling various written and recorded sources. This is an analytical step unique in jazz 
analysis because of the nature of a work-concept of jazz music. A theorist must begin by 
transcribing the audible into the visible. By doing so, I argue that, Strunk’s (and possibly all 
other jazz music theorists’) relationship with music staff notation is rendered arbitrary as any 
other method of representation. This enabled him to reimagine the Neo-Riemannian Tonnetz 
as an operational surface. Contrast to the conventional use where the Neo-Riemannian 
operations are performed on a staff and represented on a Tonnetz, Strunk performs the 
operations directly on a Tonnetz thereby establishing a new connection between two pitch-
class sets. Strunk’s treatment of a Tonnetz and a staff notation raises a critical question on the 
field of music theory. Is music analysis possible without notation? 
In today’s system, musical sound is only analyzable when it is converted from sonic 
to visual entity. To take Riemann’s position, to analyze music is perhaps to visualize sound. 
Hyer summarizes Riemann’s position that “the decisive factor in the cognition of music—
the moment music comes alive—is visual rather than aural” (Hyer 1995, 104). By 
investigating Strunk’s distinct departure from the conventional use of the Neo-Riemannian 
operations, I problematized the methodology of conventional Neo-Riemannian graphisms. 
No matter how elaborate the geometric configurations may seem, their theoretical 
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foundation is grounded on the system of staff notation. Treating such configurations as if 
they are founded on the empirical reality of musical sound will, therefore, ultimately lead to a 
labyrinth of arbitrary signification without a pathway leading back to the experience of 
music. The so-called “geometry of music” (Tymoczko 2011), therefore, may not be music 
theory per se but the theory of staff notation. 
In future research, I hope to investigate how music was conceptualized in East Asia 
prior to the introduction of Western music. This project is particularly interesting because 
the musical time progresses from top to bottom in the traditional musical notation of China 
and Korea. This, I hypothesize, is due to the use of bamboo as a writing surface in ancient 
China. Similar to how the writing practice of the ancient Greeks shaped the way music was 
originally notated, the vertical orientation of bamboo not only determined how music was 
notated in East Asia, but also how music is conceptualized. I believe that this conceptual 
origin of music, which is based on bamboo’s one-dimensional surface, eventually resulted in 
largely monophonic textures of the court music of China and Korea. As one section of 
bamboo only allows for the writing of one Chinese character, the juxtaposition of two or 
more musical notes would require an institution of a more complex apparatus of notation. 
This project will not only provide conceptual framework of East Asian music, but also 
establish a firm point of comparison for my investigation of Greek music theory. The fact 
that prior to the popularity of the monochord, the early Greek music theory relied heavily on 
wind instruments such as aulos and the fact that early Greek music notation used discrete 
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characters similar to the traditional East Asian music notation seem to suggest that 
comparing the two cultures will show deeper understanding of both.  
As a historian of music theory, I believe that music is a way into understanding the 
ideology of the society in which it is produced. In this project, I seek to uncover how society 
shapes the way we think about music. Growing interest on critical theory in music theory 
and musicology shows that the field of music theory is ripe for a project like this. By 
focusing on the historical formation of the elemental concepts of the Western musical 
thinking, I was able to investigate the social conditions that incubated the ways the Western 
world thinks about music. This investigation will prove that the practice of music, no matter 
how distant it seems from social conditions, is in a discursive relationship with society and 
the development of science and technology. 
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